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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation dynamics are ubiquitous in the public and in the private sector. For example, the 
European Union has expanded several times by adding new member states over its history. 
Prospective member states need to comply to a set of criteria called the Copenhagen criteria 
to be eligible (European Commission, 2012). Currently, candidates such as Montenegro 
and Serbia negotiate with the EU enlargement commissioner over terms and conditions 
for integration. Similarly, the British Government tries to negotiate its withdrawal from the 
European Union. 
 In 2012, the Dutch universities negotiated performance agreements with the ministry of 
Education and Culture. This agreement involved university level budgets based on university 
performance (VSNU, 2011). Similarly, the Dutch railways, negotiate annually with the ministry 
of Infrastructure and Water Management about the timeliness of trains, capacity, travel 
information and Wi-Fi connectivity in trains (Rijksoverheid, 2015a).
 In 2015, a large decentralization shifted the responsibility for youth care, elderly care and 
mental healthcare from the Dutch central government to municipalities (Rijksoverheid, 2015b). 
Typically, municipalities must now coordinate the procurement of healthcare, prizes, terms 
and conditions as well as the actual realization of these ‘new’ duties. This decentralization has 
led to an increase of negotiations with health insurers, care providers and health professionals. 
 These three examples show that negotiations are an important part of work in the public 
sector and that they are carried out by politicians and public servants at the supranational, 
national and local level. On top of this, many governmental tasks require coordination 
between actors on more than one level. For instance, one of the results of the Paris-climate 
agreement is that many governments pave the way for windfarms to generate electricity. A 
successful implementation of a windfarm requires municipalities, provinces, multiple national 
governments, energy companies and contractors to agree on a common goal and to work 
together. The examples above show that negotiations and the outcomes of negotiations 
have the potential to have great societal impact.
 Negotiations have primarily been studied in the private sector as a tool for arriving at 
binding and non-binding decisions. For example, scholars have investigated cooperation and 
competition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011), the role negotiations play in price agreements, 
information sharing for terms and delivery dates (eg. Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, & 
Bruining, 2007) and joint problem solving within and between organizations (eg. Aarikka-
Stenroos & Jaakkola, 2012; Graham, 1986).
 However, as the examples above illustrate, negotiations are also relevant in the public 
sector context. Public servants negotiate with other servants over practical implementation 
of policies and with civil society or citizens’ representatives to co-produce (Bovaird, 2007; 
Fountain, 2001). In the European Union, negotiations take place between local and national 
or supranational actors in policy implementation and in international relations (Tallberg, 
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2006). Moreover, cross-sectoral negotiations take place in public-private-partnerships (Klijn, 
Koppenjan, & Termeer, 1995). 
 Furthermore, New Public Management (NPM) brought private-sector management 
reforms in the public sector, leading to the increased use of performance agreements, 
concessions and contracts with quasi-autonomous agencies, between levels of government 
and state-owned companies (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994). These NPM reforms have increased 
the number, scope and relevance of negotiations in the public sector and between the public 
and private sector (Hood, 1995). 
 Despite the fact that that negotiations are a day-to-day activity for many public 
servants, and that negotiation outcomes often have practical and societal impacts, the 
academic literature has paid relatively little attention to negotiation behavior and negotiation 
outcomes of public servants. A systematic literature review in public administration and 
public management journals, found 104 papers are found that have negotiation* or bargain* 
in the title or keywords. Other inclusion criteria are that the articles are ISI-rated, are published 
between 1988 and 2018 (30-years), are published in a top-15 journal, are peer-reviewed and 
written in the English language (See appendix 1). The majority of these papers deal with policy 
negotiations in the realm of the European union, collective bargaining and so-called public 
service bargains (PSBs), which are not explicit negotiations but rather implicit and explicit 
agreements between politicians and servants over their duties and tasks (Hood & Lodge, 
2006). Most articles are of a qualitative nature and focus on institutional negotiating actors 
rather than individual negotiators. 
 From this body of research, only two articles specifically focus on bureaucrats as the 
unit of analysis (Burton, 1990; Johansson, 2012). The paper by Burton (1990) is theoretical 
and describes potential ethical factors that may play a role in cross-sectoral negotiations. 
The Johansson paper (2012) is an exploratory case-study of how frontline workers negotiate 
with bureaucrats and policymakers. Some studies that focus on other topics such as policy 
networks or public-private-partnerships mention negotiation as a self-evident part of a 
collaborative process in for instance network literatures (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Kickert, 
Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). This perspective predominantly projects organizations as monolithic 
actors, while individual employees engage in the actual negotiating (Rhodes, 2000). Because 
individuals negotiate, micro-level behavioral insights from the psychological and economical 
literature are relevant. 
 These literatures, however, often focus on the private sector, while public administration 
literature has shown that public and private sector organizations and employees are different 
in context, motives and attitudes (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000b). 
For example, private organizations focus on continuity and making a profit, while public 
organizations pursue collective, societal goals (Rainey, 2009). Employees in the public and 
private sector also differ on individual characteristics such as the motivation to contribute to 
a public good (Perry & Wise, 1990; Vandenabeele, 2008), altruism (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010), risk 
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propensity (Buurman, Delfgaauw, Dur, & Van den Bossche, 2012; Pfeifer, 2011) or reported risk 
preferences (Tepe & Prokop, 2018) and values (Van der Wal, De Graaf, & Lasthuizen, 2008). 
Summing up, negotiations are highly relevant in both the private and the public sector for 
arriving at binding and non-binding decisions. Typically, negotiation knowledge is based on 
the private sector. Negotiation literature does not distinguish between the public and private 
sector and its respective employees. Public administration literature acknowledges these 
sectoral differences but tends to focus on institutional actors instead of individual negotiators, 
thereby ignoring behavioral aspects of negotiation. This means that the extent to which 
public and private sector context and differences between individual negotiators from those 
sectors matter for negotiation processes and outcomes is not well understood up to date. 
 This dissertation focuses on the question whether specific characteristics of public sector 
employees, as well as specific characteristics of the public sector context, cause different 
negotiation processes and outcomes compared to characteristics of private sector employees 
and private sector context. It is my aim to understand if, and under which conditions sectoral 
and individual differences exert an influence on negotiation and negotiation outcomes. 
 In the next sections of this chapter, I define negotiations and discuss research on 
negotiations. Following this, the differences between the public and private sector contexts 
and public and private sector employees are discussed. The main research question and the 
sub questions that guide this dissertation are presented in the final sections of this chapter. 
This section is concluded with the methodological and practical contributions as well as an 
outline of this dissertation.
NEGOTIATION1
The negotiation literature can be divided in two main traditions of research. The first tradition 
builds on the social psychological literature. This research tradition focuses on perceptions, 
cognition, emotions and relations in negotiations as well as individual differences between 
negotiators, such as gender and personal abilities (cf. Fulmer & Barry, 2004; Lewicki, Saunders, 
& Barry, 2015; Rubin & Brown, 1975). While the majority of this tradition is descriptive, part of 
this literature is of a prescriptive nature and deals with questions like how to avoid conflict 
escalation and dealing with impasses in negotiations (Fisher & Ury, 1981; eg. Raiffa, Richardson, 
& Metcalfe, 2002, p. 8). 
 The economic tradition focuses on the individual negotiator or group of negotiators 
from a decision analysis or game theoretical perspective (Raiffa et al., 2002). In this tradition, 
negotiators are individual decision makers, concerned with maximizing utility (Raiffa et al., 
2002). This research tradition studies negotiation topics such as fairness in outcomes (Buelens 
1  Parts of this section are based on Bouwman (2018) with permission from the publisher.
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& Poucke, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2000a), symmetric and asymmetric information positions, 
solutions and core concepts as well as anchors and biases in decision-making (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 2008). Moreover, there is a large stream of research that focuses on 
contributing to and taking from public goods. This work has also made its way into the field 
of political science (see for example Ostrom, 2000). Experiments usually show that individuals 
voluntarily contribute more than theory would predict, they have a so called ‘warm glow’ 
(Andreoni, 1995; Khadjavi & Lange, 2015). From this perspective, negotiation is a form of joint 
decision making which can be modelled once utilities and payoff functions are known or 
assumed. In this dissertation, literature from both negotiation approaches are used.
 Negotiation is ‘the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching 
agreement with others when some of your interests are shared and some are opposed’ (Ury, 
1993, p. 4). The term ‘negotiator’ is used for a person who negotiates, while ‘a negotiation’ 
refers to the process of negotiation. In this dissertation, negotiators are considered to be 
public managers, civil servants and private sector managers or private sector employees. 
 Negotiations typically have an object such as money, time, public goods, a coalition, or 
a collection of solutions to a problem. Negotiations occur for three main reasons: 1) people 
want to agree on how to divide a limited resource such as time or money, 2) people want 
to create something that no individual could achieve alone and 3) people want to solve a 
dispute (Lewicki et al., 2015, p. 3). A number of characteristics are present in negotiations, 
albeit it in varying degrees. Negotiations occur between two or more people. There is conflict 
of needs and/or desires between the people involved. People have a free choice in whether 
to negotiate or not. In the process of negotiations, gradual concession-making is expected. 
Negotiators prefer negotiation over searching for alternatives or fighting (Lewicki et al., 2015; 
Raiffa et al., 2002).
 Central to negotiations is that the people involved are interdependent (Raiffa et al., 2002). 
They need others to reach their own goals, which distinguishes them from independent 
people. The extent to which people are dependent from others in negotiations, hinges on the 
number of alternatives they have. The appeal of potential agreement is evaluated in light of 
the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, ‘BATNA’ and in light of the Worst Alternative 
To a Negotiated Agreement ‘WATNA’ (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1999).
 The interdependency of negotiators is strongly influenced by the negotiation structure 
(Lewicki et al., 2015). A first negotiation structure is distributive negotiations. Distributive 
negotiations are the setting where the accomplishment of one negotiators’ goals, blocks the 
goals of other negotiators (Carmichael, 2005; Raiffa, 1982). Distributive negotiations most 
frequently deal with scarce assets such as time, money or territory. This negotiation structure 
is referred to as constant sum or zero-sum negotiation by some authors as the total sum of 
assets is not variable or not under the influence of the negotiators (Raiffa et al., 2002; Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007).
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 A second structure is integrative negotiations. Here, negotiators are able to achieve their 
individual goals, while other negotiators also achieve theirs (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Fisher 
et al., 1999; Raiffa et al., 2002). These are referred to as variable sum, as the total size of the 
assets is not fixed a priori (Raiffa et al., 2002). The size of the assets is negotiated over when 
negotiators share information about their goals, interests and intentions, thereby exploring 
shared interests. Formulating public policies, and joint problem solving are examples of 
integrative negotiations. 
 Negotiations produce a range of outcomes that can be tangible or intangible. Examples 
of tangible outcomes are agreements or contracts, coalitions and even impasses (Saorín-
lborra & Carmen, 2006). In the public sector, these outcomes can also be budgets, agreed 
policies, price points or concessions. Intangible outcomes are for instance the felt need to win 
or have the upper hand in negotiations (Malhotra, Ku, & Murnighan, 2008) or to keep a good 
reputation for constituents or opponents (Tinsley, O’Connor, & Sullivan, 2002).
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR CONTEXT
The public and private sector are traditionally thought to be different from one another (Rainey, 
2009; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000b, See for a discussion Allison, 1983). This distinction applies to 
contexts, organizations, and employees. In discerning the public from the private sector, there 
are two theoretical approaches, the core approach and the dimensional approach (Antonsen 
& Jørgensen, 1997; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). 
 From the perspective of the core approach, organizations are assumed to be either 
public or private, based on legal ownership. Public organizations are owned by the collective, 
such as citizens and taxpayers, while private organizations are owned by one owner or a 
group of shareholders. Also, public organizations are publicly funded through taxes, while 
private sector organizations have a limited set of funders, like private equity or shareholders. 
Besides legal ownership, other dimensions have been added. Private organizations pursue for 
example a limited set of goals such as continuity and making a profit. Public organizations 
target more diverse goals simultaneously that may be conflicting with the goals of another 
public organization or can even be conflicting internally (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000b). Public 
organizations aim to create public goods and services, while private sector organizations are 
able to exclude individuals from their goods and services. 
 Public organizations are also increasingly held to higher standards for transparency and 
accountability (Bovens, Schillemans, & ’t Hart, 2008; Power, 1994). Private sector organizations 
are accountable in terms of a ‘bottom line’, while accountability in the public sector is more 
demanding and refers to processes and policy in general (Mulgan, 2000b). Additionally, 
public servants weigh potential political consequences as their political superior will be 
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held accountable. Under unfavorable political circumstances, public servants remain out of 
‘shooting range’, while politicians take the blame of failed negotiations (Hood, 2010). 
 The core public-private distinction has been criticized by some for being overly simplistic 
and being of a solely descriptive nature (Bozeman, 2004; Rainey, 2009). Others have pointed 
out that any distinction between public and private is problematic as it mixes up empirical 
findings and normative statements about what public and private ought to be (Noordegraaf 
& Abma, 2003; van der Wal, 2008). Moreover, the boundaries between sectors are increasingly 
fuzzy as public sector organizations have adopted private sector characteristics and practices 
(Hood, 1991) and private organizations have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
practices (Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017).
 The second perspective is the dimensional approach, which considers the distinction 
between public and private sector as gradual and a matter of authority on two dimensions: 
political authority and economic authority. From this perspective, all organizations are public 
to a certain degree, depending on the mix of political and economic authority (Bozeman, 
2004; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). As a result, all organizations can be positioned 
along the two dimensions. Commercial companies, quasi-autonomous agencies (cf. Thiel & 
Yesilkagit, 2014), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s), State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) 
and (local) governments can all be positioned relative to one another. A downside to applying 
the dimensional approach is that a precise classification of organizations is complicated and 
relative to all others (Moulton, 2009).
 In this dissertation, I primarily use the archetypical ‘core’ approach in studying public- 
and private sector differences. Put differently, I focus on the variance between sectors, 
rather than for example the variance within sectors for studying negotiation outcomes and 
behavior. As negotiation differences between the sectors are mostly uncharted territory up 
to date, the core approach is more instrumental. For example, I use business administration 
and public administration students as participants in the experiments in Chapters 2, 4 and 
5. These students are enrolled in curricula that focus on working in either the private or the 
public sector organizations. Similarly, the practitioners in Chapter 6 are employed by a public 
or a private sector organization.
 The only exception is the study in Chapter 3, which is based on the dimensional 
approach. The main rationale for this choice is that this study focuses on differences in 
negotiator discretion in the public and private sector and the effects thereof on negotiation 
outcomes. In the core approach, discretion or even autonomy of public and private sector 
employees is not emphasized, while the perspective of the dimensional approach stresses 
that discretion of organizations and thus discretion of employees will vary on the dimensions 
of political and economic authority (Bozeman, 2004).
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Interestingly, both the core approach and the dimensional approach focus primarily on 
organizations as entities while negotiations are carried out by individuals. Not organizations, 
but individuals negotiate on behalf of their organization. Individual characteristics such 
as conflict style (Shell, 1974), negotiation self-efficacy (Gist, Stevens, & Bavetta, 1991) and 
gender (Leibbrandt & List, 2014)  are proven to be reliable predictors of negotiation behavior. 
Individual public servants and private sector employees are proven to be dissimilar in values, 
attitudes and preferences (Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011; Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010; Esteve, van 
Witteloostuijn, & Boyne, 2015; Perry, 1996; Rainey, 1982; Tepe, 2016; Van der Wal et al., 2008; Van 
Witteloostuijn, Esteve, & Boyne, 2017). 
 Public servants work on behalf of others such as politicians, citizens and society as a 
whole. In principle, they aim to act in the public interest (Van Witteloostuijn et al., 2017; Wise,
2000). If acting in the public interest is defined as saving taxpayers’ money, we would expect 
negotiating public servants to adopt negotiation strategies that will show this frugality for 
example by making smaller proposals. If the public interest is defined broader, as all activities 
that contribute to the public good, maintaining good relations between organizations 
and public service providers, job creation and economic stability, we would expect public 
negotiators to display more cooperative and accommodating negotiation strategies. 
 The differences in motives between public and private sector employees are well 
documented, and are better known as public service motivation (PSM). Public service 
motivation is a set of beliefs, values and attitudes that ‘go beyond self-interest and organizational 
interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and which induces through 
public interaction motivation for targeted action’ (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). Compared to 
private sector employees, public servants have a stronger interest in politics, are more willing 
to contribute to the public good and score higher on scales that measure self-sacrifice and 
compassion (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). Public sector employees are also more interested 
in rewards that appeal to them intrinsically (Bullock, Stritch, & Rainey, 2015; Houston, 2011). 
Moreover, public servants report to be more risk averse (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990), are more 
likely to whistle blow (Brewer & Selden, 1998), are more likely to collaborate in situations that 
demand competition (Esteve et al., 2015), and adhere stronger to organizational values such as 
lawfulness, accountability and incorruptibility (Van der Wal et al., 2008). These are all individual 
characteristics that will impact negotiation process and outcomes. For example, the tendency 
to contribute to a public good based on intrinsic motivation will influence the process of giving 
and taking that is central to negotiations. Similarly, taking risk by exposing your intentions in 
negotiations could be used as strategy (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002). 
 It is not clear if and how public-sector characteristics cause variations in negotiation 
processes and outcomes. Also unclear is if and how public servants and private sector 
negotiators behave differently in otherwise similar negotiation settings caused by their 
differences in motives, values and traits.
INTRODUCTION
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MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB QUESTIONS
In this dissertation, I test hypotheses on these topics by carrying out a series of experiments, 
in the laboratory, and in classroom settings. By doing so, I address the main research question 
of this dissertation:
What are the differences between public and private sector negotiations in terms 
of sector context, negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes?
The main research question in this dissertation is divided in five separate research questions. 
These questions are structured from the individual micro-level of behavior, to the meso-level 
of strategic negotiation settings, to the macro-level of the public and private sector contexts 
(see table 1). 
Table 1: Overview and research questions in this dissertation.
Chapter Research question Publication status
1 Introduction
What are the differences between public and private 
sector negotiations in terms of sector context, 
negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes?
Dissertation chapter
2
Do people with high public service motivation 
behave more cooperatively than people with low 
public service motivation in repeated negotiations?
Published in Public 
Performance and 
Management Review
3
Do variations in negotiator discretion lead to 
different outcomes for public versus private sector 
employees?
Submitted Journal of 
Management
4
Does public accountability lead to different 
coalitions and lower negotiator performance in 
coalition negotiations?
Published in Public 
Administration Review
5
Are responses to accountability different for public 
versus private sector negotiators?
Revise & resubmit 
International Public 
Management Journal
6
Can the findings from student-based negotiation 
experiments be replicated with practitioners?
Submitted to Journal 
of Policy Analysis and 
Management
7 Conclusion
What are the differences between public and private 
sector negotiations in terms of sector context, 
negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes?
Dissertation chapter
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 Note that this dissertation consists of a series of papers that are published or are to 
be published in international peer-reviewed journals. Consequently, the chapters can be 
read independently, and some theoretical arguments are repeated throughout. All empirical 
chapters have been presented at national or international conferences. 
In the second chapter, I start with studying the individual level differences between individual 
negotiators oriented towards the private sector, and those oriented towards the public sector.
 The research question in Chapter 2 asks: Do people with high public service motivation 
behave more cooperatively than people with low public service motivation in repeated 
negotiations? Compared to private sector employees, public sector employees are known to 
score high on the public service motivation (PSM) scale. PSM is a set of beliefs, values and 
attitudes that ‘go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of 
a larger political entity and which induces through public interaction motivation for targeted 
action’ (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). This scale measures the degree to which individuals 1) 
are willing to contribute to a public good, 2) have an interest in politics and policymaking, 3) 
are likely to self-sacrifice and 4) have high levels of compassion (Vandenabeele, 2008). Because 
public servants feel a strong need to contribute to a public good, and because they are likely 
to self-sacrifice, the consequences are not trivial. High PSM-individuals have for example 
been associated with higher odds of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is thought to be in the 
interest of the collective but can have severe negative consequences for those who whistle 
blow (Brewer & Selden, 1998).
 Recent findings support the idea that individuals with high PSM are more likely to behave 
more pro-social (Esteve, Urbig, van Witteloostuijn, & Boyne, 2016). Based on this, we expect 
that high-PSM individuals will also display cooperative behavior in a negotiation setting. We 
especially focus on repeated negotiations as many negotiations in practice are repeated 
through time. Moreover, many negotiation studies focus on one shot decisions. Additionally, 
many negotiations are carried out across sectoral boundaries. For instance, in Public Private 
Partnerships (PPS), negotiators from the public and private sector pursue their goals together 
by negotiating. Because negotiations across sectoral boundaries will consists of high and low-
PSM individuals, we test if the cooperation in repeated negotiations is conditional on the PSM 
level of the opponent.
 The research question in Chapter 3 asks: Do variations in negotiator discretion lead to 
different outcomes for public versus private sector employees? This chapter focuses on individual 
behavior and the effect of discretion. Negotiator discretion is thought to be influenced by 
differences between the public and private sector. 
 The discretion of negotiators will vary from setting to setting and depends on the 
negotiation setting, such as the number of the available options (Fisher et al., 1999). Discretion 
of employees as well as discretion of teams of employees is said to positively influence 
their performance and extra-role behaviors on the job (Gellatly & Irving, 2001; Leach, Wall, 
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Rogelberg, & Jackson, 2005). From the perspective of the dimensional approach, public 
organizations experience more political interference and have less financial discretion 
(Bozeman, 2004). Consequently, public managers are thought to have less discretion than 
managers in the private sector (Van Wart, 2003). Game theory on the other hand, predicts 
that the solution to a negotiation problem does not change with varying levels of discretion. 
These two opposing theoretical hypotheses are tested in a variable sum negotiation game 
in the laboratory. We test if variations in discretion indeed causes differences in negotiation 
outcomes, and secondly, if public and private sector negotiators respond differently to the 
changes in discretion as the public sector is thought to have more rules and regulations, 
resulting in lower levels of discretion for public sector employees. 
 The research question in Chapter 4 asks: Does public accountability lead to different 
coalitions and lower negotiator performance in coalition negotiations? Public organizations are 
held publicly accountable for their procedures and performance. In this chapter, accountability 
is seen as an element of the public sector context. Accountability is claimed to have an impact 
on thoughts, feelings and actions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). For example, accountability is said 
to reduce corruption in the public sector (Bovens et al., 2008). Moreover, it is thought to have 
a positive impact on organizational performance and increases citizen trust in organizations 
(Ibid). It is unclear whether the performative effect also applies to negotiations, especially 
when the negotiation outcomes are a coalition. This is a non-trivial issue as many negotiation 
settings in both the public and private settings result in coalitions. Examples of these coalitions 
are subgroups of individuals or organizations that work together in networks that aim to solve 
problems or engage in policy-making (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). In this study we test if public 
accountability leads to lower performance and if accountability also affects the inclusion of 
parties into a coalition.
 The research question in Chapter 5 asks: Are responses to accountability different for public 
versus private sector negotiators? This study extends the work from Chapter 4, by carrying out 
a cross-sample comparison of public and private sector negotiators. Compared to private 
sector employees, public servants rate public accountability as the most important value, 
while private sector employees appreciate profitability more (Van der Wal et al., 2008, p. 
474). Because public servants find public accountability a more important value, the effect 
of accountability on negotiation outcomes will be different for negotiators who are oriented 
towards the public or private sector. In other words, the effect of accountability on negotiation 
outcomes is expected to be stronger for public sector negotiators in comparison to private 
sector negotiators.
 The fifth study, in Chapter 6, replicates the negotiation experiments from Chapter 2 and 4 with 
a lab-in-the-field setup. The main question that guides this chapter is: Can the findings from student-
based negotiation experiments be replicated with practitioners? This replication has two aims. Firstly, it 
answers the question whether practitioners behave similarly in negotiation settings compared to 
students. It is often argued that practitioners have more experience, are socialized in the workplace 
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and have more diverse background characteristics compared to students. Consequently, 
experimental results based on student subjects are not representative for practitioners.
 Secondly, comparing the behavior of students with professionals in a laboratory 
contributes to a long-standing methodological discussion on the validity of using students 
as lab participants. The experiments in Chapter 2 to 5 make use of students as experimental 
participants. Students are not always considered to be representative for a target population 
such as negotiators from the public and private sector (Falk & Heckman, 2009). However, 
students do provide a homogenous statistical sample, are for example relatively young, and 
highly educated. Practitioners are often socialized in the workplace and more diverse in terms 
of age and education. In negotiation studies, age has been shown to correlate with negotiator 
efficacy and with the reduced tendency to behave unethical in some studies (eg. Robinson, 
Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000). In order to validate if, and to what extent age, education and 
experience biases the results in the empirical studies based on students, we make use of a lab-
in-the-field setup and a sample of practitioners from the private sector and from the public 
sector to (re)test the hypotheses.
 Chapter 7 is the final chapter and provides an answer to the main research question of 
this dissertation. Again, this chapter focuses on the individual negotiator level, the negotiation 
setting and the differences in negotiation contexts. I will also discuss the theoretical and 
methodological contributions of the five studies. Additionally, I will reflect on the limitations 
of the studies and provide suggestions for future research. This chapter concludes with some 
implications for practice.
METHODOLOGICAL RELEVANCE2
This dissertation consists of a series of experiments, ranging from laboratory experiments, 
laboratory-in-the-field experiments, to face-to-face classroom experiments. Experiments 
enable researchers to test theory. There are three main reasons why experiments are most 
suited to answer the research questions in this dissertation. 
 Firstly, experimental designs are particularly useful in identifying causal mechanisms by 
isolating causes and effects. The main reason why experiments are suited to answer questions of 
causality is that they are a solution to the issue of endogeneity from which much social science 
research suffers (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Morton & Williams, 
2010). For precisely this reason, leading scholars have repeatedly called for more experimentation 
in public administration (Bozeman & Scott, 1992; Margetts, 2011). Although experiments have 
been a mainstream method in many fields of science, until recently, public administration did not 
belong to those fields (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Li & Van Ryzin, 2017). 
2  This section is based on Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen, (2016), with permission from the publisher.
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 As I use a combination of laboratory experiments, lab-in-the-field experiments and face-
to-face experiments, I systematically balance the amount of experimental control, internal 
validity, external validity and realism. This approach has been called for as it creates a more 
robust body of evidence by minimizing potential common method bias (Margetts, 2011; 
Ostrom, 2007; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
Chapters 2, 3 and 6 are based on computerized laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments 
offer the advantage of more experimental control compared to other experimental types 
such as field experiments (Morton & Williams, 2010). Because the subjects cannot see their 
opponents in the laboratory, effects of gender (Leibbrandt & List, 2014), stereotypes (Bowles, 
Babcock, & McGinn, 2005) and liking (Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 
2008) on negotiation process and outcomes are absent. A potential drawback of laboratory 
experiments is the limited level of realism for the participants (Charness & Kuhn, 2011). This 
critique specifically targets the ecological validity of experiments. Especially, scholars in the 
field of public administration often mention this point and seem to prefer field or natural 
experimental designs with higher levels of realism over laboratory experiments (Margetts, 
2011, p. 192)
 In Chapters 4 and 5, I use a face-to-face negotiating experiment to study the effect of 
accountability on coalition negotiations. In this experiment, the participants negotiate in a 
classroom instead of a laboratory, which is more realistic in terms of negotiation dynamics 
and setting. They also negotiate a coalition, which is arguably more realistic than a more 
abstracted public goods game as used in Chapters 2 and 6. By taking this approach, I aim for 
high internal validity at the cost of external validity and generalizability.
 Secondly, I focus on the micro-level perspective of individual behavior in this dissertation. 
Experimental designs are suited to study individual behavior with great precision (Morton 
& Williams, 2010, p. 320). This is possible because experiments enable viewing the world in 
two states (Druckman, 2011). In one state of the world, there is an intervention administered, 
while in the other, it is absent. This way, it solves one of the fundamental problems of causal 
interference as one individual cannot possibly be observed with and without this intervention 
at the very same moment (Druckman, 2011). 
 Additionally, methodological considerations must be made based on research aim and 
question (Van de Walle, 2017). As I aim to answer causal questions in this dissertation, an 
experimental design is suited best. This choice is made in light of the available alternatives in 
the methodological ‘toolkit’. Focusing on micro-level behavior, and the desire to draw causal 
inferences, reduces the attractiveness of using alternative methods, such as quantitative 
surveys that excel in studying attitudes and motives (Groves, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, 
& Tourangeau, 2004), as well as more qualitative approaches, such as interviewing. Like 
experiments, (participatory) observations are also more suited to studying behavior but do 
for example not have the ability to answer causal questions. 
 23 
1
 Thirdly, using experiments fits the methodological tradition of negotiations research. 
In both social psychology and (micro) economics, the use of lab experiments, classroom 
experiments and field experiments are more common compared to the field of public 
administration. Moreover, by integrating theoretical insights from social psychology, 
economics and public administration, I contribute to the upcoming field of behavioral public 
administration. Behavioral public administration is “the analysis of public administration from 
the micro level perspective of individual behavior and attitudes by drawing on insights from 
psychology and related fields” (Grimmelikhuijsen, Jilke, Olsen, & Tummers, 2017, p. 45).
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE
As the examples in the introduction show, negotiations are ubiquitous in the public sector at 
the local, national and supranational levels of government. Understanding negotiations in the 
public sector is important as large amounts of public means are involved in negotiations over 
budgets and policies that impact on daily lives of citizens. There are four main reasons why 
studying negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes in the public and private sector are 
important.
 Firstly, public sector organizations are financed through taxes and aim to contribute to 
the public good. As a consequence, negotiations in the public sector often involve spending 
public means or the money of taxpayers. Additionally, public sector negotiations deal with 
agreeing on substantive topics such as infrastructure, social policy and housing or more 
mundane purchasing decisions. If individual characteristics impact on negotiation behavior 
and negotiation outcomes, value may be left on the table. Understanding the effects of 
sectoral context and individual characteristics on negotiation processes and outcomes is 
important to help preventing mistakes that are potentially very costly. 
 Secondly, in times of financial austerity, such as the most recent financial economic crisis 
(2007-2011), negotiations are a necessary tool that enable doing more with fewer resources. 
For example, the financial crisis caused severe risks for the health of vulnerable citizens in 
the EU (Vandoros, Hessel, Leone, & Avendano, 2013). Some countries, such as Austria, Latvia, 
Poland and Slovenia, (re)negotiated prices with pharmaceutical companies (Karanikolos 
et al., 2013). Understanding how public accountability impacts negotiation processes and 
outcomes helps in understanding for example when and how negotiations can be carried out 
effectively.
 Thirdly, public- and private sector negotiators engage in cross-sectoral negotiations 
in public-private-partnerships in many infrastructural projects and for example in networks 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Based on the literature, negotiations are carried out in policy 
networks on a regular basis by actors in networks. This literature stresses the need for good 
relationships to achieve results, while the question of how to negotiate and what to negotiate 
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is hardly touched upon. Network theory suggests that public managers need negotiation 
skills but how these skills can be put to use is somewhat unclear (see for example Bingham, 
Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005). A behavioral understanding of negotiations will open up this 
black box as negotiations are the central means of communication for reaching binding and 
nonbinding decisions in public-private-partnerships and in networks (Ibid). 
Fourth, many negotiations in the public sector deal with actors from both the public and the 
private sector. Any differences between negotiators will impact the negotiation outcomes, 
beyond the influence of negotiators, potentially leading to lowered service delivery or 
higher prices for end users. For example, many goods and services are acquired by means of 
public procurement. This process has reduced the negotiations as much as possible in order 
to create a level playing field for private companies under EU regulations 2004/17/EG and 
2004/18/EG. However, as many governmental contracts are fairly long-term and governments 
remain ultimately responsible for the outcomes, frequent coordination is needed. Making 
and updating agreements, while maintaining a good relationship across sectoral boundaries 
requires knowledge of differences between sectors and knowledge of how these difference 
impact negotiations in practice.
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ABSTRACT
Negotiating is a core activity in the public and private sector. Because of varying public 
service motivation (PSM) between public- and private-sector employees, we expect them to 
behave differently in negotiations. Moreover, one-shot negotiation settings are often studied 
even as many real-world negotiations are repeated exchanges. We apply a repeated linear 
public goods game in a laboratory experiment to test the link between PSM and the level of 
cooperation by using a sample of graduate and undergraduate students. 
 The results show that high-PSM participants, indeed, contributed more over the entire 
experiment, and therefore, acted more cooperatively in a repeated negotiation. Matching 
negotiators to opponents with high-PSM, low-PSM did not alter the level of cooperation in 
negotiation. Based on this, we conclude that cooperation in repeated negotiations is not 
conditional on the PSM of opponents. We conclude with implications for theory and practice.
This chapter has been published as: Bouwman, R., van Thiel, S., van Deemen, A. and Rouwette, 
E., Cooperation and Competition in Public Sector Negotiations, A laboratory experiment. 
Public Performance and Management Review, DOI: 10.1080/15309576.2018.1553720.
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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is a central activity of employees in both public and private sector organizations. In 
the public-sector, employees negotiate over scarce resources such as budgets, or coordinate 
policy problems. Negotiation outcomes are often influenced by individual behavior and 
negotiator motives such as value orientation and professional norms (Lewicki et al., 2015, p. 
452), fairness ideals (Reuben & Riedl, 2013) and gender (Van Vugt & Iredale, 2013).
 In the public sector, the rise of New Public Management (NPM) has led to an increase 
in negotiations by public sector employees such as negotiations between civil servants and 
politicians (Hood & Lodge, 2006). Other examples are performance agreements, concessions 
and contracts with quasi-autonomous organizations and stated owned companies (SOE’s), 
outsourcing and tendering. Corporate Social Responsibility practices in the private sector 
have placed an emphasis on contributing to the public good (Holme & Watts, 1999). Thus, 
both NPM and CSR have made the public and private sector more alike in terms of practices. 
 While the public and private sector are becoming increasingly alike, there is empirical 
evidence that public-sector and private-sector employees are dissimilar in motives (Baarspul 
& Wilderom, 2011; Esteve et al., 2015), risk propensity (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998; Wildavsky 
& Dake, 1990) and in trust (Tepe, 2016). One distinguishing characteristic between public 
and private sector employees is captured in Public Service Motivation (PSM) (Perry, 1996; 
Vandenabeele, 2007). PSM consists of four dimensions: interest in politics, contributing to 
the common good, self-sacrifice and compassion that could directly impact the process 
of negotiations carried out by public sector employees (Vandenabeele 2007). Although 
negotiation context matters, we presume that a compassionate negotiator will act more 
cooperatively under equal contexts, equal circumstances and equal payoffs. 
 If indeed public-sector employees act more cooperatively in a number of settings, public 
negotiators may get less ‘mileage’ out of public means as public sector employees ‘give more 
than they take’. In more complex or multidimensional negotiations, public sector negotiators 
could be more efficient negotiators by arriving at agreement faster with less friction by 
focusing on cooperation. Moreover, cooperation could lead to higher joint outcomes that are 
beneficial for society as a whole. Competitive negotiators on the other hand, are more likely 
to use bluffing or unethical tactics and they are more likely to lie (Robinson et al., 2000; Ross & 
Robertson, 2000). On top of that, Steinel and de Dreu (2004) found that cooperative negotiators 
faced with competitive negotiators overresponded by using even more deceptive tactics. 
In other words, when public managers represent public organizations their competitive or 
cooperative behavior may influence the probability of agreement to a large degree which in 
turn may have societal consequences. 
 In a recent study using three prisoner dilemma games, Esteve et al. (2015) found that 
individuals with high PSM scores acted cooperatively, even when they knew this was not in 
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN PUBLIC SECTOR NEGOTIATIONS, A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
30                                   
their personal interest in one of the games. Another study corroborated the results with a 
three person public goods game (Esteve et al., 2016). 
 Our study extends the work of Esteve et al. (2016) by focusing on cooperation in a 
repeated negotiation game. Repeated interactions in negotiation are important as this forces 
negotiators to act more honestly, more cooperative and negotiators are more concerned 
about their reputation (Raiffa et al., 2002, p. 90). Many negotiations, in the public- and private 
sector are repetitive. Repeated negotiations are for example found in service contracting 
(Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004), in public sector reform and cutback management (Bouckaert, Peters, 
& Verhoest, 2016), in international diplomacy, EU policy implementation or enlargement 
negotiations (Brücker, Schröder, & Weise, 2004) and in public private partnerships when 
private companies and municipalities negotiate practical implementation in infrastructural 
projects (Osborne, 2000).
 Negotiation studies in public management research are scarce, while characteristics of 
public sector employees are not considered in the negotiation literature. Moreover, repeated 
negotiations are common in practice but scholars have focused on single shot interactions. 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by focusing on negotiation behavior in a repeated 
negotiation game. We focus on the differences in à priori motives between public- and private 
sector employees. For this, we use a sample of graduate and undergraduate students. The 
main research question of this study is: Do people with high public service motivation behave 
more cooperatively than people with low public service motivation in repeated negotiations? 
 Our study contributes in two ways to the public management literature. First, we study 
behavior in a repeated negotiation which differs from single shot interactions that have been 
studied earlier in relation to cooperative behavior (Esteve et al., 2015). Repeated negotiations 
are more realistic in terms of expectations for negotiators. The expectation to meet again 
alters strategies of negotiators and for example trust in opponents (Lewicki et al., 2015). 
 Secondly, we contribute to the upcoming field of behavioral public administration by 
using theoretical insights from social psychology and experimental economics in the realm 
of public servants (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). Also, we carry out a laboratory experiment, 
reducing the risk of confounding effects while enabling us to study the causal effect of Public 
Service Motivation on negotiation behavior and outcomes. 
In the coming sections, we discuss negotiation literature, competitive and cooperative 
behavior and motives of public sector employees in order to arrive at the main hypotheses. 
Next, the experimental design of this study is revealed in the methods section before we 
discuss the results and discuss the findings. 
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NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiation is: ’the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching agreement 
with others when some of your interests are shared and some are opposed’ (Ury, 1993). 
All negotiation situations share a number of common characteristics (Lewicki et al., 2015). 
Negotiation consists of two or more actors. There is a conflict of (perceived) needs and desires 
between the two or more actors. Actors negotiate by choice. A give and take process is 
expected. Actors prefer to negotiate and search for alternatives (as opposed to struggle or to 
fight publicly). 
 The process of negotiation has tangible outcomes like prices and intangible outcomes 
like the need to win or avoid loss or the need to obtain or keep a good reputation. Negotiators 
are interdependent and the outcomes are influenced by the interdependence of parties’ goals 
(Raiffa et al., 2002). Generally, two types of negotiations are distinguished: constant/zero-sum 
games or distributive bargaining (where achieving one party’s goals blocks the other one’s 
goals) and variable/non-zero- sum games or integrative bargaining (where both parties 
achieve gains without blocking each other’s goals). Most negotiation settings are somewhere 
in between the two, which is called mixed scanning. Both claiming a part from a fixed pie and 
creating value by bringing issues on the table can coexist in the same negotiation setting, and 
in varying degrees (Lewicki et al., 2015).
 In public management literature, negotiation research has focused on power and 
conflicts (Perry & Levine, 1976), negotiation in networks (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012) and for 
example in European Union negotiations (Tallberg, 2008). Similarly, cooperation literatures 
in public management focus primarily on organizations while fewer studies consider the 
individual negotiator (Eg., Thomson and Perry 2006). 
Cooperation and competition in negotiations
Negotiators may choose to compete over a shared set of resources or to cooperate with 
their opponents in finding a solution (Lewicki et al., 2015). Cooperation may lead to greater 
mutual benefit than competition (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b). In reality, more options other 
than cooperation and defecting may be available to negotiators such as avoiding and 
compromising. These can arguably be seen as a degree of cooperation or competition 
(Rahim & Magner, 1995; Shell, 1974). For instance, in prisoner-dilemma games, players choose 
between cooperation and defecting (Esteve et al., 2015; Raiffa et al., 2002; Schelling, 1980). 
 In simple negotiation settings, individuals with high self-interest are thought to employ 
a competing style since this maximizes the individual pay-off at the cost of the pay-off of 
others. Cooperation is used when individuals consider the gains of others as well (Antonioni, 
1998). Since individuals often pursue not only rational self-interest, but also other goals like 
joint outcomes or a fair distribution of resources it seems that their attitude towards goals will 
affect the selection of negotiation style (De Dreu & Boles, 1998; Van Lange, 1999). 
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One-shot and repeated negotiations
In game theory, repeated and one-shot interactions are studied. In one-shot games, 
negotiators are concerned with short term payoffs as there are no potential repercussions 
(Carmichael, 2005). In repeated games, negotiators consider their own reputation, the shadow 
of the future and retaliation opportunities (Raiffa et al., 2002). For example Selten and Stoecker 
(1986) found that in a finite repeated game, players started with mutual cooperation, followed 
by an initial defection, and then mutual defection. More repetitions in general seem to induce 
more cooperative behavior and defection later in the game (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & 
Wilson, 1982) while reputation effects reduces cooperation (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 
2003, p. 450). In other words, players do not always play the dominant strategy for the period 
(cf. Aumann, Maschler, & Stearns, 1995). 
 In games in which players create a public good together, the contributions and 
cooperation of players usually start high and decline with time (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b). The 
introduction of strong punishments – negative consequences – will also lead players to 
cooperate (Ibid.). Public sector negotiations are frequently iterative and repetitive. Individuals 
who have negotiated in the past, expect to do so in the future. For instance public-private 
partnerships require many moments of coordination and negotiation (Edelenbos & Teisman, 
2008; Skelcher, 2005). Moreover, these types of negotiations are typically cross-sectoral and 
deal with issues at more than one level like practical implementation and finances. During 
these repeated negotiations, individual negotiators may choose to cooperate or to compete.
Public Service Motivation
One distinguishing element between public sector employees and private sector employees, 
is Public Service Motivation (PSM) (Perry, 1996). PSM is a set of beliefs, values and attitudes 
that ‘go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger 
political entity and which induces through public interaction motivation for targeted action’ 
(Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). Earlier work has connected PSM to increased odds of whistle 
blowing in the public service (Brewer & Selden, 1998), self-selection into the public service 
(Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010; Tepe, 2016) and to ethical leadership (Wright, Hassan, & Park, 2016).
 PSM consists of four dimensions: interest in politics, contributing to the common good, 
self-sacrifice and compassion (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). Compared to private sector 
employees, public sector employees are more attached to politics and policy, are interested 
in working for a public cause, and have higher levels of compassion and self-sacrifice (Brewer 
& Selden, 1998; Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007).  As public-sector employees have a higher 
PSM score than private sector employees, they are on average more interested in politics, 
more compassionate and more likely to display self-sacrificial behavior. Moreover, they are 
motivated to work for a public cause, essentially, creating a public good. These differences 
between public servants and private sector professionals are often attributed to self-sorting 
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into either the public or private sector, meaning that individuals with a set of social norms and 
motives are attracted to particular organizations that fit with their motives (Tepe, 2016). 
 We argue that these characteristics are important in negotiations as they will affect 
negotiation behavior. Similarly, these norms and motivations – PSM - will also make public 
and private sector employees behave dissimilar when forced to choose between cooperation 
and competition as these appeal to different à priori motives. For example compassion has 
been linked to the desire to engage in future negotiations and the willingness to achieve 
joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). The potential to achieve future gains are 
non-existent in a one-shot negotiation. In repeated interactions however, this may lead to 
more cooperation. Put differently, repeated negotiations may strengthen the effect of PSM 
on cooperation. Similarly, sacrificial behavior is central to the process of negotiations. When 
negotiators engage in the ‘dance of concessions’, they engage in making small sacrifices in 
order to reach an agreement. Low PSM individuals will feel less need to make sacrifices in 
order to achieve agreement in single-shot negotiations. At the individual level, this could 
be beneficial. In repeated interactions, not making sacrifices may lead to repercussions and 
punishments. 
  H1: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators behave more cooperatively than 
low-PSM negotiators regardless of their opponent.
If we insist that cooperation is the opposite of competition (Rahim, 2011; Raiffa et al., 2002; 
Shell, 1974), this implies that private sector employees will behave more competitively in 
negotiations. When two public sector employees negotiate, they will both behave more 
cooperatively. When two private sector employees are matched, they will behave less 
cooperatively. Negotiations between public sector employees and private sector employees 
will lead to behavior in between of cooperation and competition.  This leads to two additional 
hypotheses in which cooperation is conditional on the opponent. 
  H2: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators matched to high-PSM negotiators 
act more cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM negotiators.  
  H3: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM negotiators 
act less cooperatively than high-PSM negotiators matched to high-PSM negotiators, but 
more cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM negotiators. 
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METHOD AND DATA
In this section, we elaborate on the laboratory experiment we carried out. First, we describe 
the participants and the overall design and process of the experiment. Next, we get into the 
experimental conditions, the negotiation game and the stated preferences of our subjects.
In order to examine the relation between negotiator type (public sector employee or private 
sector employee) and contributions in a negotiation, our subjects were given a low stakes 
negotiation task (see section on negotiation game). We tested our hypotheses in a cubicle 
computer laboratory at a Dutch university in a between-subjects design using Z-tree (3.4.2) 
to administer the experiment (Fischbacher 2007). A total of eight sessions were administered, 
which took about 75 minutes each. All communication of the participants was done via their 
computer.
 A computerized laboratory experiment offers some very specific advantages over other 
experimental types (Anderson & Edwards, 2015; Charness & Kuhn, 2011; Morton & Williams, 
2010). A laboratory experiment enables researchers to study the interactions between 
individual negotiators. Moreover, a laboratory experiment offers control and reduces potential 
confounding effects that are not observed (Morton & Williams, 2010). Also, a laboratory 
experiment does not rely on narratives or self-reported measures (Tepe & Prokop, 2017). 
Finally, by sharing the experimental code, computerized experiments can easily be replicated 
using different samples, and/or different manipulations.
 We recruited graduate and undergraduate public administration and business 
administration students for participation as these students are known to differ in PSM (Perry, 
1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). These participants have registered for participation in experiments 
via the university subject-pool. The participants could enroll for the experiment via digital 
invitations (Greiner, 2015). Participants with more than two no-shows were not invited to 
participate. 
Negotiation game
The participants played a repeated symmetric linear public goods game in 100 rounds (ten 
times ten decisions). A public goods game enables us to study negotiation by tracing the offers 
and outcomes of individual negotiators. Moreover, it offers the negotiators an opportunity to 
choose between competition and cooperation (cf. Hauert, De Monte, Hofbauer, & Sigmund, 
2002; Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2003). 
 For each decision, the negotiators receive 10 units. From those units, the negotiators 
simultaneously decide how much they want to invest into a public good. Once the 
contributions to the public good are made, they are multiplied by 1.5. The total sum is equally 
divided over the negotiators. The individual payoff of the negotiators is the remainder not 
invested from the initial 10 units and their profit from the public good. After this step, the 
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process is repeated. Consequently, the individual payoffs are conditional on the contributions 
of both negotiators. 
 A competing negotiator would choose to set the contribution as low as possible. 
When both negotiators do this, a public good is not produced. Negotiators who cooperate 
will contribute the maximum number of initial units (10 in our game). This is because this 
will increase the odds of obtaining a higher group outcome. Thus, contributing more equals 
cooperation while contributing less comprises a more competitive strategy.3
 The participants were reimbursed for their participation based on individual 
performance. The exchange rate of experimental units to pay-out was €0.008. The participants 
received a show-up fee of €3,- and the mean payment was €14,80, which is slightly above 
minimum wages. The game was identical for all the participants, regardless of the conditions. 
The participants are aware that they play with the same opponent over the length of the 
experiment; the game is repeated and there is no re-matching. The subjects are not aware of 
the identity of their opponent as they are in computer-cubicles. 
 Moreover, the players are monolithic in the sense that they do not have to deal with 
constituencies. The negotiators have full information on the range of potential agreements 
and payoffs but are unaware of the actions of their opponent until the outcome is calculated 
after each contribution is made.
Process
Paper-based instructions were handed out and read out aloud by the researcher (see figure 
1). Then, the participants received an on-screen pre-test questionnaire containing generic 
questions (i.e. what is your year of birth and in what type of study program are you enrolled?).
 Based on the answers to the study question in the pre-test questionnaire, the participants 
were matched by the computer in such a manner that three experimental conditions could 
be observed: a high-PSM subject plays against a high-PSM subject, a low-PSM subjects plays 
against a low-PSM subject and finally, a high-PSM subject plays against a low-PSM subject (See 
table 1). As participants are either public administration or business administration students, 
the matching in our experiment is stratified. Within the strata, the matching to negotiation 
opponents is random.
 The three experimental conditions will allow us to observe the differences between 
individuals with high and low PSM (hypothesis 1) as well as the combinations between 
formed dyads by focusing on the group level (hypothesis 2). 
3  The participants (N) receive an endowment of y>0 units. The participants invest 0 ≤ x
i 
≤ y to the public good. The invested amount 
is multiplied by α
0 
and divided over the participants in the group. For individual participants, this yields a payoff function of: 
  Ui (x1,…,xN) = y - xi + α (x1,…,xN) where  α = N
α0  (cf. Capraro, 2013).
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Table 1: Allocation of participants during the negotiation game.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
High-PSM Low-PSM High-PSM
High-PSM Low-PSM Low-PSM
Following the experiment, the participants received a post-test questionnaire. Upon finishing 
the questionnaire, the participants were debriefed and reimbursed based on their in-game 
performance. The order of events during the experiment is presented in figure 1.
Instructions
Pre test
matching
questions
Randomization
Negotiation
Game
Questionnaire Debriefing
Figure 1: Order of events during the experiment.
A pilot session with N=12 participants was administered prior to the experiment. The pilot 
session has led to improvement of the positioning of items on screen and text size of the post-
test questionnaire. The statistical power (1 − β) of this particular study is .72 (3 groups, n=104, 
α=.05, df=17, f=.282). The tests of the three hypotheses were conducted using Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of 0.016 per test (0.05/3).
Post-experimental questionnaire
In the post-test questionnaire, we administered a number of relevant background and 
demographical characteristics of the subjects. To check the theoretical differences between 
individuals in the public administration- and the business administration programs, we 
measured public service motivation using the 18-question version of the questionnaire 
(Vandenabeele, 2008).
 As self-efficacy impacts negotiator performance, we measured negotiation beliefs by 
using the standardized 7 question scale (Elfenbein et al., 2008; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). The 
original English version was translated back-and-forth by two researchers independently. 
 In order to measure stated negotiation style, the Rahim Organizational Conflict Instrument 
II (ROCI-II) was used (Rahim & Magner, 1995). The ROCI-II measure contains 28 questions which 
generate percentile scores on five theoretically distinct modes of negotiations, including 
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competition and cooperation. The inclusion of this instrument enables us to see to what 
extent behavior in our negotiation matches to self-reported styles. 
 We measured Social Value Orientation by means of a decomposed game in which 
respondents choose to split a given amount over the ‘self’ and a fictive ‘other’ (Van Lange, 
1999). The Social Value Orientation reveals patterns of preferences of a priori outcomes for the 
’self’ and ‘others’ (Ibid.) Based on this, individuals can be categorized to be either pro-self or 
pro-social. We use social value orientation to check whether the height of the contributions 
are conditional and happen only when others contribute, or are unconditional (Frey & Meier, 
2004).
RESULTS
Our main expectation is that public- and business administration students differ in public 
service motivation, which in turn leads to degrees of cooperation conditional on matching. In 
our sample, public service motivation scores differ for public administration students (M=3.44, 
SD=0.33) compared to business administration students (M=3.25, SD=0.34) (t=-2.84, p=0.005). 
This entails that public administration students and business administration students differ in 
motives with regard to interest in politics, working for a public cause, compassion and self-
sacrifice. 
 The distribution of gender, age, negotiation beliefs and social value orientation did not 
differ significantly over the experimental conditions (see table 2). This confirms that we have 
three experimental conditions with high-PSM dyads, mixed-PSM dyads and low-PSM dyads 
while the other background variables are stable and homogenous over the experimental 
conditions. This means that any effect of the negotiation dyads must be attributed to the 
matching based on PSM. Finally, the participants in the ‘mixed’ condition seem to have a lower 
preference for cooperation based on the ROCI-II questionnaire (Rahim & Magner, 1995). In 
further analysis, we will add this self-reported variable as a control. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, by experimental condition.
High-PSM -  
High-PSM
Low-PSM -  
Low-PSM
High-PSM – 
Low-PSM
Total Test Statistic
N 30 (29%) 40 (38%) 34 (33%) 104 (100%)
Chi Square
X2 = 1.46
p = .481
Female 13 (43%) 20 (50%) 13 (38%) 46 (44%)
Chi Square
X2 = 1.04
p = .593
Age (SD) 20.73 (2.44) 21.18 (1.66) 21.52 (2.69) 21.16 (2.27)
ANOVA
F = 0.978
p = .338
PSM (SD)
Reliability = .72
3.54 (0.31) 3.30 (0.33) 3.19 (0.31) 3.33 (0.35)
ANOVA
F = 9.76
p = 0.00***
Negotiation Beliefs (SD)
Reliability = .76
2.80 (0.58) 2.69 (0.53) 2.58 (0.60) 2.69 (0.57)
ANOVA
F = 1.18
p = 0.309
ROCI-II Cooperation4
Reliability = .74
4.06 (0.33) 4.09 (0.36) 3.88 (0.40) 4.01 (0.37)
ANOVA
F = 3.40
p = 0.037*
ROCI-II Competition
Reliability = .82
3.2 (0.79) 3.1 (0.77) 3.3 (0.71) 3.91 (0.75)
ANOVA
F = 0.635
p = 0.532
Pro-Social 2 (15.4%) 6 (46.15) 5 (38.36%) 13 (100%)
Chi Square
X2 = 2
p = .367
Pro-Self 23 (28.75%) 31 (38.75%) 26 (32.5%) 80 (100%)
Chi Square
X2 = 1.22
p = .542
Neither Pro-Social or 
Pro-Self
5 (45,45%) 3 (27.27%) 3 (27.27%) 11 (100%)
Chi Square
X2 = .727
p = .695
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
The first hypothesis: ‘In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators behave more 
cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators regardless of their opponent’ is supported by the 
data. Indeed, over the experiment and across conditions, public administration students 
contributed more on average (M=7.17, SD=3.34) than business administration students 
(M=6.95, SD=3.51) (t=3.27, p=.001). This is also evident from figure 2 (right-hand side).
4  Note that the ROCI-II inventory includes compromising, obliging and avoiding styles also (Rahim & 
Magner, 1995). No significant differences between business administration- and public administration 
participants were found on these negotiation styles.
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Figure 2: Contributions by: experimental condition (left side) and by: study type (right side).
Our second hypothesis, ‘In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators matched to high-
PSM negotiators act more cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM 
negotiators’, is not supported by the data. We have tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, 
the contributions did not differ statistically significantly over the conditions for the entire 
experiment (pooled data) (See figure 2).
 Secondly, we calculated a hierarchical tobit-model in which the negotiation dyads 
were allowed to differ from each other (See table 3). In our experiment, many negotiators 
contributed the maximum possible amount which resulted in truncated data. A tobit-model 
is able to handle this truncated data (Tobin, 1958). Moreover, a hierarchical model corrects for 
dynamics between subjects that were matched together in dyads (cf. Honoré, 1992). From 
figure 3 we learn that the slopes differ across the conditions. Finally, a hierarchical model 
enables us to focus on negotiation decisions made instead of dyad level data or condition 
level data. The model was built in successive steps. For this, we used the xttobit package for 
random effects in Stata 12.1. The experimental conditions were recoded to dummies with the 
mixed (Low-PSM - High-PSM) category as reference category.
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Figure 3: Development of contributions over the experiment (left=raw contributions, right=smoothing applied).
In models I and II (table 3) the results for the second hypothesis are insignificant. Matching 
in our experiment does not have an effect on contributions and cooperation during the 
experiment. A time dummy (period) shows that contributions slowly increase over the 
experiment and a gender dummy shows that male negotiators contributed more than 
female negotiators on average. Gender also has a positive significant effect on the height 
of the contributions during the negotiation. Model III shows that participants enrolled in a 
public administration program contributed significantly more than participants enrolled in a 
business administration program, regardless of the experimental conditions (Table 3).
 In the fourth model, we found an association between the contributions during 
the experiment and the self-reported competitive negotiation style. A higher score on 
competition was significantly associated with lower contributions during the experiment. 
While there is a statistically significant correlation between cooperation and competition 
(r=-0.26, n=104, p=0.007), there is no statistical association between cooperation and the 
negotiation contributions in the experiment. Also, over the length of the experiment (figure 
3), the average contribution develops differently across the experimental conditions. The 
group with business administration students has a slightly negative slope, whereas the 
public administration group has a positive slope, while all starting between 6.5 and 7.5 for the 
contributions. The slope of the mixed group lies in between of these lines.
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Table 3: Hierarchical tobit estimates on contributions during the experiment. SE’s in parentheses. Negotiation dyads 
as random effects. 
Model 1
Conditions 
(Mixed as 
reference)
Model 2
 Period and 
gender
Model 3
Study type
Model 4
ROCI
Fixed Effects
Intercept 9.373*** 8.045*** 9.327*** 10.624***
(6.84) (5.90) (11.77) (9.54)
Study dummy (1=PA) 0.784***
(5.56)
High-PSM – High-PSM dummy -0.048 -0.005
(-0.02) (-0.00)
Low-PSM – Low-PSM dummy 0.857 0.909
(0.46) (0.49)
Period 0.180***
(12.56)
Male dummy 0.595***
(4.82)
ROCI Cooperation 0.049
(0.31)
ROCI Competition -0.355***
(-4.21)
Random effects
σ2 Negotiation dyads 5.589*** 5.549*** 5.622*** 5.630***
(9.55) (9.55) (9.54) (9.54)
σ2 Residuals 3.503*** 3.485*** 3.494*** 3.497***
(98.38) (98.43) (98.39) (98.38)
Wald X2 (df ) 0.30 (2) 181.34 (4) 30.95 (1) 19.46 (2)
Log Likelihood -16777.20 -16685.35 -16761.87 -16767.624
AIC 33564.406 33384.699 33531.743 33545.495
BIC 33600.654 33435.446 33560.741 33581.491
N 10400 10400 10400 10400
N-truncated (right) 4853 4853 4853 4853
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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The third hypothesis: ‘In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators matched to low-
PSM negotiators act less cooperatively than high-PSM negotiators matched to high-PSM 
negotiators, but more cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM 
negotiators’ is not confirmed by the data. There are differences between the conditions, but 
these are not statistically significant. This is evident if we inspect the contributions during the 
negotiation visually (figures 2 and 3). The level of cooperation can also be seen in model I and 
II which are corrected for time, gender and matching in dyads. Model I and II also disconfirm 
this hypothesis.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this section, we discuss some limitations before turning to the conclusions to be drawn 
from our study. The findings of our study have some limitations which we have tried to 
alleviate as much as possible. 
 First of all, we have used students as subjects in our experiment. Students provide a 
homogenous sample, which makes detecting an effect more straightforward (Calder, Phillips, 
& Tybout, 1982). The main question remains whether public sector employees and private 
sector employees would respond similarly to the treatments in our experiment. Moreover, 
public service motivation can be seen as a relatively stable predisposition (Perry & Hondeghem, 
2008), or as a learned social norm (Chen, Hsieh, & Chen, 2014; Tepe, 2016). Compared to 
students, practitioners may exhibit more or less motivation based on experience and workplace 
socialization. Studies that compare student samples and practitioners remain inconclusive on 
this particular question (Eg., Liyanarachchi and Milne 2005). While a substantial part of public 
administration experiments employs student samples (see Li & Van Ryzin, 2017), there is no 
agreement on this matter. Students have been found to behave more rational than a generic 
population (Belot, Duch, & Miller, 2015). This might imply that practitioners would act less 
cooperative in a similar negotiation setting. Note that no cooperation is a Nash equilibrium, 
while cooperation leads to a higher payoff at both individual and group level.  Moreover, 
practitioners are socialized in their respective sectors, which may induce more collaborative 
behavior in public managers as a consequence of learned roles and more competition in 
private sector managers. This limitation and its implications, call for more research, including 
experimental designs using practitioner samples. 
 Secondly, the participants in our experiment were financially incentivized. Compared 
to the situation in practice, individual negotiators, especially those in the public service are 
not incentivized as public budgets are prioritized and rewards for individual behavior are 
uncommon (Verhoest, Roness, Verschuere, Rubecksen, & MacCarthaigh, 2010). Similarly, it 
could be argued from the view of transaction-cost theory that in high stakes negotiations 
in practice, negotiators will weigh the consequences of cooperative or competitive behavior 
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more diligently (Jap, Robertson, Rindfleisch, & Hamilton, 2013). The latter is especially relevant 
as many professional negotiations are in fact principal-agent settings. We leave to future 
research how individual public service motivation influences behavior in these more complex 
and realistic settings.  
 Thirdly, a laboratory experiment provides an artificial situation in which our subjects 
are asked to negotiate. A laboratory experiment offers control to the researcher while it also 
reduces the risk of confounding effects. In our experiment, liking or body language presents 
a potential risk in studying negotiations that could distort our findings in a face-to-face 
experiment (Morton & Williams, 2010). Like in many experimental designs, experimenter 
demand effects could have an impact on our findings (Orne, 1962; see Zizzo, 2010). Similarly, it 
is possible that the lower than ideal power in this study has led to false negatives. Consequently, 
replication of this study is much needed, preferably with a sample of practitioners.
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature by bringing together literature 
on negotiation and individual characteristics of future public- and private sector employees. 
Negotiations at the individual level are seldom studied in public management literature. Our 
study brings together negotiation literature with public service motivation. We study behavior 
in a repeated negotiation which differs from single shot interactions that have been studied 
earlier in relation to cooperative behavior (Esteve et al., 2015). We address the generalizability 
of studies that focus on cooperation in decision-making by extending it to negotiations. 
 Secondly, we contribute to the field by using an experimental laboratory design that 
enables us to study behavior of individuals and dyads of negotiators. Although experimental 
research designs are common in negotiations research, experimental laboratory designs are 
upcoming but still relatively rare in public administration (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 
2016; Li & Van Ryzin, 2017). Experimental designs fit well when there is a focus on behavior, 
using micro-level theory with individual decision makers (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). 
 We found that overall, High-PSM individuals (public administration students) behave 
more cooperatively than Low-PSM individuals (business administration students). In general, 
individuals tend to cooperate in repeated public goods experiments (Fischbacher, Gächter, & 
Fehr, 2001). Although this game is a low-stakes negotiation setting, preferring a cooperative 
negotiation style is potentially beneficial at the group level, rather than at the individual level. 
Recent studies have found that individuals are sometimes conditional co-operators where 
cooperation heavily depends on the precedent of a collective (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010). In 
our study, the participants could only see how they performed in dyads and not how others 
performed. For the public sector this is especially relevant as one of the demands placed 
on public sector employees is that they behave cooperatively in many circumstances as this 
facilitates problem solving (McNamara, 2012; O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). Our study shows that 
high-PSM individuals also cooperate unconditionally. The latter could be a specific effect of 
the motivation to contribute to the public good of high-PSM individuals. As negotiations 
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generate public outcomes with real consequences in the public sector, this finding shows 
that reaching agreement by cooperation seems to be prioritized by high-PSM individuals.
Additionally, in repeated public goods games, the trend of contributions is often found to have 
a downward slope (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b). When players negotiate repeatedly, they tend to 
punish freeriding behavior, even if it is costly. In our experiment, the slope is slightly upwards 
for the high-PSM dyads, implying that they may have punished freeriding behavior to a lesser 
degree. This raises the question whether public managers are less likely to punish competitive 
behavior in practice, as private sector managers (high-PSM) do (cf. Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). 
Moreover, it implies that low-PSM individuals use more unethical tactics, regardless of their 
opponents (eg. Robinson et al., 2000).
 In our experiment, the motives of the matched opponents have no significant effect 
on the contributions in the negotiations. This finding contrast sharply with the social-
psychological literature on this matter. For instance Greenhalgh (1985) found that personality 
directly affects negotiator contributions and outcomes. Building on the similarity-attraction 
theory, more similar negotiators are found to experience less conflict and also reach 
agreement faster (Wilson, DeRue, Matta, Howe, & Conlon, 2016). Note that our participants 
could only communicate by offer and counteroffer, whereas in the experiment of Greenhalgh 
et al., (1985) and the experiments of Wilson et al. (2016), negotiators could also see each other.
 The differences between the public and private sector have blurred over the past years 
as the result of NPM developments in the public sector and CSR developments in the private 
sector (Bullock et al., 2015). This blurring of sectors also stresses the need for knowledge on 
this topic (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997). Whether the characteristics and motives of the 
practitioners in the once distinct sectors are also more alike is unclear. Based on our experiment, 
high-PSM and low-PSM individuals behaved differently and also reported dissimilar to the 
standardized ROCI-questionnaire. This finding partly mirrors the findings of Esteve et al. (2015) 
but in a repetitive negotiation setting. 
 These findings are of particular relevance for settings where public and private 
sector employees need to cooperate. For instance, in public-private partnerships. Because 
cooperation levels – and thus outcomes – differ for the negotiators from the different sectors, 
this may put public sector negotiators at a comparative disadvantage in win-lose negotiations. 
In more complex negotiations, the tendency to cooperate may lubricate negotiations on the 
other hand. How this works and to what extent this can be understood from the perspective 
of public service motivation is an important avenue for further research.
 Our findings have two important implications for public managers and policymakers. 
First, it suggests that public managers (high-PSM) will collaborate more unconditionally. 
This is beneficial in variable-sum negotiations, while it may be harmful in constant or zero-
sum negotiations. Secondly, for public managers it may prove difficult to reach agreement 
in repeated variable sum negotiations with low-PSM negotiators such as private sector 
negotiators or entrepreneurs.
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 Future research efforts could be aimed at replicating this study by using different samples 
such as practitioners and in different contexts. Moreover, a replication using a different 
multiplier in the public goods game or testing cooperation with payoffs in the domain of 
losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) seems a good addition. Similarly, it is unclear under what 
circumstances individuals behave competitively or cooperatively while they report to have 
no strong preference for a particular style of negotiations. Although we did find a relation 
between contributions and self-reported competition, more research is needed to find out 
under what circumstances self-reported measures align with measured behavior.

CHAPTER 3
COMPARING PUBLIC- AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
NEGOTIATORS UNDER VARYING LEVELS OF 
NEGOTIATION SPACE, A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT
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ABSTRACT
It is often claimed that more discretion positively impacts performance, increases trust in 
followers and leads to extra-role behaviors. However, in game theory, the discretion of a 
negotiator does not change the solution and the performance remains unchanged. On top 
of this, negotiator discretion levels may be a consequence of organizational contexts. For 
instance, bureaucrats are thought to have very little discretion.
 In this paper, we use a variable sum negotiation experiment to test 1) whether the level 
of negotiation discretion matters for the negotiation outcomes and 2) whether public and 
private negotiators perform differently under varying levels of discretion.
 We manipulate negotiation discretion - the set of solutions to a negotiation problem to 
test our hypotheses for public sector and private sector negotiators. 
 The results contradict the game theoretical prediction as the solution to a negotiation 
problem varies with the level of discretion, while we found no evidence that students of 
public- and business administration performed differently.
This chapter is under review in an international peer-reviewed journal.
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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is a central part of work in organizations (Lewicki et al., 2015). Work relationships, 
working in teams or matrix organizations, and entrepreneurial employees place pressures on 
managers and employees to be effective negotiators (Ibid.). Similarly, the acquisition of goods 
and services and coordination of public policy is one of the core activities of employees in the 
public sector that depend heavily on negotiations carried out by civil servants (Dijkstra, Van 
Assen, & Stokman, 2008; Laegreid, 2000). 
 One element that typically structures how negotiations unfold, is the level of maneuvering 
space or discretion that negotiators have. Negotiation discretion is seen as the number of 
solutions for negotiators to agree on, or – the number of available options to a given decision 
problem (Lewicki et al., 2015; Raiffa et al., 2002, p. 110). On top of that, Negotiation discretion 
will naturally vary and may depend heavily on the strategic negotiation setting, such as the 
number of available options (cf. Fisher et al., 1999) or on elements of contexts such as sectoral 
or even cultural differences (Lewicki et al., 2015, p. 476). For instance, public bureaucrats are 
thought to have less discretion in general than private sector employees (Bozeman, 2004).
 In this paper, we pursue two goals. First, we test experimentally whether negotiators are 
sensitive to variation in negotiation discretion. Secondly, we test whether this sensitivity varies 
for public sector and private sector negotiators. This leads to the following research question: 
Do variations in negotiator discretion lead to different outcomes for public versus private sector 
employees?
 This question is important as various theoretical claims about the effects of discretion 
have been made (Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker, 2014). Discretion is the latitude of action for 
a decision maker (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  In HRM, more discretion for managers is 
thought to lead to more extra-role behaviors and higher individual performance (Gellatly 
& Irving, 2001; Shin & Konrad, 2014). Teams of employees are also thought to benefit from 
more discretion as it leads to higher team outputs (Leach et al., 2005). Public managers 
are thought to have less discretion compared to private sector managers (Van Wart, 2003). 
Public organizations experience more political interference and have less financial discretion 
(Bozeman, 2004). The positive connection of discretion with performance and the fact that 
private sector employees have more discretion suggest that private sector employees will 
perform ‘better’ under otherwise equal circumstances simply because of their relatively higher 
discretion. 
 In game theory however, discretion is not believed to impact the outcome or the quality 
of the outcomes at all. Regardless of the discretion of the decision maker, the theoretical 
solution to a negotiation problem stays the same.
 This study contributes to the literature by juxtaposing the expectations from game-
theory and managerial discretion by applying it to variable sum negotiations. The impact 
of discretion on outcomes of variable sum negotiations, has to our knowledge not 
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systematically been tested before. Empirical research on this topic has been limited to fixed 
sum negotiations (both negotiators want to have as much as possible from the same good) 
and on the role of alternatives: choices that lie outside the negotiation (Schaerer, Loschelder, 
& Swaab, 2016). In general, less discretion and smaller negotiation space may lead to more 
competitive behavior (Kim & Fragale, 2005). Moreover, many studies focus primarily on fixed 
sum negotiations. Although a focus on fixed sum negotiations provides useful insights, pure 
fixed sum negotiations are rare in practice (Lewicki et al., 2015). Moreover, the contradictory 
predictions from game theory and management literature have not been juxtaposed before 
while the differences for the public- and private sector have been neglected altogether in the 
context of negotiations. As public and private sector negotiators often meet in high-stakes 
negotiations such as infrastructural public-private partnerships, this topic is equally relevant 
for practice.
 In the coming sections, we first discuss the literature on negotiations and the game 
theoretical view on negotiation discretion. We derive a hypothesis about the relation 
between the level of discretion and the nature of the negotiation solution. Subsequently, we 
discuss the literature on management discretion as well as discretion for public- and private 
sector negotiators. From this latter discussion we derive our second hypotheses about the 
differences in negotiation behavior between private and public employees under variations 
of the negotiation space. In the subsequent sections we present the experiment, followed 
by a presentation of the results, the discussion of the findings and a conclusion. Additional 
materials can be found in the appendices. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we first discuss negotiations, negotiation discretion from the game-theoretical 
perspective and management literature to arrive at our hypotheses.
Negotiation
Negotiation is: ’the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching agreement 
with others when some of your interests are shared and some are opposed’ (Ury, 1993, p. 1). 
Negotiations are usually between two or more people. There is a conflict of needs and desires. 
People negotiate out of free will. A give and take process can be expected. People prefer to 
negotiate rather than to fight openly, to have one side dominate and the other to capitulate, 
permanently break off contact, or take their dispute to some higher authority. Finally, 
negotiators are usually concerned with managing tangibles (prices, terms and contracts) as 
well as intangibles (like the need to maintain face or the urge to appear ‘tough’) (Lewicki et 
al., 2015, pp. 7–9). 
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Another central element is interdependence. Actors need each other to reach their own 
objectives (Raiffa, 1982). If actors can reach their goals without others, there is little reason to 
negotiate at all. For example, when there is a power difference such that A dominates B. Then, 
A is able to get what he or she wants by dominating the other (Raiffa, 1982).
Alternatives and options
Negotiators have some level of maneuverability during the negotiation. We distinguish 
between alternatives and options (Fisher et al., 1999). Alternatives are choices that lie 
outside the negotiation. Individuals tend to believe that having more alternatives leads to 
better negotiation outcomes (Schaerer et al., 2016). In reality, more alternatives outside the 
negotiation lead to lower first offers and worse outcomes. These are thought to be the result 
of a ‘distortion’ of the perceived alternatives (Galinsky, Schaerer, & Magee, 2017). 
Options are the choices that lie within the negotiation, which is often called the bargaining 
zone. More options equal a larger bargaining zone and vice-versa. Present study focuses on 
the options the negotiators have.
Negotiation from a game theoretical perspective
In game theory, the possible outcomes (deals) of a negotiation process are represented in 
utility (or payoff ) space. This space is spanned by the utility scales of the respective players. 
The utility scales in fact are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, but they may be 
seen as measurement scales at interval level. If there are two players, then, consequently, the 
payoff space is the real plane ℝ2 spanned by the dimensions of utility, one for each player. A 
point in this plane represents the utilities of the players for the respective bargain. Thus, if we 
have (u, v) in the plane, then this point represents a bargain having utility u of Player I and 
utility v for Player II. In the sequel we discuss a two-player negotiation process.  
 In negotiations, only a part of all the possible outcomes is feasible. There are numerous 
reasons that bargains are not feasible and that they are out of reach. For example, bargains may 
be considered unreasonable by the players, they may be unethical or forbidden by society. 
The representation of the set of feasible outcomes leads to a region in space which usually 
is called the bargaining space (see Figure 1). This region is denoted by
 
B. B is assumed to be 
a convex and closed set in the utility space. Convexity means that for any two points (u, v) 
and (u', v') in B, all points on the line connecting (u, v) and (u', v') are also in R. Closeness of a set 
means that it contains its boundary (or more technically that its complement is open).  
 A special point is the point in which no agreement is arrived at. This point is called the 
point of disagreement (see Figure 1). This special point is denoted by d = (u
0
, v
0
). We assume 
that (u
0
, v
0
) is in B, that is, that it is feasible. In a two-player negotiation situation (See figure 1) 
we see that the players will not accept deals with a lower utility than they receive in the point 
of no agreement. That is, they prefer any bargain (u, v) with u ≥ u
0
 and v ≥ v
0
 to the point of 
disagreement and they will resist any bargain (u, v) with u < u
0
 and v < v
0
. 
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Formally, a bargaining game is an ordered pair (B, d)  where B ⊆ ℝ2 is the bargaining set and 
where d ∈ B is the point of disagreement. 
 A solution for a bargaining game is a rule or (arbitrage) scheme that assigns to each 
bargaining game (B, d) a point from B. Mathematically, a solution is a function ƒ : 𝔅 → ℝ2 such 
that ƒ (B, d) ∈ B for any (B, d) ∈ 𝔅. 
. 
Here, 𝔅 is the set of bargaining games. Such a function ƒ : 𝔅 → ℝ2
is also called an arbitration rule.
 Clearly, there are many possible solutions for a bargaining game. In order to reduce 
the number of possible solutions, it is necessary to impose additional restrictions. The most 
important restriction in this respect is that the solution lies on the Pareto effi  ciency frontier. 
The Pareto effi  ciency frontier is the set of all points on the boundary of B such that no player 
can gain more utility without worsening the utility level of the other player. See Figure 1. 
The line connecting the max utility of Player 1 with the max utility of Player 2 constitutes 
the effi  ciency frontier. If we move along this line from a point to another point, then one 
of the players will gain in utility while the other player will lose utility. We denote the Pareto 
effi  ciency frontier of any B with P(B).
U2
U1
Feasable region B
Ecient frontier
Point of
disagreement
d
Utopian point
3
Figure 1: Feasible solutions in 2-persions variable sum game (adapted from Raiff a et al., 2002:263).
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Pareto Effi  ciency is one of the basic conditions (or axioms) imposed by Nash on solutions in 
his famous article on the subject (Nash, 1950). In this paper, he formulates the so-called Nash 
bargaining solution (NBS), which is the scheme that assigns the point (u*, v*) to a (B, d) such 
that (u* - u
0
) · (v* - v
0
) is maximal, that is, it is the maximal product of the players’ utility. It can 
be proven that (u*, v*) ∈ P(B) for any bargaining game (B, d).  
 Another important solution concept is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Kalai & 
Smorodinsky, 1975). Consider again Figure 1. The max utility for Player 1 is at the angle of the 
utility scale U
1
 with the Pareto effi  cieny frontier; the max utility for Player 2 is at the angle of 
U
2
 with the same frontier. If we draw a perpendicular on this point of U
1
 and one on the max 
point on U
2
 then these perpendiculars will intersect each other in a point x = (x
1
, x
2
) where the 
utilities for each player are maximal. However, this point usually lies outside the region 𝔅 ⊆ ℝ2,
i.e., it is not feasible. For this reason, it is called the Utopian Point of the game. Now, if we draw 
a straight line from disagreement point d = (u
0
, v
0
) in the bargaining set to the utopian point x
= (x
1
, x
2
) outside the bargaining set B, then this line will intersect the Pareto effi  ciency frontier. 
This intersection point is called the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (KSS) of the game. Clearly, this 
solution is in P(B). Moreover, this point is feasible and is at the shortest distance from the 
Utopian Point, which justifi es this solution. For a nice (axiomatic) study of both the NBS and 
the KSS solution see Peters (2010).
 In our experiment, we assume symmetric positions of the test subjects. Moreover, we 
assume that utility is linear with respect to the points to be distributed. The set of all points 
(u, v) ∈ B such that u ≥ u
0
 and v ≥ v
0
 is called the negotiation set. We will vary the size of this 
set by varying the d-point by drawing a line from the origin of the region to the middle of the 
hypotenuse, and by moving this d-point along this line. Clearly, this middle point is both a NBS 
and a KSS in all three cases. 
U2
U1
Small
negotiation discretion
U2
U1
Medium
negotiation discretion
U2
U1
Large
negotiation discretion
1
Figure 2: Diff erences in negotiation discretion.
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By varying the size of the set, we vary the number of potential solutions to the negotiation 
game. A larger negotiation space contains more potential outcomes and more potential to 
find a solution. However, according to game theory, the solution itself is invariable to this 
amount of discretion for the negotiators. If we expand the feasible region towards the utopian 
point or to the NBS, the NBS and the KSS remain the same. 
Managerial discretion
Little attention has been devoted to the link between discretion and negotiation outcomes 
while discretion literature covers many aspects of the work of employees and managers in the 
organizational context. 
 It is often assumed implicitly that more discretion leads to more productivity (Graham, 
1992; Strain, 1999). In management studies, a meta-analysis of empirical results showed 
that high levels of perceived control was associated with high levels of job satisfaction, 
commitment, involvement, performance and motivation (Spector, 1986). Managers with 
more discretion display a greater variety of in-role and extra-role behaviors (Gellatly & Irving, 
2001). Moreover, teams are claimed to perform better as a result of higher discretion (Leach et 
al., 2005)
 In the public sector, discretion is often related to the work of Lipsky (Lipsky, 1980), who 
found that bureaucrats, especially at the street-level, use their discretion to implement policies 
as they see fit. The discretion of street-level-bureaucrats is associated with their willingness 
to implement policies (Tummers and Bekkers 2014;  Tummers, Steijn, and Bekkers 2012). 
Although public managers make efforts to reduce the use of discretion of workers in order to 
‘go by the book’, street level bureaucrats resist top down steering and control as they feel they 
have to be able to adapt to individual cases (Rutz, Mathew, Robben, & de Bont, 2017). Frontline 
workers such as school teachers, police officers and health professionals experience shrinking 
levels of discretion, lowering their support for top-down policies (Musheno and Maynard-
Moody 2016; Tummers 2012). To summarize, discretion is important for the performance of 
workers in general, in HRM practices and in the public sector for frontline workers. 
 For negotiations, the question remains whether more discretion also leads to ‘better’ 
negotiator performance. For negotiators with a smaller bargaining zone, meaning less 
space and less autonomy, alternatives to a proposed deal have a stronger effect on how 
they experience trade-offs (Kim & Fragale, 2005). In other words, changes in autonomy have 
an effect on the experienced power of negotiators, leading to different results. Moreover, 
negotiators also use different tactics under varying levels of autonomy (Babcock, Loewenstein, 
& Wang, 1995) 
 Summarizing, there are two contradictory predictions. From the more formal game 
theory, we derive that regardless of the autonomy of the negotiators, the negotiation-
solution remains the same. The negotiation outcomes do not change. In our study, this is 
the null-hypothesis (H
0
) as the theoretical expectation is that there is no effect of variations 
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in negotiation discretion. From more informal works in HRM, management and public 
management, it can be argued that the negotiation-solution changes when the discretion of 
negotiators also changes. As a result, we hypothesize that:
 H1: The solution of the negotiation problem varies with the size of the negotiation set. 
Discretion for public and private sector negotiators
Given the differences between the contexts of public- and private sector as well as its 
respective employees we may expect differences in negotiation process and outcomes (See 
for example Bozeman, 2004; de Graaf & van der Wal, 2010; Tepe, 2016; Vandenabeele, 2008). 
Compared to private sector organizations, public organizations are subject to higher levels 
of political interference and they have less financial discretion (Bozeman, 2004). Moreover, 
public organizations are classically associated with high levels of red tape: “rules, regulations 
and procedures that entail a compliance burden without advancing the legitimate purposes 
they were intended to serve” (Bozeman, 2000, p. 12). Findings suggest that public- and private 
sector organizations do not unquestionably differ in red tape but the perceptions of managers 
and citizens may differ for public and private sector organizations (Rainey, Pandey, & Bozeman, 
1995). 
 Furthermore, public servants are known to differ from private sector employees in a 
number of ways. Public servants have a lower tolerance for risks (Buurman et al., 2012), higher 
public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990; Vandenabeele, 2007) and a lower need for closure 
(Franco & Rouwette, 2016; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). A lower tolerance for risks is traditionally 
seen as a characteristic of public servants and the public sector as a whole (See for example: 
Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998; Hartog, Ferreri Carbonell, & Jonker, 2002; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). 
Similarly, public servants systematically rate themselves as more interested in politics, more 
interested in contributing to the common good, more willing to sacrifice their own interests 
in favor of a greater good and, having higher levels of compassion (Vandenabeele, 2007). 
These are characteristics better known as public service motivation (PSM) (Perry & Wise, 1990). 
Interestingly, even undergraduate students in public administration also seem to differ from 
business administration students on public service motivation (Christensen et al., 2013; Perry 
& Wise, 1990; Vandenabeele, 2008). Arguably, this suggests that motivation to serve the public 
interest is connected to personality, rather than a form of study or work related socialization (a 
trait versus state) (Brewer & Selden, 1998).
 Another illustration of personality differences, is the concept of need for closure. Need 
for closure is “a desire for definitive knowledge on some issue and eschewal of confusion and 
ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 2013; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, p. 264). Franco and Rouwette (2016, 
p. 883) found that MBA students have a higher need for closure than students in specialist 
MSc programs (MPA, among others). This suggests that MBA graduates are less able or willing 
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to handle complex and multidimensional negotiation situations, in which the weighing of 
different values is central (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
 The dissimilarities between public- and private sector employees such as risk propensity, 
PSM and need for closure suggest that they will not respond in similar fashion to similar 
decision problems or in similar negotiation settings. Risk-taking is inherently connected to 
negotiations. Making an opening offer could be seen as a risky (but effective) strategy as 
it reveals one’s intentions in a negotiation (Raiffa et al., 2002, p. 146). Evidence is mounting 
that differences in public service motivation (PSM) impacts the outcomes of decision-making 
and cooperation (Esteve et al., 2015). Similarly, Tepe (2016) found that public administration 
students (individuals with high PSM) behaved more trusting and trustworthy than business 
and law students. To sum up, based on contextual public sector discretion and individual 
characteristics, we expect that individuals with higher public service motivation and a lower risk 
tolerance, such as public servants, respond stronger to variations in discretion than individuals 
with lower public service motivation and a higher risk tolerance. As a consequence, managers 
from the private sector will respond less strongly to variations in discretion. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis is:
  H2: The effect of variations in the size of the negotiations set is stronger for public sector 
negotiators than for private sector negotiators
We notice that this hypothesis is in line with game theory. In game theory each player is 
supposed to have a payoff function (expected utility function) that values the possible 
outcomes of the game for the respective player. The above discussion of the differences 
between public and private sector employees inclusive the hypothesis imply that the 
payoff functions of public sector players differ from those in the private sector. For example, 
as suggested above, public sector players might bear risk-avoiding payoff functions while 
private players might have risk-seeking ones. Note, however, that the nature of the difference 
is not specified in the hypothesis. 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
We have tested our hypotheses in a computer laboratory at a Dutch university. The laboratory 
consists of 32 laptops, connected to a central server. The experiment itself was programmed 
and administered in Ztree version 3.6.7 (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of six sessions took place 
over the course of three days in spring 2016. We used a between-subjects design with three 
conditions for testing the causal effect of negotiation space on the negotiation process and 
outcome (see Figure 2).
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Participants
We recruited a mixed sample of (n=158) graduate and undergraduate students from a course 
in public administration and a course in business administration. We did not use pecuniary 
incentives for the participants as the experiment was part of a teaching course (classroom 
experiment). Moreover, negotiators in an organizational context seldom experience the 
financial consequences of professional negotiations (cf. Rhodes, 1994).  The participants were 
instructed that the points were valuable. 
Negotiation game
The participants were asked to engage in a variable-sum negotiation game in dyads. In this 
game, a surplus is divided over players within the dyad. The negotiators could propose a split 
of the surplus back and forth by entering this on screen. The participants could make as many 
proposals back and forth as they wished before they accepted or rejected the agreement. 
Allowing negotiators to make back and forth proposals approximates the dynamic nature of 
negotiations (a give and take process) better than one-shot games do and mimic a negotiation 
in a more natural way. In order to accept an agreement, at least one negotiator had to press 
‘agree’ to an offer of the opponent (see appendix 1). Negotiators could only agree to proposals 
of the opponent, not their own. We implemented a timeframe for each negotiation decision 
of two minutes. When players had not reached an agreement when the time has ended, both 
players received nothing.
 We manipulated the level of discretion for the negotiators. There are three experimental 
conditions: small discretion, medium discretion and large discretion. See table 1 for the 
experimental conditions. The randomization to one of the experimental conditions as well as 
matching to an opponent was carried out by the computer. 
Table 2: Experimental conditions
Negotiation discretion Small Medium Large
Total range of points 90-100 80-110 70-160
Size of the surplus 10 30 90
The negotiation game is a variable-sum game as the negotiators could decide what the 
maximum size of the surplus would be. For example, in the ‘small’ condition, the negotiators 
could agree on a 50/50 split of 90 points, but also on a 50/50 split of 100 points. Negotiators 
could also opt for any other division of points.
Procedure
Upon entry, the participants were seated at one of the computer cubicles. The instructions 
were displayed on the computer screen of the subjects (see figure 3 for the procedure and 
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Appendix II for the instruction texts). After the participants had read the instructions, they 
could ask questions. 
Instructions Test round
10 rounds
negotation Rematch
10 rounds
negotation
Post-test
ques-
tionnaire
Debriefing
2
Figure 3: Process during experiment.
In total, the participants were asked to make 20 negotiation decisions. After ten negotiation 
rounds the participants were re-matched to different opponents. The participants were 
matched to their partners in one of the three conditions: small discretion, medium discretion 
and large discretion (see table 1). After the final round, a questionnaire was presented to the 
subjects (See next section). 
Measures
There are two dependent variables, which are both negotiation outcomes. The first outcome 
is how the value of the surplus is divided over the players is the first outcome. This measure 
ranges from 0% to 100% of the surplus for each negotiator, for each round. Second, as the 
players were able to agree on a range of outcomes, we are also able to focus on the efficiency 
of the outcomes. If for example two players in the small condition (where the surplus lies 
between 90-100) agree on splitting 90 points equally, this is a less efficient outcome than 
splitting 100 points equally. Outcomes that lie on the pareto-efficient line have a higher total 
value than outcomes below the line. 
 A post-test questionnaire was administered to check background characteristics of the 
participants. This questionnaire contained background questions such as age and gender, 
the BIG-five inventory (see Denissen, Geenen, Van Aken, Gosling, & Potter, 2008), and the 
standardized Risk Taking Index (RTI) (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton‐O’Creevy, & Willman, 2005). 
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RESULTS
In total, 158 graduate and undergraduate students participated in the experiment (See table 
3). The background characteristics of the participants are distributed reasonably evenly over 
the experimental conditions. Due to the simple randomization combined with multiple 
sessions, a lower number of participants ended up in the large discretion condition. Moreover, 
there is a relatively large number of women in the small discretion condition. For testing the 
main effect, gender will be used as a control variable. Hypothesis tests were carried out using 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 0.025 per hypothesis test (0.05/2). A post hoc power test, 
using the condition with the smallest N, revealed that the power of this study is .955 (α=.05, 
df=2, N=158, F=.321).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (n=158). Standard deviations in parentheses.
Small
discretion
Medium 
discretion
Large 
discretion
Overall Test
N (43%) (31%) (24%) (100%)
CHISQ, X2=9.33, 
P=0.009
Age
22.85
(4.29)
22.80
(2.53)
21.60
(2.61)
22.53 (3.46)
ANOVA, F=1.838, 
P=0.163
Female 47% 22% 37% 35%
CHISQ, X2=6.14, 
P=0.046
PSM 
Alpha = 0.66
3.26
(0.40)
3.10
(0.50)
3.27
(0.40)
3.36
(0.45)
ANOVA, F=2.346, 
P=0.099
Extraversion
Alpha = 0.83
3.65
(0.66)
3.63
(0.54)
3.48
(0.70)
3.60
(0.63)
ANOVA, F=0.962, 
P=0.384
Agreeableness
Alpha = 0.66
3.58
(0.52)
3.50
(0.47)
3.55
(0.49)
3.55
(0.59)
ANOVA, F=0.32, 
P=0.727
Conscientiousness 
Alpha = 0.77
3.59
(0.60)
3.46
(0.59)
3.51
(0.48)
3.53
(0.57)
ANOVA, F=0.781, 
P=0.46
Neuroticism
Alpha = 0.81
2.68
(0.57)
2.49
(0.73)
2.72
(0.67)
2.63
(0.65)
ANOVA, F=1.623, 
P=0.201
Openness
Alpha = 0.66
3.59
(0.46)
3.40
(0.50)
3.51
(0.43)
3.51
(0.47)
ANOVA, F=2.43, 
P=0.091
Risk
Alpha = 0.74
2.00
(0.52)
2.14
(0.53)
1.87
(0.57)
2.01
(0.57)
ANOVA, F=2.798, 
P=0.064
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H1: The solution of the negotiation problem varies with the size of the negotiation set
Our fi rst hypothesis: the solution of the negotiation problem varies with the size of the 
negotiation set is supported by the experimental data. To test this hypothesis, we standardized 
the outcomes of the experimental conditions by dividing the negotiation outcomes by the 
total pie sizes of the respective conditions. Over the entire experiment, we found that the size 
of negotiation discretion has a signifi cant eff ect on negotiation outcomes, F(2,155)=6.676, 
p=0.0016). A post-hoc Scheff é test showed that the medium-large and small-large groups 
did not diff er from each other. The small and medium negotiation space groups diff ered 
signifi cantly at p = .01.
Figure 4: Size of the claims by experimental condition.
The negotiators made off ers and counteroff ers, potentially adding up to a total of 100% of 
the ‘pie’ in all conditions. If the surplus was equally shared between the negotiators, both get 
0.5 (or 50%) of the total. Negotiators could also divide less value than 100% of the surplus. 
From fi gure 4 we can observe that the negotiators in the medium condition claimed the 
least of the surplus (y-axis), followed by the large discretion condition. The negotiators in the 
small discretion condition claimed more of the surplus than those in the medium discretion 
condition and this diff ers signifi cantly from medium and large discretion.
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Figure 5: Agreements between negotiators for the small, medium and large discretion condition.
In fi gure 5 we observe that the majority of the agreements lie on the imaginary line between 
the origin of the axes (0,0) and the utopian point for the negotiators. Furthermore, not all 
agreements maximize the payoff s. That is, they agree on a less effi  cient payoff  smaller than the 
maximum. To control for the background characteristics of the participants, we calculated an 
OLS regression in successive steps (see table 3). The fi rst model shows the diff erence between 
the experimental conditions with the medium condition as reference category. 
The second model shows that there is no specifi c round or learning eff ect present during 
the experimental sessions that should be corrected for. Model three shows that gender has 
a signifi cant eff ect on the outcomes in addition to the main eff ect. Despite that diff erences 
in negotiation behavior between men and women are well established in the literature, the 
eff ect could be the result of our randomization as men and women were unbalanced over the 
experimental conditions (see table 3).
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Table 3: Effect of experimental conditions and background characteristics on negotiated agreements (OLS, n=158).
B SE B t p
Model 1: Experimental treatment
  Intercept 0.329 0.015 22.04 0.000
  Small negotiation discretion 0.071 0.020 3.61 0.000
  Large negotiation discretion 0.031 0.023 1.38 0.168
R2
Adjusted
 =0.067, F(2,155)=6.676, p=0.001
Model 2: Effect of experimental round/learning
  Intercept 0.352 0.021 16.90 0.000
  Small negotiation discretion 0.069 0.019 3.57 0.000
  Large negotiation discretion 0.034 0.023 1.50 0.136
  Experimental round -0.000 0.000 -1.57 0.119
R2
Adjusted
 =0.076, F(3,154)=5.313, p=0.001
Model 3: Participant characteristics
  Intercept 0.372 0.136 2.73 0.007
  Small negotiation discretion 0.068 0.020 3.42 0.001
  Large negotiation discretion 0.024 0.023 1.02 0.309
  Male -0.068 0.020 -3.34 0.001
  Age -0.001 0.003 -0.40 0.687
  PSM -0.014 0.021 -0.67 0.502
  Risk 0.037 0.017 2.16 0.032
  Extraversion -0.022 0.014 -1.62 0.107
  Agreeableness 0.031 0.019 1.67 0.097
  Conscientiousness -0.003 0.015 -0.22 0.829
  Neuroticism -0.017 0.014 -1.21 0.228
  Openness 0.007 0.019 0.350 0.724
R2Adjusted =0.119, F(11,146)=2.929, p=0.000
Model 4: Interaction effects
  Intercept 0.349 0.031 11.15 0.000
  Small negotiation discretion 0.089 0.037 2.38 0.018
  Large negotiation discretion 0.034 0.039 0.84 0.400
  Male -0.026 0.035 -0.74 0.462
  Male x small negotiation discretion -0.035 0.044 -0.80 0.423
  Male x large negotiation discretion -0.017 0.049 -0.34 0.733
R2
Adjusted
 =0.096, F(5,152)=4.321, p=0.001
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The insignificant interaction between gender and experimental condition in model four 
shows that the effect is not due to the male/female ratio over the experimental conditions. 
Risk-taking and agreeableness both have a small statistically significant effect on the size of 
the agreement.
H2: The effect of variations in the size of the negotiations set is stronger for public sector 
negotiators than for private sector negotiators
In our experiment, both public administration students and business administration students 
participated. Based on the experimental data, we can test this (one-tailed) hypothesis in two 
separate ways. First, we distinguish between study types public administration and business 
administration as predictor for outcomes. Secondly, we use public service motivation (PSM) 
to make the same distinction. Arguably, the latter is a more precise measure to establish 
behavioral motives during negotiations as some individuals may have lower public service 
motivation, while being enrolled in a public administration program. This mirrors the situation 
in practice. Some employees with higher public service motivation may work in the private 
sector while employees with lower public service motivation could work in the public sector.
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Public Administration Business Administration
Figure 6: Claims of the surplus across experimental conditions, for public administration and business administration 
participants.
PUBLIC- AND PRIVATE SECTOR NEGOTIATORS UNDER VARYING LEVELS OF NEGOTIATION SPACE
64                                   
At face value the scores differ slightly (Figure 6). A students T-test reveals that the differences 
between the public administration (M=0.355) and business administration (M=0.383) students 
are insignificant (t=-1.62, df=148.49, p=0.053).
 Additionally, we created two groups of negotiators based on the median score of 3.4 
on the public service motivation questionnaire. This resulted in a low-PSM group in which 
the scores were ≤3.4 and a high-PSM groups with scores >3.4.  The low and high groups 
were, again used for predicting the payoffs that the negotiators agreed on. Negotiators in 
the low-PSM group (M=0.361) differed slightly from the negotiators in the high-PSM group 
(M=0.377). Again, these differences were not statistically significant (t=-0.889, df=147.18, 
p=0.19). Therefore, we conclude that our second hypothesis: “The effect of variations in the 
size of the negotiations set is stronger for public sector negotiators than for private sector 
negotiators” is not supported by the experimental data. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to answer whether variations in negotiator discretion in a variable 
sum negotiation leads to different outcomes and whether negotiator type: public- and 
private sector negotiators interact with this main effect. Not only are there natural variations 
in the discretion of workers in the public and private sector, managers also sometimes 
determine the amount of discretion of workers. The short answer to our question is that 
indeed, variations in negotiation discretion matters for the outcomes, while the theorized 
public-private differences do not exert an influence on this main effect.
 We used two contradictory theoretical approaches to test our first hypothesis that the 
solution of the negotiation problem varies with the size of the negotiation set (H
1
). The first 
approach is the formal game-theoretical expectation that the negotiators will do the same 
under varying levels of negotiation discretion (H
0
) while the second, more informal approach 
predicts exactly the opposite: discretion will influence negotiation outcomes directly. We 
found that indeed, negotiator discretion seems to impact the claims made on the surplus 
and the outcomes in a variable sum negotiation setting. Our findings corroborate the results 
of earlier work on discretion that demonstrates the idea that discretion has an influence on 
performance. We accomplished this by using an experimental design that enables us to 
eliminate any confounding variables (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
 In contrast, the experimental findings contradict the fundamental assumption of the 
theory of bargaining games that bargaining solutions only depend on the utility functions of 
the players and some point of disagreement.  The solutions should be independent from the 
size of bargaining regions. However, the experimental findings imply that the solution of such 
games do also depend on the size of the bargaining space. Apparently, the attractiveness of 
the solutions varies with the size of the bargaining set. At the theoretical level this would imply 
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that solutions of bargaining games are functions not only of individual utility functions and 
some point of disagreement, but also of the size (volume) of the negotiation space. Since the 
findings show that different sizes lead to different solutions, and since solutions are yielded 
by arbitration rules, different sizes of negotiation space ask, clearly, for different arbitration 
rules. This a surprising result which is not in line with game theory. So far, the discussion 
which arbitration rule is empirically most relevant such as the Nash bargaining solution and 
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is not settled in game theory.  Our results show that it is even 
more complex empirically. The experimental participants in the ‘small’ condition claimed 
more from the surplus than the participants in the ‘medium’ condition. No differences were 
found between the ‘large’ condition and the ‘small’ or ‘medium’ condition. We do not have an 
explanation for this finding. It suggests a non-linear connection between size of bargaining 
spaces and bargaining solutions.
 Secondly, we apply the debate on discretion to the negotiation literature by studying 
its effects in a variable sum negotiation. Our experimental design is unique in the sense 
that it combines a controlled laboratory setting with variable sum negotiations. Moreover, 
the participants could make offers and counteroffers before committing to an agreement. 
Variable sum negotiations occur frequently in practice and therefore provide a realistic test 
while much of the research has focused on constant sum negotiations 
 Our second hypothesis (H
2
), that negotiators with a public sector background solve 
negotiation problems differently from negotiators with a private sector background is refuted 
as the results were statistically insignificant. The negotiation setting in our experiment was 
void of sectoral context, while the contexts of the public- and private sector may trigger 
specific role behaviors. For instance, the availability of resources and power may differ in the 
public and private context. At the individual level, we based our public/private distinction on 
the public service motivation scale (Perry & Wise, 1990). Despite that our participants differed 
on PSM, they did not exhibit different negotiation behaviors, suggesting a limited role for 
values in the context of our experiment. This goes against recent empirical findings that link 
public service motivation to different outcomes in a range of economical games (Esteve et al., 
2016, 2015).
Limitations and future directions
Our study has two limitations that we have tried to alleviate as much as possible. In our 
experiment, we used student participants. While many experimental studies use student 
participants (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Li & Van Ryzin, 2017), this practice has been 
criticized in social psychology and experimental economics for its low replicability (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015). Our study should be replicated using practitioners from the 
public sector and the private sector. This could mitigate any potential drawbacks from using 
student-participants.
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 Secondly, the surpluses in our experimental vehicle are numerical which has the drawback 
that participants may attach different meaning to the points gained or lost in absolute sense. 
Negotiating over a one point from 10 points may be different from negotiating over one 
point from 90 points. In future research, this problem may be solved by displaying the surplus 
virtually instead of numerically.
 Given the important consequences for game theory, further research could aim at 
replicating the findings. Moreover, further research could also focus on the possible co-
variation of bargaining solutions with the sizes of the bargaining spaces. Do larger spaces 
lead to greater differences in outcomes than smaller spaces? Moreover, according to prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), individuals behave differently 
in cases of gains than in cases of losses. A very interesting research question is whether the 
effect remains when the negotiation setting is played in the domain of losses.
 To our understanding, this is the only scholarly study that tests the effect of negotiator 
discretion on outcomes in a variable sum negotiation. The relative scarcity of studies is 
surprising, given the theoretical and practical relevance. Managers have to decide on the 
discretion of employees which appears to impact performance. Additional research is much 
needed to improve our understanding of discretion in variable sum negotiations and how 
individual differences between public and private sector negotiators interact.
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CHAPTER 4
ACCOUNTABILITY AND COALITIONS, 
EVIDENCE FROM A NEGOTIATION EXPERIMENT
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ABSTRACT
This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face-to-face 
classroom experiment. Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. 
In the treatment condition, negotiators were held accountable by a personal forum during the 
formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were not held accountable. 
Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. 
Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a “grand 
coalition.” Rather, accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. 
Accountability increased the odds of reaching no agreement. These findings challenge the 
idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the context of coalition 
negotiations. 
This chapter is published as: Bouwman, R., van Thiel, S., van Deemen, A. and Rouwette, E. (2018), 
Accountability and Coalitions: Evidence from a Negotiation Experiment. Public Administration 
Review, 78: 37-47. 
The dataset, instructions and posttest survey can be found here (Open Access): https://doi.
org/10.17026/dans-zvw-hf9y
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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is one of the most common activities of all employees (Laegreid 2000; Susskind 
and Ozawa 1983). Negotiations focus, for example, on buying and selling goods or problem 
solving. In the public sector, negotiations involve coordination of inter- and intra-departmental 
tasks, the acquisition of goods and services and the allocation of budgets (Dijkstra, Van Assen, 
and Stokman 2008). An example would be implementation of healthcare policies with its 
many stakeholders. During implementation of these policies, representatives of patients’ 
federations, hospitals and government have to negotiate practical implementation (see 
O’Toole 2000). Although the outcomes of negotiations by public servants can have great 
societal impacts, negotiation as a research topic has not gained much attention by public 
administration scholars. Some exceptions are the work of  Medda (2007) in public-private 
partnerships, decisionmaking in policy implementation (Torenvlied and Akkerman 2004) or 
labour relations and collective bargaining (Riccuci 2011; Perry and Angle, 1979). As public 
organizations contribute to the public good by definition, individual negotiation outcomes 
by civil servants are often public outcomes as well.
Public accountability is consistently rated as the most important public value by civil servants 
(Van der Wal, De Graaf, and Lasthuizen 2008). Recent developments in Western democracies 
have only bolstered accountability measures by public organizations (Bovens, Schillemans, 
and ’t Hart 2008, 225). 
 However, competing claims have been made about the effects of accountability. 
Accountability is often viewed as an instrument to prevent corruption of those in power. It 
is seen as instrument to increase perceived trustworthiness, enhance integrity and increase 
performance (Bovens, Schillemans, and ’t Hart 2008).  The problem of who exactly is to blame 
is a well-known difficulty of accountability (Thompson 2005). Accountability may lead to 
window-dressing (de Wolf  and Janssens 2007) or to task overload for public servants. 
 Public accountability literature has some similarities to bureaucratic and legislative 
oversight literature (see for example: Shikano, Stoffel, & Tepe, 2017). While related, public 
accountability is different as the forum and actor are not expected to have divergent interests 
but more overlapping interests, while principals have power over bureaucrats, accountability 
forums do not necessarily have power. Moreover, bureaucratic-oversight literatures emphasize 
the relation between bureaucrat and principal, while accountability takes bureaucrats, 
principals and citizens as object of study.
 While accountability is known to have an impact on thoughts, feelings and actions 
of individuals (Lerner and Tetlock 1999), public administration scholars have neglected 
its potential effects on specific activities of public servants, such as negotiating. Social 
psychologists have established that individual negotiators will be more ’contentious’ when 
they expect to be held accountable (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). Negotiators care for equality 
of outcomes when the accountability between negotiators is high (Kramer, Pommerenke, 
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and Newton 1993). When teams of negotiators are held accountable, the responsibility of the 
negotiated outcome is distributed over the team members (O’Connor 1997). 
 Still, individuals respond competitively to accountability mechanisms, leading to 
lower individual outcomes in negotiations (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). Thus, the effects of 
accountability on negotiator behavior and outcomes has been investigated in a limited 
number of studies, while the effect of accountability on negotiating a coalition by public 
servants has been neglected thus far. 
 Coalitions as a negotiation outcome are omnipresent in public policy networks (Provan 
and Milward 2001) and public-private partnerships (PPS) (see Skelcher 2005), among other 
settings, which reinforces the need for knowledge on this topic. In this study, we aim to fill 
this gap and ask: Does public accountability lead to different coalitions and lower negotiator 
performance in coalition negotiations?
 We employed a face-to-face classroom experiment that enabled us to test the causal 
effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes by public servants. In negotiation research, 
experiments are often used to establish causal relations. Both laboratory and classroom 
experiments have been used in a range of negotiation studies (e.g. Embrey, Fréchette, and 
Lehrer 2014; Sinaceur et al. 2013). 
 Within public administration, the share of experimental work is still relatively small 
(Groeneveld et al. 2015). Experimental designs are increasingly seen as a rigorous method 
for testing and developing theory (Perry 2012; Margetts 2011; Anderson and Edwards 2015). 
Accountability scholars have suggested that experimental research could help in answering 
fundamental accountability questions by disentangling causes and effects (Koch and 
Wüstemann 2014).
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this section, we first discuss literature on negotiations, on accountability in the public domain 
and on coalitions. Next, we combine these literatures to arrive at a set of five hypotheses to 
be tested in our experiment.
Negotiations
Negotiation is: ’the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching agreement 
with others when some of your interests are shared and some are opposed’ (Ury 1993). 
Examples of public sector negotiations are negotiations in public-private partnerships (Klijn 
et al., 1995), the allocation of scarce resources within organizations or negotiations with 
autonomous bodies; so called public service bargains (Hood & Lodge, 2006).
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Negotiation situations share a number of common characteristics (Lewicki, Saunders, and 
Barry 2015). Negotiations have two or more actors which have a conflict of needs and desires. 
Actors negotiate by choice and a give and take process can be expected. Actors prefer to 
negotiate and search for alternatives rather than to struggle or fight publicly. Negotiation 
involves the management of tangibles (prices or terms) and intangibles (like the need to 
win or avoid losses and the need to obtain or keep a good reputation). The outcomes of 
negotiations are influenced by the interdependence of parties’ goals (Lewicki, Saunders, and 
Barry 2015). 
Two types of negotiations are often distinguished. Distributive bargaining are negotiations 
where achieving one party’s goals blocks the other one’s goals (Pruitt et al. 1978). Distributive 
negotiations are also known as constant/zero-sum games in game theory (see Scharpf 1994). 
The second type is known as integrative negotiation, where all parties achieve gains, or solve 
a common problem (Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2015). These are known as variable/non-
zero-sum games in game theory (see Osborne and Rubinstein 1994; Schelling 1980; Peleg and 
Sudhölter 2007; Morrow 1994). Negotiations carried out by public servants may be constant 
sum, for example the acquisition of goods and services, or variable sum: seeking a solution 
to a policy problem together with other policy actors. In this study, we focus on variable sum 
negotiations.5
Accountability in the Public Sector
We define accountability in the public sector as: ’a relationship between an actor and a forum, 
in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences’ (Bovens 2007).6
Because public servants operate on behalf of citizens or civil society, based on politically-
defined mandates, public organizations are held publicly responsible for the outcomes 
they produce. This responsibility is determined by accountability through various oversight 
mechanisms (Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans 2014). Accountability is seen as a mechanism 
of democratic control that is claimed to increase performance, enhance integrity of public 
governance and render perceptions of trustworthiness and transparency with citizens.
 Central in the definition used in this study is that there are four distinctive elements 
(Bovens 2007, 7). An actor and a forum are in a relationship. Within this relationship, the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct. Afterwards, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment. Finally, the actor may face consequences. These consequences 
come in the form of sanctions or rewards. 
5   See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) and Schelling (1980) for a general introduction to game theory or Raiffa (2002), Peleg and 
Sudhölter (2007) or Morrow (1994) for an overview of cooperative game-theoretical introduction to negotiation.
6   For an overview of accountability literature see: Bovens (2005, 2006); Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans (2014); Mulgan (2000a) 
and Behn (2001).
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 In many public organizations, the relationship between the actor and forum is legally 
binding. Therefore, it is especially the expectation of being held accountable (shadow of the 
future) or to face the consequences of performance that will alter the behavior of negotiators 
(O’Connor 1997). 
Coalitions
This study focuses on coalitions as an outcome of negotiations. Coalitions are defined as: 
“a collection of parties within a larger social setting who work together to pursue mutually 
desirable goals” (Guo and Lim 2007; Murninghan 1986). 
 Coalitions have a number of characteristics. They are interacting groups of individuals. 
Coalitions are deliberately constructed and issue oriented. They exist independently of a 
formal structure, meaning that coalitions are not a formal group such as an organization or 
team that is created by design. Coalitions also lack a formal structure like internal hierarchy 
while leadership roles may form in existing coalitions. They focus on goals external to the 
coalition.  And coalitions require concerted member action (Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter 
1985; Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2015). Central in formed and pending coalitions is that the 
actors involved care about the outcomes (O’Connor 1997, 386). Coalition forming demands of 
negotiators to balance individual needs and desires against group needs and desires.
Accountability and negotiations
O’Connor (1997) found that negotiators paired in teams who are held accountable behave 
more dominantly or competitively. Accountable negotiators made fewer concessions, and 
employed more contentious strategies than their non-accountable counterparts (Klimoski 
1972). Compared to non-accountable negotiators, this could lead to higher individual gains 
and lower group gains on average (Pruitt et al. 1978). 
 If mechanisms of accountability indeed lead to competitive rather than cooperative or 
problem-solving behavior, the difficulty of reaching an agreement will increase - especially in 
potential coalitions that aim to solve issues by negotiating. Accountability will lead to more 
competitive behavior during negotiations because negotiators will feel the social need to 
perform better for their ’forum’ (see O’Connor 1997), or they may fear the consequences of 
bad performance (Bovens 2007).
H1: Accountable negotiators will show lower performance at the group-level than non-
accountable negotiators.
As accountability leads to more competitive behavior by individual negotiators (Ben-Yoav 
and Pruitt 1984; Mosterd and Rutte 2000; O’Connor 1997), we expect this mechanism to lead 
to lower group scores as soon as all negotiators are exposed to accountability. As a result, 
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negotiators will form coalitions that do not incorporate all negotiators, but rather a subset of 
the group.
By reaching an agreement that includes all negotiators that are present (a grand coalition), 
negotiators show that they care about group outcomes more than they do about individual 
outcomes. This is partly in line with what others have found; negotiators care about individual 
as well as group outcomes at the same time (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). However, under 
pressure of accountability, negotiators must choose between individual and group payoffs.
H2: The presence of an accountability forum during negotiations will lead to fewer grand 
coalitions.
The increased efforts of players to reach an agreement but also to maximize pay-offs at 
the group and individual level, makes reaching an agreement that satisfies all negotiators 
more difficult. We expect that the number of defaults (no deal) will increase as a result of 
accountability, even in coalition negotiations (see Mosterd and Rutte 2000). When time is 
limited, negotiators are also forced to reach an agreement. Not reaching an agreement has 
no payoff.
 In the public domain, there are often a limited number of alternatives for certain (policy) 
coalitions, which forces negotiators to cooperate. Further, as the number of people and thus 
interests expand vastly when negotiators are being held accountable the ’computational 
difficulty’ of many viewpoints in the negotiation setting drives negotiators to opt for a solution 
that will yield more points at the individual level. Therefore, reaching a coalition - regardless of 
size and shape - is more attractive than defaulting. Because negotiators care about the group 
outcome (H2) but also compete as a result of accountability (H1) the frequency of defaults will 
increase (H3). 
H3: Holding negotiators accountable will lead to a higher chance of defaults (no deal) 
compared to non-accountable negotiators.
We expect that the consequences (sanctions or rewards) of accountability will have effects 
on negotiator behavior. The consequences define the relation between the forum and the 
negotiator. Public budgets are prioritized but rewards for good performance are not so 
common in the public domain (Verhoest et al. 2010, 143). Sanctioning poor performance is 
more a common practice. From this perspective, negotiators who are sanctioned are “poor 
performers.”
H4: Lower individual negotiation outcomes lead to a higher frequency of sanctions by an 
accountability forum. 
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We also expect that there is a link between the number of defaults (no deal) as a coalition 
outcome and the chances of a sanction. Poor negotiators will fail to order their preferences 
(especially given the presence of a forum) and therefore also fail to reach an agreement. 
 In terms of payoffs, not reaching an agreement can be viewed as the worst potential 
outcome for negotiators individually, but also at the level of the group. The payoff at the 
individual- and the group-level is zero in this scenario.
H5: Not reaching an agreement (no deal) leads to a higher chance of facing negative 
consequences (sanctions).
METHOD
In this section, we set out the experiment that we carried out in order to test our hypotheses. 
First, we explain the setting and experimental context and participants. Next, we describe 
the design, the experimental procedure, the experimental conditions and the post-test 
questionnaire.
Experimental setting, context and participants
The hypotheses were tested in a campus-based, face-to-face experiment at a Dutch 
university. In total, we carried out two control sessions and three treatment sessions that were 
administered consecutively. All sessions were carried out on the same day and in the same 
classroom. Graduate and undergraduate student subjects were recruited from a course in a 
public administration program. 
 The participants were given a negotiation task that enabled us to examine the causal 
effect of accountability on negotiating a coalition. A face-to-face negotiation enhances the 
mundane reality for participants in the experiment (Bozeman and Scott 1992). A classroom 
setting gives the researcher situational control during the experiment (Morton and Williams 
2010).
 We asked the participants to negotiate a coalition in triads in a game that is best 
described as a coalition game in which utility is transferable (from hereon: coalition game) 
(Peleg & Sudhölter, 2007).  Forming coalitions, while weighing individual and group pay-offs, is 
central to negotiation in both public and private sector settings (Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 
2015). 
Rewards
The subjects were not financially compensated for participation as is customary in 
experimental economics (Charness and Kuhn 2011). Rather, the experiment was part of a 
public administration course and the negotiation was structured in such a manner that scores 
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could be compared after the experiment had ended. The student with the highest score was 
rewarded with a box of chocolates. This reflects that we have incentivized the participants 
to perform well on an individual level, which could only be achieved by striking a balance 
between individual and group interests.
Design
A between-subjects design was used. The independent variable (accountability) is manipulated 
in order to test its effect on the dependent variable (negotiation outcomes). We focused on 
two levels of negotiation outcomes. At the group-level we focused on group scores and 
the coalition type that was agreed upon whereas at the individual level, we focused on the 
individual scores as indicator for negotiator performance.
 In the control condition, subjects played the coalition game in groups of three individuals. 
In the treatment condition, the subjects played the same game in the presence of a randomly 
matched viewer who acted as an accountability forum (see procedure section).
 During the experiment, subjects played a coalition game. The task of the players was 
to form a coalition and to divide its value between or among its members. Different types of 
coalitions were worth points for the group of subjects. The goal for each player was to obtain 
the highest individual score possible. The negotiation itself centered around the division of 
points within the coalitions that were formed. In other words, the players could decide among 
each other, how they would divide the points that a certain coalition was worth.
 The coalition game is denoted below. The value (v) of staying alone for players A, B and 
C is 0. The value of a coalition between A and B is 60, between A and C, 40, between B and C, 
70, and the grand coalition among all players A, B and C gives a total value of 80.
v(A), v(B), v(C) = 0 
v(A, B) = 60
v(A, C) = 40
v(B, C) = 70 
v(A, B, C) = 80
(1)
Our coalition game is a variable-sum game, meaning that the sum of all players’ payoff 
depended on their employed strategies. Further, the game has an infinite amount of solutions 
for the players (Telser 1994; Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, 257). Moreover, the core is empty.7 
7  Proof that the core is empty (cf. Raiffa et al., 2002):
   XA+ XB
 ≥ v(AB)    =  60 
   XA+ XC ≥ v(AC)   =  40
   XB+ XC ≥ v(BC)    =  70  
 2XA+ 2XB+ 2XC      ≥  170
   XA+   XB+    XC       ≥    85   (Core is empty because: 85 ≥ XA+ XB+ XC= 80)
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This means that the solutions, known as payoff vectors formed by the players are inherently 
unstable (Song and Panayides 2002; Parkhe 1993).  For every solution the players agree on, 
there is another agreement that has a higher value (v) for at least one player. An illustration 
of this is when the value is evenly divided over players. The ‘grand coalition’ (1/3 of v(A, B, C) = 
26.6) in this game results in fewer points for the individual players than the points a coalition 
between A and B will generate (1/2 of v(A, B) = 30) (for A and B, that is). Players may also 
choose to distribute points of this coalition differently, but always rounded off to 0.5 point.
 Also, the players’ positions differ in negotiation power. For this reason, the participants 
are rotated over the players’ positions. Theoretically, player B is the strongest, followed by C 
and then A.8
 Our experimental setting is an artificial situation, but is comparable to many negotiations 
in the public domain. In public negotiations, a single optimal solution does not exist due to 
a multitude of interests that also vary over time and space (Head 2008). There are different 
solutions that will satisfy actors in different configurations and require collective action (Van 
Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003). Theoretically, players have an incentive to negotiate 
endlessly in this coalition game, as they will never reach a stable solution (Telser, 1994). 
Mundane deadlines or limited resources will then define the end of a negotiation. Think of 
policy targets or for example an ending financial year. For the same reason, a time limit ends 
negotiation rounds in this experiment.
Procedure
A pilot round with six subjects was administered before the final experiment took place. The 
pilot round led to improvement of the instructions and improved the relationship between 
the negotiator and viewer (forum) by adding green and red cards instead of written feedback.
 During the experiment, randomization was ensured by letting the subjects draw from 
pre-printed number-cards that corresponded to the pre-numbered tables in the room upon 
entry to the classroom. When seated, the participants received an instruction sheet (See 
the appendices belonging to Chapter 4) and the instructions were read out aloud by the 
researcher. After questions of students had been answered, the negotiations began.
Procedure
Subjects are randomly assigned in groups of three people upon entry and
read the instructions sheet. Next, the instructions are read out aloud by the
researcher. Randomization was ensured by drawing from printed number-cards
that corresponded to the pre-numbered tables in the room.
After each round, the subjects note their individual scores and group scores
on paper. In total the subjects play this game six times with rematches between
rounds. For each of the six rounds, the subjects have 5 minutes (See figure:
1). During the experiment, a time constraint ends the negotiation round (see
appendix A for the entire procedure).
Control
In the control condition, the subjects play the strategic alliance game 6 times
in total (See figure 1). After each round, the subjects are assigned a di↵erent
position (A,B or C). After three rounds, the subjects are rematched across tables.
For an overview of the entire procedure, see appendix A.
A
B C
Figure 1: Negotiation a coalition in the control condition
Treatment
Subjects are matched in groups (triplets) of players and viewers. The players play
the coalition game but now every player has a viewer (a personal accountability
13
Figure 1: Negotiating a coalition in the control condition
8   Shapley values indicate the bargaining power of the players (Raiffa et al., 2002). Shapley-values for players: A = 20, B = 35, C = 25.
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Following each negotiation round, the subjects had to note their individual scores and group 
scores on paper. In total, the participants played this game six times with rematches of players. 
For each of the six rounds, the subjects had five minutes time of ‘play’. During the experiment, 
a time constraint ended the negotiation rounds (see figure 1).  Finally, the subjects could ask 
questions and were extensively debriefed and informed about the purpose of the experiment. 
Control condition
In the control condition, the subjects played the coalition game six times in total (see figure 2). 
After each round, the subjects were assigned a different position (A, B or C). After three rounds, 
the subjects were regrouped across tables.
forum) which he/she must report to. This viewer receives 30% of the players
(A,B,C) points, which are not deducted from the players total. Therefore, the
viewer has an interest to give feedback and interfere with the process. The viewers
watch the negotiation process and are allowed to give feedback at set moments.
The responsibility remains with the players. All viewers and negotiators are able
see each other.
The negotiation game is played for 2 minutes (figure 2)(Step I). Then, the
players have to report to their viewers. The viewers are allowed to re ct on the
strategy, earnings and results of the players (one minute) (Step II). Then, A, B
and C play for another three minutes (Step III). This process is repeated six
imes. I between, subjects are rematched over the groups, as well as over the
players or supervisor group (see figure 2). The subjects are matched in such a
manner, that they do not meet the same player and/or viewer a second time.
X
A
Y
B
Z
C
X
A
Y
B
Z
C
X
A
Y
B
Z
C
Step I Step II Step III
Figure 2: Negotiation a coalition in the treatment condition
When the negotiation round finishes, the viewers ’pass judgement’ (Bovens, 2005)
by giving either a green or a red card to his or her matched player (Step II).
In case of a green card, the player is allowed to keep the earned points. A red
14
Figure 2: Negotiation a coalition in the treatment condition
Treatment condition
In the treatment condition, the subjects were matched in groups of three. There were 
negotiators and viewer roles. All negotiators in this condition played the ole of negotiator 
as well as the viewer role. The negotiators played the same coalition game but now every 
negotiator had a viewer (a personal accountability forum) to which he/she had to report to. 
This viewer received 30% of the players’ (A, B, C) points, which were not deducted from the 
players’ total. Therefore, the viewer has an interest to give feedback and interfere with the 
process. The viewers watched the negotiation process and were allowed to give feedback at 
set instances. The responsibility for the negotiated outcomes remained with the players. All 
viewers and negotiators were able to see each other.
 The coalition game was played for two minutes (Step I) (see figure 3). Then, the players 
had to report to their viewers. The viewers were allowed to react on the strategy, earnings and 
results of their negotiator only (one minute) (Step II). Then, A, B and C played for another three 
minutes (Step III). This process was repeated six times in total (see figure 3). In between, 
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negotiators and viewers were re-matched over the groups. The subjects were matched in 
such a manner, that they could never meet the same player and/or viewer for a second time. 
Like in the control condition, the participants were randomly assigned to different tables after 
three rounds.
 When the negotiation round finished, the viewers had to ’pass judgment’ (Bovens 2007) 
by giving either a green or a red card to his or her matched player (after Step III). In case of a 
green card, the player was allowed to keep the earned points. 
A red card was a penalty for bad negotiation performance in the eyes of the viewer. Players 
that had received a red card had to subtract two points from their round-total. Potentially this 
could add up to a total of twelve points being subtracted from the players’ total score.
Post-test
A paper-based questionnaire was administered after the experiment (see supplemental 
appendix B). This questionnaire contained questions on age, gender, public service motivation 
(PSM). We included these control variables as older individuals may have more negotiation 
experience. Also, negotiation literatures have established that men and women negotiate 
differently which stresses the importance of controlling for gender (Lewicki, Barry, and 
Saunders 2015). Additionally, we expect public administration students to have high public 
service motivation and as a result have high motivation to serve the public interest and high 
compassion levels (Vandenabeele 2008).
RESULTS
In total, 87 graduate and undergraduate students were recruited from a public administration 
course from which 27 served as control and 60 served as treatment. There were 19 groups in 
total with nine groups in the control condition and ten groups in the treatment condition. The 
results from one group were excluded from analysis because of unreadable handwriting and 
calculation errors of the participants. All groups negotiated six times (for five minutes) which 
yielded 114 negotiated coalition outcomes (54 in control and 60 in treatment).
Age and gender did not differ over treatment and control. The highest level of education 
differed over the conditions (see table 1). For this reason, the background variables are used 
as control in further analyses. The descriptive results also confirm that the student subjects are 
good proxies for civil servants as their public service motivation is relatively high (Leisink and 
Steijn 2009). The 10-item Dutch PSM scale had moderate reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .60).
 A post-hoc power test for unequal sample sizes revealed that on the basis of the means, 
the statistical power in this study is .97 (α=.05, df=17, N=10/9, d=1.88), which is more than the 
recommended statistical power of .80 (Cohen 1988). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (n=87) (SD in parentheses).
% Female Average age Education PSM
No accountability (control) 41.4% 21.81
(1.798)
5.76
(0.812)
3.46
(0.367)
Accountability (treatment) 25.7% 20.91
(2.485)
5.33
(0.705)
3.32
(0.424)
Overall mean 33.3% 21.19
(2.321)
5.46
(0.759)
3.37
(0.410)
Test statistic χ2 = 1.510,
p = 0.219
t-test = 1.903
p = 0.061
wilcox-w= 1040.5
p = 0.011
t-test = 1.56
p = 0.123
Accountable Negotiators Will Show Lower Performance at the Group-Level 
than Non-Accountable Negotiators. 
The first hypothesis is supported by our data. Triads of players that are in the control condition 
obtained higher group scores (Mcontrol = 464.44, SD = 27.43) than did the triads in the 
treatment condition (Mtreatment = 374.75, SD = 61.44). Figure 4 shows the average total 
scores of the groups over the entire experiment. The development of the scores over time per 
round can be found in supplemental appendix C.
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Figure 4: Average group scores over the entire experiment.
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As the scores at the group level are not parametric, a Wilcoxon-ranked-sum test is suitable 
(Siegel and Castellan 1988). The differences between control and treatment are statistically 
significant (w = 83.5, p = .0017).
 Groups scores, and thus solutions, in the accountability condition are more different 
from each other than they are in the control condition. This is also confirmed when testing the 
second hypothesis.
The Presence of an Accountability Forum During Negotiations Will Lead to 
Fewer Grand Coalitions.
The second hypothesis is also supported by the data. The negotiators in the accountability 
condition were less inclined to reach the ’grand coalition’ (table 2). The grand coalition (ABC) 
occurred in 88.9% of instances in the control condition, whereas it occurred in 36.7% in the 
treatment condition. 
Table 2: Frequency of coalitions by condition
No accountability
Control
Accountability
Treatment
Test 
statistic
AB 1.9% (1) 15.0% (9)
AC 1.9% (1) 16.7% (10)
BC 7.4% (4) 25.0% (15)
ABC 88.9% (48) 36.7% (22)
No coalition 0.0% (0) 6.7% (4)
100% (54) 100% (60) X2 = 33.56, p < .000
Holding Negotiators Accountable Will Lead to a Higher Frequency of 
Defaults (No Deal) Compared to Non-Accountable Players.
The third hypothesis is also supported by the data. Indeed, subjects in the accountability 
condition show a 6.7 percent rate of defaults, whereas the subjects in the control condition 
always reached an agreement (see table 2). As players were always able to reach an agreement 
in the control condition, and only in four cases did not reach an agreement in the treatment 
condition, the results are statistically significant. Although absolute numbers are only small, 
the point-wise attractiveness of reaching a coalition outcome (whichever combination of 
players) is expected to always generate a coalition outcome of some sort.
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Lower Individual Scores Lead to More Sanctions by an Accountability 
Forum. 
Analyzing the results for the fourth hypothesis demands that we focus on the effects within 
the accountability condition only. Therefore, the results from this part of our analysis are of a 
correlational nature. In total, a red card was given to negotiators in 30.5% of all opportunities 
to do so by the viewers. 
  Based on the data we conclude that a lower score predicts a sanction at the group-level (see 
table 3). Note that the betas represent the scores over the length of the experiment (i.e. earning 
90.9 points less resulted in one sanction - or 15.15 fewer points leads to a sanction per round on 
average). The second model adds the covariates age, gender and public service motivation. The 
covariates have no effect on the relationship between individual scores and sanctions. 
 
Table 3: (OLS) Predicting sanctions under the effect of accountability (SE in parentheses)
Model I Model II Model III
Constant 1.174*** 0.585 1.168
(0.199) (0.943) (1.381)
Score -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.015 -0.012
(0.032) (0.054)
Male -0.162 -0.185
(0.186) (0.193)
PSM 0.115 0.137
(0.188) (0.195)
Education (secondary school) -0.119
(0.628)
Education (applied university) 0.018
(0.706)
Education (college level BA/MA) 0.165
(0.689)
N 53 53 53
R2 0.215 0.237 0.250
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.173 0.133
Residual Std. Error 0.572 (df = 51) 0.581 (df = 48) 0.595 (df = 45)
F Statistic 14.007*** (df = 1; 51) 3.726** (df = 4; 48) 2.142* (df = 7; 45)
AIC 95.09 99.62 104.71
Durbinson-Watson (1 > criterion < 3) 1.81 1.83 1.84
Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
No VIF values <10 and average close to 1), Cooks-d, all <.4, Normality of errors and heteroskedasticity met.
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 Additionally, a lagged linear regression was calculated in which the sanctions were used 
as predictor for each round t+1. A sanction in round one would predict scores in round two, a 
sanction in round two predicts the scores in round three and so on. Sanctions in the previous 
round did not significantly predict performance, R2 = .00, F(1, 143) = 0.36, p = .545. There is no 
carry-over effect between subsequent negotiations.
Not Reaching an Agreement (No Deal) Leads to a Higher Chance of Facing 
Negative Consequences (Sanctions). 
The fifth hypothesis is not supported by the data. Based on the frequency of the sanctions, 
the grand coalition (A, B and C) led to a sanction in 11.3% of the cases. In 17.3% of cases, a 
dyadic agreement resulted in a sanction for players. Not reaching an agreement at all led to a 
sanction in 33.3% of cases. 
 A pooled binomial logistic regression analysis was calculated using the coalitions as 
predictors for sanctions (sanction or no sanction) (table 4). The grand coalition is used as 
reference category (most occurring). Not reaching an agreement significantly predicts the 
odds of receiving a sanction (odds ratio = 3.93, 95% confidence interval, 1.04-14.87, p = 
0.043). Put differently, not reaching an agreement is associated with a 79.7 percentage point 
higher chance of receiving a sanction (compared to reaching an agreement). At the same 
time reaching a dyadic coalition (AC) is significantly associated with a 75.45 percentage point 
higher chance of receiving a sanction. As the AC coalition is also associated with sanctions 
and the model quality is not satisfactory, (i.e. high AIC and low pseudo-R2) we decided to 
reject the fifth hypothesis.
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Table 4: (Binomial Logistic Regression) Predicting sanctions from coalition type (SE in parentheses)
Model I Model II Model III
Constant -2.061*** -2.906 -5.091
(0.401) (2.546) (3.803)
No coalition 1.368** 1.324* 1.237*
(0.679) (0.687) (0.700)
AB -0.241 -0.331 -0.391
(0.843) (0.853) (0.857)
AC 1.123** 1.004* 1.031*
(0.562) (0.574) (0.590)
BC 0.174 0.062 0.154
(0.626) (0.634) (0.645)
Age -0.035 0.104
(0.090) (0.156)
Male 0.616 0.629
(0.545) (0.550)
PSM 0.353 0.307
(0.510) (0.522)
Education (secondary school) -0.377
(1.315)
Education (applied university) -0.943
(1.642)
Education (college level BA/MA) -2.335
(1.790)
N 169 169 169
Log Likelihood -71.916 -70.964 -69.314
AIC 153.832 157.929 160.629
Hosmer and Lemeshow R2 0.052 0.056 0.086
Cox and Snell R2 0.046 0.056 0.075
Nagelkerke R2 0.077 0.095 0.126
% correct predicted 28.1 28.2 28.5
Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
 87 
4
DISCUSSION
Many NPM public-sector reforms hinge on the idea that public accountability increases public 
performance (Bovens, Schillemans, and ’t Hart 2008). Dubnick (2005) notes that empirical tests 
of the link between public accountability and performance are scarce. Moreover, decisions 
are increasingly taken by means of negotiations in governance networks while public 
accountability structures have not adapted to these newer forms of decision making. 
 Our experiment consistently shows that public accountability leads to different coalitions 
and more no-deals. The group-level payoffs seem to be prioritized when negotiators are not 
held accountable. Conversely, when negotiators are held accountable, individual payoffs 
seem to be prioritized. Although the data do not allow us to make causal claims on the 
sanction part of the experiment, the results suggest that sanctions have a small, or no effect 
on subsequent negotiations. Our findings have implications for public accountability as well 
as for coalition negotiations in the public sector.
Public accountability
Our main finding is that group level performance of negotiators is reduced by public 
accountability. In our experiment, individual negotiators were held accountable for their 
actions. A question remains whether performance of organizations instead of individual 
negotiators would also be lowered by public accountability. This question is relevant as 
individual negotiators may be held accountable by their superiors, while the organization 
they represent will be held accountable by a political forum or citizens.
 In our experiment, the viewers were instructed to rate their negotiators. If the goal 
of public accountability is to increase performance, the accountability structure may need 
to focus more on process rather than output. Similarly, if including all actors in a coalition 
is a goal, viewers may need more precise process benchmarks instead of just rating their 
negotiators. 
 Despite that our negotiation setting is a low stakes game for the players, the viewers 
indeed sanctioned poor performers while these sanctions as such seem to have no effect at 
all on the future negotiations of the sanctioned. Although these findings are preliminary, they 
imply that accountability fora do indeed sanction poor performance but the sanctions as 
such do not impact the future behavior of organizations. Additionally, the worst performing 
negotiators are not sanctioned hard. This may point to effects of social reciprocity between 
actor and forum. 
Public negotiations
Public organizations are increasingly held accountable by citizens. In our experiment, 
negotiators seem to focus on including all players as much as possible. As negotiators knew 
beforehand that they would negotiate in multiple rounds, the focus on the group could 
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be a result of forward induction. This does not explain the higher number of no-deals when 
negotiators are held accountable. Our findings also provide some support for the idea that 
negotiations behind closed doors may result in better group outcomes than negotiations 
that are subject to public accountability (Chambers 2004). 
 Also, it seems that a focus on accountability of the output reduces the attention of 
negotiators to the results at the group level. Negotiation results in the public sector are 
frequently about the group level or even about generating a public good.
For practitioners, there are a number of relevant takeaways. Negotiators should pay specific 
attention to payoffs of parties at the group and individual level when parties are expected 
to be held accountable. Practitioners should expect that negotiators are more likely to form 
smaller coalitions. The consequences of public accountability – such as sanctions – have little 
effect on future negotiations. 
Limitations
Finally, we discuss some limitations and avenues for further research, before final conclusions 
can be drawn from our study. A first limitation is that we have employed student subjects in 
our experiment. This raises the question whether public servants that negotiate a coalition 
would respond in a similar fashion. The use of student-based samples in experimental 
research has been criticized because for their limited statistical generalizability (see for an 
overview: Morton and Williams 2010; Charness and Kuhn 2011). Psychologists and behavioral 
economists are struggling with the question of when and how using students in experiments is 
appropriate (Druckman and Kam 2011; Charness and Kuhn 2011; Open Science Collaboration 
2015). In public administration, there is no real consensus on this matter but a substantial 
share of experimental studies in public administration make use of student participants (Li 
and Van Ryzin 2017; Bouwman and Grimmelikhuijsen 2016). Our study focuses on behavior 
of individuals in negotiations and groups of individuals at the psychological micro-level of 
aggregation (Tepe and Prokop 2017; Meijer and Funk 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2016). 
Using students creates a problem especially when “the treatment effect is moderated and the 
moderating variable varies between students and nonstudent samples” (Druckman and Kam 
2011; Tepe and Prokop 2017). Also, distinctive characteristics of students such as a relatively 
low age and higher education, compared to practitioners, could influence our findings. 
 Second, a face-to-face negotiation is more realistic to subjects, compared to 
computerized laboratory negotiation settings and therefore has higher ecological validity, but 
does introduce the risk of exogenous (confounding) influences, such as social effects of liking 
or body language of the participants. The participants in our experiment could see each other, 
and possibly knew each other beforehand. Despite randomization, some familiarity with one 
another might have biased the results.  Additionally, experimenter demand effects may have 
influenced the findings. This is a trade-off between mundane realism (Bozeman and Scott 
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1992) on the one and experimental control on the other hand. The choice for a face-to-face 
experiment is partly legitimized by the fact that negotiations are most often a face-to-face 
activity and that negotiators and an accountability forum may also know each other. 
 Third, in our study, negotiators and viewers switched roles for practical reasons while 
in the public domain, the role of viewer and negotiator will be more stable over time. More 
research is needed to study the repeated and asymmetric character of the relation between 
actor and forum, in which for example building trust or familiarity could play a moderating 
role.  
 The viewer in our study obtained 30% of payoffs of the negotiators. Varying on this 
strength, i.e. setting the payoff for the viewer at 10% or 60% may provide insight in how the 
relation between forum and negotiator works. Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to 
answer to what extent individual negotiator payoffs under public accountability pressure are 
conditional on the group results.
Replication
Future research efforts should be aimed at replicating this study in different settings by 
using different types of experimental designs like a computerized experiment that strips off 
more context for higher internal validity. Alternatively, a field experiment with practitioners 
that focuses on the link between public accountability and negotiator or organizational 
performance seems a good step forward to see how our findings travel to more context rich 
environments.
Public and private sector negotiations
Another promising way forward would be to study differences between public sector and 
private sector negotiators in their responses to accountability. Accountability in the public 
sector is more stringent compared to the private sector, especially with regard to processes 
and general policy (Mulgan 2000). Moreover, public and private sector employees seem to 
differ consistently in some personality characteristics like compassion, self-sacrifice, altruism 
and risk-perceptions (Perry and Wise 1990; Vandenabeele 2007; Wildavsky and Dake 1990). 
The differences specific characteristics may play an important role in negotiations as well. 
CONCLUSION
Our study makes two important contributions to the literature. First, this paper brings together 
accountability and negotiation literature in the public domain, which has not been done 
before to our knowledge.9
9   There are studies in International Relations that focus on the related concept of transparency and negotiations  (eg. Stasavage, 
2004).
ACCOUNTABILITY AND COALITIONS, EVIDENCE FROM A NEGOTIATION EXPERIMENT
90                                   
 Second, accountability scholars have suggested to use experiments to test the impact of 
accountability on public sector organizations and employees (Koch and Wüstemann 2014). 
By using a face-to-face negotiation experiment, we balanced between high internal validity 
of the study and reasonable reality for the participants. While acknowledging that further 
refinements are necessary, we have made an important first step in studying effects of 
accountability on public negotiators by means of an experimental design. 
In line with earlier studies on negotiations, we found that public accountability leads to lower 
performance in negotiations at the group level (see table 5) (Klimoski 1972; O’Connor 1997). 
This is an important finding as negotiating a coalition differs in many respects from simpler 
dyadic bargaining settings that are often used in experiments (Stevenson, Pearce and Porter 
1986; Murninghan 1986; Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry 2015). 
Table 5: Summary of findings
Hypothesis Findings
H1 Accountable negotiators will show lower performance at the group-level than non-
accountable negotiators 
Supported
H2 The presence of an accountability forum during negotiations will lead to fewer grand 
coalitions.
Supported
H3 Holding negotiators accountable will lead to a higher chance of defaults (no deal) 
compared to non-accountable negotiators.
Supported
H4 Lower individual negotiation outcomes lead to a higher frequency of sanctions by an 
accountability forum
Supported
H5 Not reaching an agreement (no deal) leads to a higher chance of facing negative 
consequences (sanctions)
Refuted
Next to lower performance, the frequency in which negotiators reached a grand coalition was 
reduced under the influence of accountability in our experiment. Recent research found that 
civil servants as well as public administration students are relatively cooperative in a range of 
settings (Esteve, van Witteloostuijn, and Boyne 2015). This may partly explain the high number 
of grand coalitions in the control condition. Within the accountability treatment, our finding 
seems to suggest that negotiators opt for higher individual payoffs at the cost of cooperation 
with all negotiators.
 Further, accountability led negotiators to not reach any agreement at all. When an 
agreement was reached, it appears that negotiators focused on smaller coalitions and higher 
individual results instead of group results. This finding is particularly interesting as the size of 
the sanctions in our experiment was limited in size and the experimental game was a low-
stakes setting. One should interpret this finding with caution: time pressure in general seems 
to produce non-agreements in negotiations (Mosterd and Rutte 2000; Carnevale and Lawler 
1986).
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 When focusing on only the treatment condition and using cross sectional data, we 
found that poorer performing negotiators received more sanctions from their accountability 
forum. Also, sanctions did not improve performance in subsequent negotiation rounds. 
 Accountability is claimed to reduce corruption, increase trust and performance. We 
contribute to the so far inconclusive theoretical discussion on the effect of accountability in 
public sector by providing empirical evidence that public accountability leads to different 
coalitions and lower group outcomes in negotiations. Our findings underscore that adverse 
effects of public accountability on individual and group outcomes as well as organizational 
performance should not be overlooked.
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CHAPTER 5
ACCOUNTABLE COALITION NEGOTIATIONS, 
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR 
BACKGROUND ON NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR BACKGROUND ON COALITION OUTCOMES
94                                   
ABSTRACT
Forming coalitions by means of negotiations are an important form of decision-making. 
Meanwhile accountability demands have increased in the public- and private sector. Earlier 
work has shown that accountability has a negative effect on negotiation outcomes. As public 
sector workers value accountability more than private sector workers, we investigate if the 
effects of accountability on negotiation outcomes differ for public and private sector-oriented 
individuals.
 We tested the effect of accountability (present versus absent) on forming a coalition 
by using a between-subjects-design negotiation experiment. A mix of graduate and 
undergraduate students were asked to negotiate a coalition in triads. The students represented 
either public or private sector negotiators, based on their level of Public Service Motivation. 
 The results show that accountability lowers group and individual performance in 
coalition negotiations. Contrary to our expectations, behavior did not differ between public 
and private sector negotiators. The paper concludes with some implications and a research 
agenda.
This chapter is currently under review in an international peer reviewed journal.
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INTRODUCTION
In this study we test the effect of accountability on forming coalitions by two types of 
negotiators: those with preferences and motives oriented towards the public sector and 
those who have preferences and motives oriented towards the private sector. There are five 
main reasons why this is important.
 First, negotiations are a core activity in the private sector but also in public sector 
organizations. Politicians determine who gets what, when and how by negotiating over scarce 
assets (Lasswell, 1936). Public servants involved in the implementation of policies, production 
and delivery of public goods, services and provisions have to deal with negotiations. 
Negotiation is mentioned in the policy network literature (e.g. Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012) and 
coproduction literature (e.g. Fenwick, 2012; Needham, 2008) as an important tool for achieving 
policy results. Yet, there is a great lack of research in public administration into the processes 
and mechanisms and outcomes of the actual negotiations (see for some exceptions Medda, 
2007; Perry & Angle, 1979; Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2004). 
 Second, negotiation literature does not distinguish between the public and private 
sector even though there are some notable differences between individual characteristics and 
values of public- versus private sector employees that have a potential impact on negotiation 
behavior. For example, public sector workers behave more cooperatively compared to private 
sector workers (e.g. Esteve, Urbig, Van Witteloostuijn, & Boyne, 2016; Esteve, van Witteloostuijn, 
& Boyne, 2015) and are more risk averse (Buurman et al., 2012; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). 
 Third, negotiations by public servants and private sector negotiators, are usually carried 
out in name of ‘others’. In the public sector, the ‘others’ are beneficiaries: a distal public good 
or citizens as a whole while in the private sector, negotiations are carried out in name of a 
commercial company, which may have shareholders. Empirical research shows that ownership 
matters for individual motives and behavior (Andersen, Pallesen, & Pedersen, 2011).
 Fourth, in both the public and private sector, negotiators are held accountable in 
fora. Accountability is often considered to be a cornerstone of modern democracies in the 
public sector (Mulgan, 2000b). Accountability demands for the public sector have increased 
over the years (Bovens, Goodin, & Schillemans, 2014; Power, 1994). Increasingly, citizens and 
clients demand that their governments are accountable to them – directly or via political 
representation (Ibid.). In the private sector, accountability varies more with organizational size 
and company type, but is thought to be more focused on financial results (Mulgan, 2000b). 
Despite that public accountability is considered to be relevant to both the public and private 
sector, public servants mention accountability as the most important public value in their 
work (Van der Wal et al., 2008, p. 476).
 Fifth, although accountability is rated as one of the most important values in the public 
and private sector, and that negotiation is central to many decisions, surprisingly little is 
known about the relation between accountability and negotiation outcomes. The effects of 
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR BACKGROUND ON COALITION OUTCOMES
96                                   
secrecy on decisions and deliberation - the opposite of accountability - have been better 
documented (Chambers, 2004). 
For example, when teams are held accountable, the members distribute the responsibility for 
the results (O’Connor, 1997). Moreover, when negotiators expect to be held accountable (but 
are not actually held accountable), they act more combatively, by making larger claims and 
fewer concessions (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). 
 Despite positive claims about the effects of accountability, such as increased performance, 
higher trust and lower corruption, a recent study found that imposing public accountability 
on negotiators strongly lowers negotiation outcomes for public sector negotiators (Bouwman, 
van Thiel, van Deemen, & Rouwette, 2018a). Accountability led negotiators to form smaller 
coalitions, which included fewer parties, while a higher number of no deals occurred. Also, 
accountable negotiators decided to divide fewer points, signifying negotiation outcomes and 
therefore performed less than non-accountable negotiators. 
Summing up, negotiating is a core activity in the public- and private sector and there are 
significant differences in behavior between public and private negotiators, but the topic is 
somewhat neglected in public administration literature. Negotiation literature focuses more 
on the process and outcomes of negotiations but does not distinguish between the public 
and private sector. The limited literature available points to an important role of accountability. 
Accountability is thought to be essential by workers in the private sector, and even more so in 
the public sector (Van der Wal et al., 2008).
As public and private sector workers are different in attitudes (Liu & Perry, 2014), motivation 
(Coursey & Pandey, 2007; Vandenabeele, 2007) and decision behavior (Esteve et al., 2016; Van 
Witteloostuijn et al., 2017), it is plausible that they will respond dissimilar when exposed to 
accountability. Our main research question therefore is: Are responses to accountability different 
for public/private sector negotiators?
 
To answer this question, we test if responses to accountability differ for public- and private 
sector negotiators. This is done in an experiment that is similar to the one by Bouwman et 
al. (2018a), but we add to the design two ‘types’ of backgrounds: people oriented towards 
the public sector, and people more oriented toward the private sector, based on their Public 
Service Motivation. In doing so, we contribute to both the negotiation and accountability 
literature in the public sector. Also, we respond to calls for more experimental studies into 
the effects of accountability (Koch & Wüstemann, 2014). Finally, we contribute to the stream 
of behavioral public administration literature by combining psychological insights on 
characteristics and behavior of public servants with public administration research practice 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017).
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The following section outlines the article’s theoretical approach and develops the two 
hypotheses that will be tested. Next, we discuss the experimental design, the participants, 
the setting and negotiation game. Lastly, we discuss the findings, and their implications for 
theory and practice. 
THEORY
In this section, we discuss coalition negotiations, public accountability and differences 
between public and private sector negotiators. The theory informs the two hypotheses that 
are to be tested in our experiment. 
Negotiating coalitions
Negotiation is defined as: ’the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching 
agreement with others when some of your interests are shared and some are opposed’ 
(Ury, 1993, p. 4). The outcomes of negotiations are determined by the fact that negotiators 
are interdependent (Lewicki et al., 2015, p. 9). In other words, for negotiators to reach their 
individual goals, they need each other. 
 It is typical for negotiations that there are two or more people involved. Those people 
have a conflict of needs and desires and they negotiate by choice. A give and take process 
can be expected. People prefer to negotiate and search for alternatives rather than to struggle 
or fight publicly. Negotiation involves the management of tangibles (prices or terms) and 
intangibles (like the need to win or avoid losses and the need to obtain or keep a good 
reputation) (Lewicki et al., 2015).
 This study focuses on coalitions as the outcome of negotiations (eg. van Deemen, 
2013). Coalitions come in different forms and sizes. Coalitions are defined as: ’a collection of 
parties within a larger social setting who work together to pursue mutually desirable goals’ 
(Guo & Lim, 2007; Murninghan, 1986). Coalitions are interacting groups of people. They are 
deliberately constructed and issue oriented. Coalitions exist independent of a formal structure. 
Coalitions focus on goals external to the coalition. Finally, coalitions require joint action of 
their members (Lewicki et al., 2015; Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985). Central in formed and 
pending coalitions is that the negotiators care about the outcomes (O’Connor, 1997, p. 386) 
as these contribute to their own, individual goals. However, other parties may have an interest 
as well.
 In the public domain, such other parties are for example interest groups and citizens. 
Also, it should be noted that in case civil servants negotiate, they do so in the interest of the 
public good - and it is the politicians who are usually held accountable. In the private sector 
shareholders (owners) will be interested in the outcomes as well.  
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Accountability
Accountability is often considered to be a cornerstone of modern democracies. Public 
organizations are held accountable for how public means are used or to what extent intended 
policy goals are achieved. Organizations are ‘audited’ by their ultimate owners - citizens - via 
mechanisms of accountability such as elections. 
 Many definitions of accountability exist, and the precision of the definitions is heavily 
debated (Mulgan, 2000b). However, most definitions involve a relation of responsibility where 
one person or body is responsible to the other (Ibid). In this study, we define accountability as 
’a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain 
and to justify his or her conduct. The forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the 
actor may face consequences’ (Bovens, 2006, p. 7). 
 The consequences of accountability come in the form of sanctions or rewards (Mulgan, 
2000a). In public sector organizations, the relationship between the actor and forum is usually 
defined by law. While accountability may have observable impact on behavior, it is especially 
the expectation to be held accountable by actors - and to face consequences imposed by a 
forum - that steers actual behavior (O’Connor, 1997).
 Increasingly, public- and private organizations are expected to provide information 
to stakeholders and shareholders about their results (Olsen, 2015). Municipalities, schools, 
hospitals and companies are all increasingly required to be accountable about their output, 
procedures and results. The growth of accountability demands on both the public- and private 
sector has altered the way organizations work (Power, 1994, 2000, 2005). For example, New 
Public Management reforms and decentralizations have re-allocated formal responsibility 
from national governments to agencies (Hood, 2000). The increase in measurement of output 
of governments and agencies has a number of unintended ramifications (cf. Thiel & Leeuw, 
2002). For example: citizens are sometimes unable to correctly assign the responsibility for the 
outcome of certain policies because they are unsure who exactly must be held accountable 
(León, 2018).
 Some authors point out that the increase in accountability demands has led to 
undesirable side effects that can be sorted into two categories: deficits and overloads (Bovens 
et al., 2008). For example, performance data can be presented in the most favorable way by 
excluding underperforming governmental units (Wolf. de & Janssens, 2007). Task-overload 
refers to the amount of accountability demands placed on organizations, leaving less and less 
time for primary tasks (Bovens et al., 2008). 
Accountable public and private negotiators
Negotiations do not necessarily benefit from more accountability (Kramer, Pommerenke, & 
Newton, 1993). For example, despite the societal call for more and more accountable public- 
and private organizations, a central criterion for negotiations in the context of international 
relations to succeed is that they happen ‘behind closed doors’ (Chambers, 2004). In other words, 
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some level of secrecy is needed for negotiations to succeed. When audiences are present, 
they usually insist that negotiators behave tough (Lewicki et al., 2015). Empirical studies 
frequently find that negotiators who are being held accountable behave more dominantly 
or competitively as they are less willing to make concessions (Klimoski, 1972; O’Connor, 1997). 
 In turn, this could lead to higher individual gains, compared to non-accountable 
negotiators, and lower group gains on average (O’Connor, 1997; Pruitt et al., 1978). If 
mechanisms of accountability lead to competitive rather than problem-solving behavior, it 
becomes more difficult to reach agreement. This is especially the case in potential coalitions 
that aim to solve issues by negotiating an agreement. Accountability will lead to more 
competitive behavior during negotiations because negotiators will feel the social need to 
do better for their ’forum’ (cf. O’Connor, 1997), or they may fear the consequences of bad 
performance (Bovens, 2006). As a result, we expect that accountable negotiators behave 
more competitive, leading to lowered performance (Bouwman et al., 2018a).
H1: Compared to non-accountable negotiators, accountable negotiators will perform 
lower in forming coalitions.
Public- and private sector negotiators may have different expectations when they are held 
accountable for their negotiation results. Van der Wal et al. (2008) found that both public- and 
private sector employees place emphasis on accountability in their work but public-sector 
workers find it a more important value. The negative effect of accountability on negotiation 
performance could therefore be stronger for public sector negotiators than for private sector 
negotiators.
 Moreover, public- and private sector employees differ in work motives (Perry & Wise, 
1990; Vandenabeele, 2008) and risk propensity (Buurman et al., 2012; Pfeifer, 2011). When 
placed in the same situation, public and private sector employees behave differently, in a 
range of different settings and tasks (e.g. Belle, 2013; Brewer & Brewer, 2011). For example, 
Esteve et al. (2016) show that individuals with higher public service motivation - a set of 
motives that are typical for public servants - are more likely to cooperate. Similarly, federal 
public sector workers are likely to whistle blow as a result of their motivation for the public 
interest, job commitment and job satisfaction (Brewer & Selden, 1998). 
 Traditionally, who fits the categorizations of public- and private sector workers has been 
the focal point of debate (Bozeman, 2004). Clustering individuals based on the sector in which 
they work assumes that people are either oriented towards the public or private sector. In 
practice, semi-public organizations, quango’s and commercial companies with a societal aim 
are a relevant category that can be placed halfway between these extremes. 
 We will use the concept of public service motivation (PSM) for measuring individuals’ 
predisposition towards the public sector (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). Public service 
motivation aims to measure the motivation that individuals have to contribute to society 
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(Perry & Hondeghem, 2008). As a consequence, PSM is particularly useful in distinguishing 
public sector employees from private sector employees. Originally, the concept of PSM 
was developed using students and has later been extended to employees (Perry, 1996). 
Still, empirical studies show that both students and practitioners differ on PSM based 
on the sectors or study programs they reside in. For example: students enrolled in public 
administration and political science programs have higher levels of PSM on average, compared 
to students enrolled in economics and business administration programs (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 
2017; Vandenabeele, 2008). Compared to a distinction based on sector, PSM is arguably a 
better measure of ‘publicness’ as it allows for a more fine-grained distinction between the 
extremes of individuals’ orientation towards the public and private sector. Additionally, a 
distinction based on measured motives instead of sector fits well with the behavioral public 
administration stream, that aims to use psychological insights in the realm of the public sector 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). 
 In sum, public- and private sector employees respond differently to similar situations, 
and public sector employees will consider accountability as a more important value. Based on 
this, we expect the negative effect of accountability on performance to be stronger for public 
sector employees than for private sector employees. 
H2: The adverse effect of accountability on forming coalitions through negotiations is 
stronger for public sector negotiators compared to private sector negotiators.
METHOD
In this section we describe the experiment that was carried out to test our hypotheses. First, 
we explain the context, the participants and the experimental design. Then we describe the 
experimental procedure, the experimental conditions and the post-test questionnaire. 
Context, participants and experimental design
Our experiment is a face-to-face negotiation setting. For the experiment we used a classroom 
with arranged numbered tables and chairs. In the classroom, subjects were asked to negotiate 
a coalition in triads in a coalition game (see experimental design section). 
 Our experiment is a factorial, between-subjects design. In the experiment, we 
manipulated accountability to test the effect on negotiating a coalition. We used the same 
experiment as Bouwman et al. (Bouwman et al., 2018a) with one addition: we measure the 
participants’ public service motivation as we expect differences between individuals oriented 
to the public sector versus individuals with motives oriented towards the private sector. In 
order to assess differences, we recruit graduate and undergraduate students enrolled in 
public administration and business administration programs at the same university (see table 
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1). Based on students’ self-selection into study programs, we will obtain a reasonably diverse 
sample in terms of public service motivation (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010).
Table 1: Experimental factors.
No accountability &
Low PSM
Accountability
&
Low PSM
No accountability &
High PSM
Accountability
&
High PSM
As in the original study by Bouwman et al. (2018a), the focus is on both individual and group-
level outcomes. There was a total of eight sessions on two different days in May 2015 and 
January 2016. The data on public administration students was collected first in five sessions. 
On the second day, the data on business administration students was collected in three 
sessions. The data from the two days were combined for a cross-sample comparison. 
 There are two experimental conditions. In the control condition, subjects play the 
negotiation game in groups of three. In the treatment condition, the subjects play the same 
game but are accountable to a viewer (one per negotiator). During the experiment, subjects 
played a coalition game (cf. Song & Panayides, 2002). The aim of this negotiation game is to 
form a coalition. Every coalition is worth points for the group of negotiators, which must be 
divided among the individual players. The goal for players is to obtain the highest individual 
score possible (there is no reward as this is a classroom experiment, see also below). The players 
negotiate how to divide the total points is to be divided over the players. The total value and 
boundaries of the negotiation game are denoted below. The value (V) for no coalition for 
all negotiators (A, B and C) is 0 points. The value of a coalition between A and B is 60 points, 
between A and C, 40 points, between B and C, 70 points, and a coalition between all players 
A, B and C gives a total value of 80 points for the players.
v(A), v(B), v(C) = 0 
v(A, B) = 60
v(A, C) = 40
v(B, C) = 70 
v(A, B, C) = 80
(1)
This game has an endless amount of solutions for the players (in game-theoretical terms: 
the core is empty). As a consequence, the coalition agreements made by the negotiators 
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are unstable and there is always at least one proposal that generates a higher value (V) for 
one or more players. For example, if the negotiators decide to split the total value (V) of the 
coalitions evenly over the players, then they will choose the coalition that includes all players 
(A, B, C) which will deliver 80 points in total, which means 26.6 for A, B and C individually. Then, 
negotiator A and B could agree on a coalition that will deliver them more points because V 
(A, B) = 60 and both get 30 points if divided evenly. The same also goes for this agreement, as 
negotiator B and C can do better and so on. The negotiation itself thus revolves around the 
precise division of points (value) over the negotiators. 
 The situation where one optimal solution does not exist is representative for many 
negotiation settings and any agreement made is the result of a multitude of interests that also 
vary over time and space (Head, 2008). In this negotiation game, the negotiators will never 
reach a stable solution and will potentially negotiate endlessly (Song & Panayides, 2002). A 
time constraint of five minutes was set for each round in our experiment. For the procedure 
see Appendix A.
Procedure
The participants are first randomized and assigned to groups of three. We ensured 
randomization by having the participants draw from pre-printed numbers that correspond to 
one of the tables and player positions (A, B or C). After taking place at one of the negotiation 
tables, the participants all read the instruction sheet (see appendix B). The instructions are read 
out aloud by one of the researchers and participants can ask questions. Then the negotiations 
start. The scores of each participant in each round are noted by the players on forms. 
Control condition
The participants played the coalition game six times in total (see figure 1). Between rounds, the 
players are assigned to a different player position (A, B or C). After three rounds, the subjects 
are re-matched across tables. For an overview of the entire procedure, see appendix A.
Procedure
Subjects are randomly assigned in groups of three people upon entry and
read the instructions sheet. Next, the instructions are read out aloud by the
researcher. Randomization was ensured by drawing from printed number-cards
that corresponded to the pre-numbered tables in the room.
After each round, the subjects note their individual scores and group scores
on paper. In total the subjects play this game six times with rematches between
rounds. For each of the six rounds, the subjects have 5 minutes (See figure:
1). During the experiment, a time constraint ends the negotiation round (see
appendix A for the entire procedure).
Control
In the control condition, the subje ts play the strategic alliance game 6 times
in total (See figure 1). After each round, the subjects are assigned a di↵erent
position (A,B or C). After three round , the subjects are rematched across tables.
For an overview of the entire procedure, see appendix A.
A
B C
Figure 1: Negotiation a coalition in the control condition
Treatment
Subjects are matched in groups (triplets) of players and viewers. The players play
the coalition game but now every player has a viewer (a personal accountability
13
Figure 1: Negotiating a coalition in the control condition.
Treatment condition
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The participants in the treatment condition play the same coalition game as in the control 
condition with the addition that each negotiator has an individual viewer (an individual 
accountability forum) to which he/she reports. The viewer has an incentive to give feedback 
to the negotiator and interfere with the process as the viewer receives 30% of what the 
negotiator earns, not deducted from the negotiators’ scores. 
forum) which he/she must report to. This viewer receives 30% of the players
(A,B,C) points, which are not deducted from the players total. Therefore, the
viewer has an interest to give feedback and interfere with the process. The viewers
watch the negotiation process and are allowed to give feedback at set moments.
The responsibility remains with the players. All viewers and negotiators are able
see each other.
The negotiation game is played for 2 minutes (figure 2)(Step I). Then, the
players have to report to their viewers. The viewers are allowed to react on the
strategy, earnings and results of the players (one minute) (Step II). Then, A, B
and C play for another three minutes (Step III). This process is repeated six
times. In be ween, subjects ar rematched over the groups, as well as over the
players or supervisor group (see figure 2). The subjects are matched in such a
manner, that they do not meet the same player and/or viewer a second time.
X
A
Y
B
Z
C
X
A
Y
B
Z
C
X
A
Y
B
Z
C
Step I Step II Step III
Figure 2: Negotiation a coalition in the treatment condition
When the negotiation round finishes, the viewers ’pass judgement’ (Bovens, 2005)
by giving either a green or a red card to his or her matched player (Step II).
In case of a green card, the player is allowed to keep the earned points. A red
14
Figure 2: Negotiation a coalition in the treatment condition.
At the fourth minute, the viewers were allowed to give feedback and discuss with the 
negotiators. When the negotiation started again for one more minute, the viewers had to 
remain silent. As a result, the ultimate responsibility for the outcome and decisive power 
remained with the negotiator. All negotiators and view rs could see each other. When the 
negotiation starts, the players negotiate for two minutes (see step I in figure 2). Then, the 
players have to discuss with their viewers. The viewers are allowed to react to the strategy, 
earnings and results of their negotiator only (for one minute) (step II). Then, A, B and C negotiate 
for an additional three minutes, adding up to a total negotiation time of 5 minutes (step III). 
 As in the control condition, the negotiators are re-matched over the groups (after three 
rounds), as well as over the players or supervisor configurations (each round) (see figure 2). 
The subjects are paired in such a manner that they will never meet the same negotiator and/
or viewer a second time.
 When the negotiation round finishes, the viewers ’pass judgment’ (Bovens, 2005) by 
giving either a green or a red card to his or her matched player (after step III). In case of a 
green card, the player is allowed to keep the points earned. Poor performance in the eyes 
of the viewer can be penalized by a red card. Negotiators who receive a red card have to 
subtract 2 points from their round-total. Potentially this may add up to a total of 12 points 
being subtracted from the players total score. Players and viewers switch chairs after three 
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rounds of play. Finally, the subjects could ask questions and were extensively debriefed and 
informed about the purpose of the experiment. See appendix A for the order of events and 
re-matching.
 We carried out a pilot session prior to the actual experiment. Based on the pilot round, 
we improved the wording on the instruction sheet and added green and red cards as means 
of feedback between negotiator and viewer instead of written feedback.
Rewards
The experiment was part of a public administration and business administration course. 
The participants were instructed that the points were valuable for them.  As a result, the 
participants were not financially reimbursed, as is customary in experimental economics 
(Charness & Kuhn, 2011). 
Measures and Covariates
Our main dependent variable is the individual scores that the negotiators obtain during 
the experiment. The background characteristics of the participants were measured using a 
posttest, paper-based questionnaire right after the experiment. We used the 10-item, Steijn 
and Leijsink (2009) standardized abridged Dutch version of the PSM questionnaire. In addition 
to PSM, the questionnaire contained questions on age, gender, study type and a manipulation 
check (three questions) (See the appendix belonging to Chapter 5).
Table 2: Descriptives and correlations.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. DV scores (Σ) 108.66 46.06
2. Experimental condition 0.69 0.46 -0.62***
3. Male 0.64 0.64 0.02 0.07
4. Age 24.17 2.66 -0.16 0.16 -0.02
5. PSM (a = 0.66) 2.93 0.47 0.04 -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.27**
6. Study type, Public Administration = 1 0.63 0.48 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.49*** -0.25**
Note: n=123-138 (pairwise), Listwise n=138. Note: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. Based on the 
descriptive statistics we can make a number of observations. First, there seems to be a 
negative statistically significant association between experimental condition and the 
negotiation scores. Moreover, there is a negative association between PSM and experimental 
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condition, gender and age. Finally, there is a positive association between age and study 
type and between PSM and study type. Contrary to our expectation, business administration 
students seem to have equal or higher PSM levels, compared to the public administration 
students. A final note is that the reliability of the PSM scale is lower than expected and lower 
than found in earlier research using the same scale or individual dimensions (cf. van Loon, 
Kjeldsen, Andersen, Vandenabeele, & Leisink, 2016).  All variables are included in later analyses 
to control for any confounding effects.
At the group-level, the effect of our experimental manipulation is statistically significant 
(t = 5.38, p = 0.000) and can be considered a large effect size (Cohens d = 1.36). Over the 
experiment, the negotiators not subjected to accountability scored significantly more points 
(M = 461.38, SD= 29.54) than the accountable negotiators (M = 380,53, SD = 52,64) (See figure 
3). Over the duration of the experiment, individual scores show a similar pattern, regardless of 
the experimental condition.
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Figure 3: Mean group scores by experimental condition (left). Mean individual scores for the experimental conditions, 
plotted over time (right).
The negotiators could agree on a coalition type for each agreement, such as AC, AB, BC, ABC 
or no coalition. The occurrence of coalition types differed significantly over the experimental 
conditions (X2 = 51.09, p = 0.000). 
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Table 3: Coalitions over the experiment, % and (counts).
No accountability Accountability Test
AB 1.2% (1) 16.7% (17)
AC 2.4% (2) 11.8% (12)
BC 6.0% (5) 26.5% (27)
ABC 89.3% (75) 38.2% (39)
No coalition 1.2% (1) 6.9% (7)
100% (84) 100% (102) X2 = 51.09
p = 0.000
There are no statistically significant differences between the control conditions of the two 
study types (X2 = 6, p = 0.1991) or between treatment conditions between the two study types 
(X2 = 0, p = 1) (See Appendix D). In order to test the hypotheses, we carried out hierarchical 
regression in successive steps (Gelman & Hill, 2007). A hierarchical model is especially suited 
as 1) we analyze clustered data of individual negotiators within groups and 2) individual 
negotiator performance is a function of group and thus opponent performance. Consequently, 
the performance will also cluster within groups as result of the experimental setup.
 The continuous predictors were mean-centered to reduce the potential effect of 
multicollinearity in the interaction models. The tests of the two a-priori hypotheses were 
conducted using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 0.025 per test (0.05/2).
The first hypothesis: Accountable negotiators will underperform compared to non-accountable 
negotiators in forming coalitions is supported by the experimental data. We test this hypothesis 
at the group (negotiator) level and at the individual level. At the level of the group, there is a 
statistically significant effect of accountability in the negotiation outcomes (b = -.80.86, t(29) = 
-5.11, p = 0.000), R2 = .45, F(1, 29) = 26.14, p = 0.000. Additionally, this hypothesis is confirmed 
for the negotiator level with negotiators as random intercepts (See model 1, Table 4). 
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Table 4: Hierarchical estimates on negotiation scores.
MODEL 1: Experimental accountability treatment
  Fixed effects B SE B t p
  Intercept 25.11 0.933 26.93 0.000
  Experimental treatment -10.15 1.121 -9.052 0.000
  Random effects Variance SD
  σ2 Negotiator 2.63 1.62
  σ2 Residuals 203.40 14.26
  AIC=6682.82, BIC=6701.66, LogLik=-3337.41, df.resid.=814
MODEL 2: Experimental treatment, PSM 
  Fixed effects B SE B t p
  Intercept 25.77 1.003 25.68 0.000
  Experimental treatment -11.369 1.25 -9.07 0.000
  PSM (ALPHA = .66) -3.08 1.25 -2.45 0.015
  Random effects Variance SD
  σ2 Negotiator 4.41 2.10
  σ2 Residuals 202.38 14.23
  AIC=5981.2, BIC=6004.21, LogLik=-2985.62, df.resid.=727
MODEL 3: Experimental treatment, PSM and interaction
  Fixed effects B SE B t p
  Intercept -25.66 1.04 24.72 0.000
  Experimental treatment -11.32 2.26 -8.97 0.000
  PSM (ALPHA = .66) -2.56 1.70 -1.50 0.133
  PSM x Experimental treatment -1.15 2.53 -0.45 0.651
  Random effects Variance SD
  σ2 Negotiator 4.68 2.16
  σ2 Residuals 202.38 14.23
  AIC=5979.3, BIC=6006.9, LogLik=-2983.66, df.resid.=726
MODEL 4: Experimental treatment and covariates
  Fixed effects B SE B t p
  Intercept 26.54 1.77 14.99 0.000
  Experimental treatment -11.49 1.34 -8.56 0.000
  PSM (ALPHA = .66) -3.28 1.41 -2.33 0.020
  Male 0.48 1.26 0.38 0.702
  Age 0.12 0.26 0.44 0.659
  Study type -1.26 1.51 -0.83 0.405
  Random effects Variance SD
  σ2 Negotiator 5.45 2.33
  σ2 Residuals 202.89 14.24
AIC=5838.1, BIC=5874.66, LogLik=-2911.04, df.resid.=706
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The second hypothesis: Compared to non-accountable negotiators, accountable negotiators 
will perform lower in forming coalitions is not supported by our data. Model 2 shows PSM 
has a negative statistical effect on the scores of negotiators, in addition to the experimental 
condition. Based on our hypothesis, we expect that the effect is stronger for public sector 
negotiators, compared to private sector negotiators. In other words, the different samples 
in our experiment need to show a statistically significant interaction with the experimental 
treatment effect. Model 3 shows that there is no interaction present. Both the experimental 
treatment and PSM separately have a negative effect on the negotiator scores, which is 
indifferent to any interaction between PSM and accountability (see figure 4 also). Model 4 
also confirms that there is no effect of study type on individual negotiation outcomes (despite 
the correlation between PSM and study type). Moreover, there is no effect of gender and age 
on the negotiation outcomes in the experiment.
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Figure 4: Scores and PSM by experimental condition.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Despite that negotiation processes and outcomes occur frequently in many organizations, 
very few studies have focused on differences between negotiations carried out by public 
and private sector actors. Similarly, the role of accountability in public and private sector has 
grown over the years while its effects on public and private sector negotiators have not been 
studied. This study aimed to add to the literature by focusing on both accountability and 
differences between public and private sector negotiators. 
 Firstly, we found that accountability has an adverse effect on the performance of 
negotiators when forming coalitions. This finding resonates with earlier findings on variable 
sum negotiations (Pruitt et al., 1978), on groups of negotiators (O’Connor, 1997) and replicates 
the results of Bouwman et al. (2018a) for negotiating coalitions. In addition, we found that 
negotiator performance is lower at the group-level, as well as at the individual level. There are 
a few possible/plausible explanations for this effect. For example, negotiators who are held 
accountable may feel the need to act stronger or tougher in eyesight of viewers (Mosterd 
& Rutte, 2000). The pressure of being watched by superiors or the pressure of oversight 
mechanisms (Shikano et al., 2017) may trigger negotiators to try harder. If all group members 
try harder when they are being watched, reaching a solution becomes harder. Another 
potential explanation is that the positive aspects of accountability fora are overrated in theory 
(Naurin, 2007) and that accountability mechanisms could lead actors to use a different rhetoric 
(Chambers, 2004), in turn leading to different interactions between negotiators.
   Secondly, we found that the effect of accountability on negotiator performance in 
negotiating a coalition is not significantly different for public sector and private sector 
negotiators. This finding is interesting as recent research has shown that PSM leads to higher 
levels of collaboration in three prisoner dilemma games (Esteve et al., 2015). Balancing 
between collaboration and competition is a crucial element in negotiating a coalition. Also, 
as accountability is rated as more important by public sector negotiators (de Graaf & van der 
Wal, 2010) and enforcing accountability triggers more competitive behavior, we expected 
that public sector negotiators would perform less well. This was not corroborated. 
 A potential explanation for this finding is that the weight that public sector negotiators 
attach to accountability as a value does not match with externally enforced accountability 
in practice. In addition to this, accountability is typically enforced externally in practice, and 
also in our experiment, which may have a stronger direct effect on behavior than public 
service motivation does. For example, Jacobsen, Hvitved and Andersen (2014) found that 
strong perceived obligations for school teachers crowded out their individual motivation. 
Also, the idea of PSM refers to an unidentified, distal beneficiary while in our experiment, the 
beneficiaries were proximal (Vandenabeele, Ritz, & Neumann, 2018).
Finally, two important limitations of this study need to be discussed. Firstly, we used student 
subjects in the experiment to test the effect of accountability on negotiation performance 
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and to test differences between negotiators oriented towards the public- versus the 
private sector. Student samples have the advantage of high internal validity because of the 
homogeneity between experimental conditions (Belot et al., 2015; Charness & Kuhn, 2011). 
However, different samples may generate different results, especially when it comes to testing 
our second hypothesis that focuses on differences between the samples of public and private 
sector negotiators that leans on individual characteristics. Future research should try to use 
samples that are more representative for public and private sector employees, preferably 
practitioners.
 A second limitation is that our experimental game is a low stakes game and accountability 
is simulated in a very direct manner: with payoffs for the accountability forum and individual 
negotiators. In practice, payoffs for individual negotiators may not exist or are more covert. 
Additionally, the open and visible way in which the negotiators were held accountable in our 
experiment may have impacted the outcome. This situation is comparable to some extent 
with the situation in practice where open debates with citizens and media press public 
leaders for answers impact outcome as well. 
To our knowledge, this study is the only scholarly study that empirically and experimentally 
tests the effect of accountability on negotiator performance for different types of negotiators: 
those oriented towards the public sector versus the private sector. The absence of studies is 
remarkable given that negotiation is a core activity of public and private sector employees, 
and that accountability demands are increasing in both sectors. Our findings stress that 
accountability has a strong downward effect on the outcomes of negotiations and that this 
effect is not significantly different for negotiators with public and private sector orientation. 
More research is needed to improve our understanding of negotiations and accountability for 
different negotiators, coalition composition, organizations and negotiation types. 
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ABSTRACT
Negotiation is a critical form of decision-making in public- and private organizations. 
Empirical evidence suggests that public- and private sector contexts are different and that 
the respective workers have distinguishing traits, motives and behaviors. Experimental 
research using student subjects show mixed results when it comes to those differences and 
their impacts on negotiations. An often-heard critique on the use of students as experimental 
subjects is that they are not representative for the target population and lack experience, 
rendering findings unreliable.
By using a lab-in-the field experiment, this study presents the results from two replications 
of negotiation studies. The sample consists of employees from two mid-sized Dutch 
municipalities as well as university alumni, working in the private sector.
Study 1 shows that public and private sector negotiators indeed show different negotiation 
behavior and outcomes as their inclination to collaborate differs. Study 2 shows that negotiators 
with little discretion place larger claims on the total available ‘pie’, a finding that challenges 
a core-assumption of game theory. Both study 1 and study 2 show a high resemblance to 
earlier studies that use student subjects. 
This chapter is submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal.
 115 
6
INTRODUCTION
This study replicates two negotiation studies that were originally carried out with a student 
sample by now using a sample of practitioners.The aim is to understand if and how the 
findings of the student-based experiments can be replicated with practitioners. The first 
experiment uses a repeated public goods game (PGG) to test the effect of public service 
motivation on collaboration in a negotiation setting (Bouwman, van Thiel, van Deemen, & 
Rouwette, 2018b). The second experiment tests the effect of discretion levels in a negotiation 
setting on the outcome of negotiations (Bouwman & van Deemen, 2018). By using these 
two experiments, this paper focuses on individual characteristics and motives by using the 
PGG and focuses on contextual elements by using a variable sum negotiation game in which 
discretion is manipulated. There are three reasons why replicating negotiation experiments 
with practitioners is important. 
 Firstly, despite the relevance of negotiations as a research topic, there is little empirical 
research in public administration that focuses on negotiations mechanisms and outcomes, 
especially at the individual, negotiator level. Some notable exceptions that are relevant for the 
public sector are Torenvlied and Akkerman (2004), who focus on the interactions between 
social partners, Lehr et al. (2016), who focuses on information spillovers in wage bargaining or 
(Perry & Angle, 1979) who focus on role behavior of negotiators. Still, none focus on negotiation 
behavior and outcomes of public sector negotiators such as public managers, civil servants 
and private sector managers. This is surprising as negotiation is one of the core processes in 
the public- and private sector that leads to binding and nonbinding decisions. Politicians, civil 
servants, and members from civil society generate many agreements and decisions on joint 
issues. For example: public sector employees negotiate in public–private partnership projects 
to achieve goals that are aspired by both private and public sector parties (Klijn et al., 1995). 
Developments, such as New Public Management have led to an increase of the significance of 
negotiations for public servants as more contracts, performance agreements and covenants 
have to be made (Hood, 2006; Hood, 1991). Literature on networks in the public sector 
acknowledges negotiation as an important tool but neglects process of negotiation, tactics 
and individual characteristics of actors within the network itself (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012). 
 Secondly, negotiation literature focuses on the outcomes as a result of traits or motives 
(Elfenbein et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2016), negotiation strategy (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, 
& Euwema, 2006; Knott, Miller, & Verkuilen, 2003), negotiation in teams (O’Connor, 1997), 
coalitions (Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1986; van Deemen, 2013) and effects of culture on 
negotiation (Salacuse, 1998). A distinction between public- and private sectors is not typically 
made, while public and private sector employees differ in negotiation contexts (eg. Colosi, 
1983) and at the individual level. For example, private sector workers and entrepreneurs 
are known to be more risk seeking, in many day-to-day and work activities, compared to 
government employees (Hartog et al., 2002). Public sector workers on the other hand, act 
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more collaboratively (Esteve et al., 2015) and are more motivated to contribute to a ‘distal’ 
public good, a set of motives better known as Public Service Motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990; 
Vandenabeele, 2008).
 Thirdly, this article also has an important methodological contribution. Many negotiation 
studies use student participants as experimental subjects. For instance, in a review of 60 
laboratory experiments in economics, only four papers used non-students (Danielson & 
Holm, 2007). A substantial share of public administration experiments also employ students as 
participants (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Li & Van Ryzin, 2017) but the use of student 
samples has been the focal point of many methodological debates (Charness & Kuhn, 2011; 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Students are cheap, available, accustomed to receiving 
and following instructions, and provide a homogenous statistical subject sample (Charness 
& Kuhn, 2011; Morton & Williams, 2010). However, students are not always considered to be 
representative for the target population researchers are interested in. Students are for example 
fairly young and thus inexperienced in certain areas or tasks. A good example for negotiations 
is that negotiation proficiency has been connected to experience and thus negotiation 
proficiency correlates with age (Uta & Sabine, 2011). Moreover, a large-scale replication project 
in the field of social psychology showed that only a small proportion of the findings – based 
on experiments with student participants – could be replicated (Open Science Collaboration, 
2015). Within the recent ‘experimental turn’ in public administration and the upcoming stream
of behavioral public administration (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017) this particular issue has 
gained attention as part of the broader calls for more replication (Walker, James, & Brewer, 2017).
 By replicating the two mentioned studies, we respond to the call for more replications 
and carry out an empirical generalization (Tsang & Kwan, 1999; Walker et al., 2017, p. 1226) 
with practitioners from the public- and private sector. The practitioners were recruited from 
a post-graduate alumni-program and from two medium sized Dutch municipalities. We use 
a lab-in-the-field setup for running the experimental sessions enabling to collect data with 
practitioners (See Morton & Williams, 2010 for an overview of experimental types).
 In the coming sections, negotiations in the public and private sector are discussed first. 
After this, we discuss differences between the public- and the private sector at two levels; 
differences in individual characteristics and differences at the contextual level. This results in 
three testable hypotheses. Next, we discuss the two experiments and our practitioner sample 
before we turn to the results and discussion and conclusion of the results. 
NEGOTIATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
Negotiation is: ‘the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching agreement 
with others when some of your interests are shared and some are opposed’ (Ury, 1993). Central 
to negotiation settings is that the negotiators are interdependent: in order to reach their own 
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goals, they must coordinate with others (Raiffa et al., 2002). Two types of negotiations can 
be distinguished: constant-sum/zero-sum negotiations and variable sum negotiations. In 
constant/zero sum negotiations, achieving one negotiator’s goal, directly blocks the other 
party to achieve his or her goal (Raiffa et al., 2002). Negotiators claim parts of a fixed resource 
by making offers and counteroffers. Negotiations over fixed means such as budgets are 
typically constant sum. In variable sum negotiations, all parties can achieve individual goals 
without blocking other parties’ goals. The total size of the ‘pie’ is not fixed a priori, enabling 
negotiators to search for alternatives and add value to the pie. Variable sum negotiations 
allow for problem solving by contributing to individual and group goals (Lewicki et al., 2015). 
Most negotiations in practice are a combination of the pure constant-sum and variable sum 
negotiation types, so called ‘mixed scanning’ (Ibid.). Problem-solving and claiming co-exist in 
for example public-private partnerships and infrastructural projects as actors are interested in 
the benefits, that could be mutually exclusive, while they will have to solve issues at the same 
time. As the public- and private sector are different in aims, contexts, output and outcomes 
(Boyne, 2002; Bozeman, 2004; Rainey, 2003), negotiations in those sectors are different too 
(Bouwman, 2018). We discern between differences that take place at the individual level, and 
differences that are contextual. Below, we first discuss individual differences and then the 
contextual differences. Similarly, we test individual differences in the first experiment and 
effects of contextual differences in the second experiment (see the methods also).
Individual differences
Individual differences between public- and private sector workers have been well 
documented. On average, public sector workers are more motivated to serve the public 
good, have a higher interest in politics and policymaking, are more willing to self-sacrifice 
and are more compassionate (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). These motives are better 
known as Public Service Motivation (PSM). Empirical research has shown that PSM differs 
systematically between public- and private sector employees and between students of 
public administration/political science and business administration and economics (Van 
Witteloostuijn et al., 2017). High PSM individuals such as civil servants are more likely to be 
whistle-blowers (Brewer & Selden, 1998), show higher job-performance when they have face-
to-face contact with beneficiaries (Belle, 2013) and high-PSM physiotherapists serve a higher 
proportion of disabled patients, which is less lucrative (Bøgh Andersen & Serritzlew, 2012). 
 Furthermore, PSM is found to be associated with observable behavior in recent 
experimental laboratory studies. For instance, Esteve et al. (2016, 2015) found that high PSM 
individuals – such as public servants – act more prosocial if the group also acts prosocial while 
they do not act more pro-social if the behavior of the group also is less prosocial. Extending
the findings of Esteve et al. (2016), Bouwman et al. (2018b) used a repeated public goods 
game, mimicking repeated negotiation interactions. As many interactions in both the public 
and private sector are recurrent, repeated negotiations arguably provide a better benchmark 
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for testing collaboration. In this experiment, student participants were matched based on the 
study programs they were enrolled in, effectively creating high, low and mixed PSM-groups 
of negotiators. This way, overall collaboration and conditional collaboration, based on group-
matching was tested. 
The most important finding by Bouwman et al. (2018b) is that high-PSM subjects tend to 
collaborate more than low-PSM subjects by making higher contributions over the entire 
experiment, regardless of matching to low- or high-PSM opponents. We assume that public 
and private sector practitioners will behave the same as the student-subjects in the original 
experiment. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:
H1: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM subjects act more collaboratively than low-PSM 
subjects.
Contextual differences
Public and private sector contexts are different from each other in a number of dimensions. 
For instance, public organizations create public goods and services by definition, they are 
publicly owned and financed by means of taxes, and public organizations (and thus public 
sector workers) adhere to a different set of values. In practice, negotiations in the public sector 
are carried out in name of some unidentified beneficiary: citizens or society at large. In the 
private sector, negotiations are carried out in name of a company, which has more proximal 
owners or shareholders. In the private sector, accountability regimes are focused on financial 
outcomes such as bottom line results, while accountability in the public sector is focused on 
procedures and policy outcomes, via political representation (Mulgan, 2000b). 
 Another interesting difference between public- and private organizations is that 
whereas private organizations pursue a limited set of goals like continuity and profitability, 
public organizations pursue many more goals that are can be conflicting internally or with the 
goals of other public organizations (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000a). 
 While the public-private distinction has been criticized in the past for being overly 
simplistic (Perry & Rainey, 1988; Weintraub, 1997), and the distinction between sectors is 
blurring (Dees & Anderson, 2003; Lee, 2011), the main tasks and functions remain different 
for public- and private sector organizations. One approach treats organizations not as 
dichotomous but places organizations on a continuum in a plane with two axes: political 
influence and economic autonomy (Bozeman, 2004). All organizations experience some 
level of political influence, with private organizations experiencing little political interference 
and public organizations high political influence. Similarly, private sector organizations are 
relatively autonomous when it comes to deciding over organizational assets while public 
organizations have less autonomy in doing so. Overall, public organizations have less 
autonomy, both financially and politically, leaving less room for workers to make individual 
choices and weigh personal considerations.
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 In general, discretion of individuals has been argued to positively impact productivity 
(Graham, 1992; Strain, 1999). This increase in performance is also observed for teams of people, 
working together on a common task (Leach et al., 2005). Moreover, more discretion leads to 
more extra-role behaviors and a greater variety of in-role behaviors for workers (Gellatly & 
Irving, 2001). As autonomy for organizations varies between public and private organizations, 
and public sector negotiators have less discretion as a consequence, the responses from 
public- and private sector negotiators will be different (Bouwman & van Deemen, 2018). In 
a negotiation setting, less discretion means less space to maneuver and less opportunity to 
explore alternative agreements (see the design of the second experiment). From a game-
theoretic perspective, discretion in negotiations is dependent on the size of the negotiation 
set. The negotiation set is the number of available potential solutions to a negotiation 
problem. More potential solutions equal more alternative solutions and more opportunity or 
need to explore these solutions. 
 Bouwman and van Deemen (2018) tested if the negotiation outcomes vary with 
changes in negotiator discretion – the negotiation set -  in a coalition game. In an experiment 
with n = 158 student subjects, they manipulated the level of discretion that negotiators had 
in three levels: small, medium and large negotiation discretion. They found that - in contrast 
with the game-theoretical prediction – negotiators claimed a larger part of the total pie when 
they negotiated in the small condition, compared to the medium condition. In the medium 
and large conditions, the differences were not statistically significant. The attractiveness 
of negotiation solutions for negotiators apparently varies with the level discretion they 
experience (Ibid.). Therefore, the second hypothesis for this replication is:
 H2: The solution of the negotiation problem varies with the size of the negotiation set.
Additionally, they tested whether responses to contextual discretion were different for high-
PSM and low-PSM negotiators. As public sector workers have a number of distinguishing 
characteristics, such as lower risk tolerance (Hartog et al., 2002; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990), 
being attracted to working in the public sector (Vandenabeele, 2008) and showing different 
behavior when solving complex problems (Franco & Rouwette, 2016), it is expected that 
subjects with high PSM will also negotiate differently. Moreover, as public sector negotiators 
are subject to more political interference, and less financial autonomy (Bozeman, 2004), they 
expected the effect of discretion to be stronger for subjects from the public sector, such as 
those subjects with high-PSM (Bouwman & van Deemen, 2018). For this replication, we have 
the same expectation, resulting in the following hypothesis:
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H3: The effect of variations in the size of the negotiations set is stronger for public sector 
negotiators than for private sector negotiators.
Note that the expectation that high- and low PSM subjects behave differently under varying 
levels of discretion was not corroborated in the original study (Ibid.). This replication is based 
on the same theoretical foundations and thus results in the same hypotheses.
DATA AND METHOD
This section sets out the two experiments that were used to test the hypotheses. First, we 
describe the lab-in-the-field setup, next we lay out the specifics of the two experimental 
designs, the experimental conditions, the participants, measures and posttest measures.
Design and participants
This study utilizes a lab-in-the-field approach in order to test the hypotheses. The replication 
is a so-called empirical generalization: the same experimental design is used, but with 
a different sample composition (Walker et al., 2017). Critiques on traditional laboratory 
experiments often focus on the potentially lowered external validity and limited statistical 
generalizability (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; James, Jilke, & Van Ryzin, 2017). A lab in 
the field setting offers the advantage of a highly-controlled laboratory setting, combined with 
a more ecological valid subject sample thereby increasing also the external validity (Morton 
& Williams, 2010). We ran three sessions of the experiments over the course of three months 
in the Fall of 2017. We used 24 connected laptop-computers, placed in individual cubicles at 
the respective locations of the municipalities and with the university alumni. The laptops were 
equipped with Z-tree 3.6.7 for administering the experiment (Fischbacher, 2007).
Each of the sessions took place according to the same protocol: first the participants were 
seated at one of the cubicles, the instructions for the first experiment were read out aloud by 
the researcher and appeared on the screens, then the participants could ask questions. Next 
the first experiment commenced. After 20 rounds of the first experiment, the instructions 
for the second experiment followed. Again, questions could be posed and the second 
experiment was started. Finally, the post-test questionnaire followed and the subjects were 
debriefed (See Figure 1).
Instructions I Experiment I Experiment IIInstructions II Posttestquestions
Figure 1: Order of events during experimental sessions.
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Experiment 1
The first experiment is a quasi-experiment, in which the participants play a repeated two-
person public goods game (PGG). The aim of this experiment is to test whether cooperation 
varies with Public Service Motivation. PGGs are commonly used to study cooperation, 
and competitive behavior (eg. Hauert et al., 2002; Semmann et al., 2003). Additionally, our 
game is a repeated public goods game, meaning that players have the same opponent for 
a number of rounds, instead of rematches for each decision. As building trust is central to 
many negotiations relations, a repeated public goods game is better suited than the one-shot 
alternative (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b). 
 A public goods game enables the negotiators in the game to choose between 
cooperation and competition. The participants are asked to allocate an amount to a common 
pool from an initial received endowment of 10 units. Thus, the participants choose how many 
of the 10 units are contributed and how many remain in the ‘purse’ of the individual negotiators. 
The contributed amount to the common pool is multiplied by the known multiplier of 1.5 and 
are divided over both the contributors. This way, high contributions generate higher utility for 
the individual contributors. 
 The competitive choice is to expect the opponent to contribute, but refrain from 
contributing yourself. A cooperative choice would be to contribute as much as possible, 
increasing the odds of a higher joint outcome. The PGG was played twenty rounds, with no 
rematches in between. The participants had full information on all aspects of the PGG except 
the identity of their opponent.
 This replication deviates in two ways from the original Bouwman et al. (2018b) study. 
First, the participants negotiate 20 times, instead of 30 in the original study. Second, the 
practitioners were not matched to their opponents based on their expected PSM levels, as 
the students were in the original study.
Experiment 2
The second experiment is a within-subjects design with a variable sum negotiation game in 
which the players were asked to divide a surplus in pairs of two (cf. Bouwman & van Deemen, 
2018). The negotiators are given lower and upper boundaries for the surplus and have to make 
offers and counteroffers in order to arrive at an agreement on how to split the surplus. The 
players could make as many proposals back and forth as they wished, within the timeframe of 
30 seconds for each decision. To create an agreement, the negotiators could select the offers 
and click on ‘agree’. Reaching an agreement or running out of time ended the negotiation 
round. If none of the players agreed, the payoff was zero for the players.
 The size of the surplus (or the upper and lower boundaries) were manipulated in this 
experiment in order to test the effect of discretion levels on the negotiation outcomes (see 
Table 1). For each negotiation round, the players were randomly placed in one of the three 
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experimental conditions of small, medium sized and large negotiation discretion. Effectively, 
the size of the surplus was 10, 30 or 90 points for each decision. 
Table 1: Experimental conditions and discretion size (cf. Bouwman & van Deemen, 2018).
Negotiation discretion Small Medium Large
Lower and upper boundaries 90-100 80-110 70-160
Size of the surplus 10 30 90
After two test rounds, the negotiators were randomly re-matched each 10 rounds. This was 
done three times, leading up to 30 negotiation decisions per individual negotiator, with three 
different opponents. Negotiators could not ‘meet’ the same opponent a second time.
 This replication deviates from the original study by Bouwman and van Deemen (2018) 
as it is a within-subjects design in which the participants are randomly assigned to all of 
the experimental conditions, compared to the original between-subject study in which 
the participants were randomly assigned to one condition only. A within-subjects design is 
advantageous as it creates a individual-level baseline to compare the treatments. A within-
subjects-design also offers advantages in terms of statistical power (Greenwald, 1976).
Incentives
The participants were instructed that the points were valuable to them. The participants 
were not reimbursed financially, as is customary in behavioral economics (Charness & Kuhn, 
2011). After the experiment a workshop was held in which the results of the prior negotiation 
research were discussed.
Variables
As the aims for the two experiments are different, we used two different dependent variables. 
In the first experiment, we focus on the contributions to the common pool of the individual 
negotiators. The contributions in a PGG are a conventional measure of pro-social behavior 
(Esteve et al., 2016; Hauert et al., 2002) because the negotiators are asked to balance between 
contributing to a greater good at the cost of their own benefit. In the second experiment, 
the dependent variable is the claim that negotiators agreed on as percentage of the total 
available ‘pie’ or surplus. This way, the claims can be compared across experimental groups 
and for the background variables.
 In order to control for the background characteristics of the subject sample, a posttest 
questionnaire was given to all participants. The questionnaire contained questions on age, 
gender, and highest educational level attained. Additionally, the subjects filled out the 
standardized Kim et al (2013) translated public service motivation PSM questionnaire with 
16 items. The individual PSM measure provides the basis on which public sector and private 
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sector oriented negotiators can be distinguished. In addition to this, we measured risk 
propensity with the Risk Taking Index (TKI) (Nicholson et al., 2005) and Social Value Orientation 
by using a decomposed game (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011; Van Lange, 1999) as 
risk taking and value orientation is known to vary over individuals and to impact negotiation 
behavior (Lewicki et al., 2015).
 
Ethical statement
At the time of data collection, no formal requirement existed for formal approval of the ethical 
committee for studies that were non-clinical. All participants in our subject sample gave verbal 
consent during the sessions. This consent is seen as sufficient as there are few risks involved 
and the participants were free to opt-out at any given moment without consequences. Prior 
to the experiment, the participants received instructions and were told that there were no 
negative consequences of opting out and that data was stored anonymously and that the 
data would be used for (re)analysis. After the experiments, the participants were debriefed 
extensively about the aim and purpose of the study and were still given the opportunity to 
opt-out.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In total, there were 30 participants in three different sessions. The participants are employees 
from the real-estate departments from two mid-sized Dutch municipalities. Real-estate 
employees typically negotiate over acquisition and sale of plots and coordinate with housing 
developers. Additionally, a session was organized by inviting alumni from the university. These 
participants have a background in project development, sales and consultancy.
 In the first experiment, the participants played 20 rounds, adding the observations up 
to n=600. For the second experiment there were 32 decisions for each negotiator, adding 
up to n=960 observations. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations for all 
variables. Based on the descriptive statistics, we can draw a number of conclusions. Firstly, 
the average age of the participants is 44.23 years, with over two thirds of the sample being 
male. What stands out is that pro-social motivation is negatively associated with pro-self-
motivation. Theoretically, prosocial motivation is the motivation to help identified while pro-
self-motivation is the tendency to contribute to the self, rather than others. How pro-social 
and pro-self motivation relate is part of an ongoing discussion. Our descriptive findings seem 
to suggest that pro-self and pro-social are two extremes on one dimension. 
 Secondly, the scores in the second experimental game are positively associated with 
the contributions in the first experiment. The latter means that negotiators who contributed 
higher amounts in the PGG, also claimed a larger share of the ‘pie’ in the discretion experiment.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations (n=30).
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Male 0.633 0.49
2 Age 44.233 11.395 0.12
3
Highest 
education 3.433 0.898 -0.02 -0.1
4 Public sector 0.833 0.379 -0.15 -0.14 0.32
5 Pro-self 0.667 0.479 -0.1 0.01 -0.05 -0.13
6 Pro-social 0.267 0.45 0.15 -0.02 0.05 0.27 -0.85***
7
PSM 
(alpha = 0.90) 3.818 0.475 0.28 -0.03 -0.07 -0.25 -0.18 0.26
8
Risk 
(alpha = 0.82) 2 0.515 0.08 -0.24 0.17 0.16 -0.07 0.04 0.06
9
Contribution 
experiment 1 5.77 1.798 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.29 -0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
10
Scores 
experiment 2 0.331 0.077 -0.2 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.14 -0.07 0.06 0.31 0.38*
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Experiment 1: repeated PGG
A regular OLS regression was used to test the effect of the individual characteristics of the 
negotiators on the contributions in the repeated public goods game. The results show PSM 
has a positive effect on the height of the contributions (table 3, model 1). When adding the 
covariates: gender, risk and pro-social motivation are also statistically significant. Individuals 
with higher PSM contributed more, while males contributed less, a higher education also 
leads to lower contributions and risk propensity and pro-social motivation lead to higher 
contributions (table 3, model 2). In the third model (table 3, model 3), significant interaction 
terms were retained. Despite the poorer model fit compared to the first and second model 
there is a significant interaction between PSM and risk propensity. Based on these analyses 
the first hypothesis: ‘In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM subjects act more collaborative than 
low-PSM subjects’ is supported by the data.
Adding the covariates in model 3, distorts the effect of PSM. Prosocial motivation and risk 
both have a positive effect on contributions, while being male has a negative effect on the 
contributions (model 2). Moreover, the effect of prosocial motivation on the contributions is 
conditional on the risk propensity of the participants and vice versa (model 3). 
 For further analysis, we split subjects that score lower than the median on PSM into 
the low-PSM category. Individuals that scored higher than the median are assigned to the 
high-PSM category. The same was done for the risk-taking variable. Taking a closer look at the 
interaction effect between the contributions in the repeated PGG, risk propensity and PSM, 
we can conclude that individuals with a low risk propensity, and low PSM, contribute less 
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on average, compared to individuals with a high-risk propensity and low PSM. This effect is 
stronger for individuals with high(er) levels of PSM. On average, individuals with higher PSM 
levels contribute more to the PGG, while low risk individuals contribute less than do high risk 
individuals (see figure 2).
Table 3: OLS, DV = Contributions in a repeated PGG (n = 600).
MODEL 1: PSM only
   B SE B t p
   Intercept 2.764 1.098 2.518 0.01207*
   PSM 0.787 0.285 2.757 0.00601**
   F statistic = 7.603*** (df=1;598), Resid. Std. Error = 3.264 (df = 598)
MODEL 2: Covariates added
B SE B t p
   Intercept 1.605 1.537 1.044 0.297
   PSM 0.719 0.305 2.361 0.018*
   Male -0.602 0.290 -2.075 0.038*
   Age 0.003 0.012 0.286 0.775
   Education -0.107 0.153 -0.702 0.483
   Round 0.0259 0.023 1.134 0.257
   Risk 0.775 0.273 2.834 0.004 **
   Prosocial 0.716 0.311 2.301 0.022 *
   F statistic = 3.634*** (df=7;592), Resid. Std. Error = 3.233 (df = 592)
MODEL 3: Covariates and interaction
B SE B t p
   Intercept 17.365 5.2988734 3.277 0.00111**
   PSM -3.475 1.384 -2.511 0.012 *
   Male -0.282 0.306 -0.924 0.356
   Age -0.000 0.012 -0.043 0.966
   Education -0.178 0.154 -1.160 0.246
   Round 0.026 0.023 1.143 0.253
   Risk -6.329 2.303 -2.748 0.006**
   Prosocial 0.465 0.319 1.458 0.145
   Risk * Prosocial 1.928 0.621 3.106 0.001**
   F statistic = 4.432*** (df=8;591), Resid. Std. Error = 3.209(df = 591)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. VIF values all below 10 and around 1 (model 1 and 2). 
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Figure 2: PGG Contributions by Risk and PSM.
By splitting up the contributions by PSM and plotting them over time, we can see that most 
negotiators start out with roughly equal contributions in the first round (figure 3). Over time, 
the slope of low-PSM individuals is downwards, whereas the slope for high-PSM individuals 
is upwards in the first rounds (1-14) and downwards in the last six rounds. This suggests that 
cooperation levels (up- and downward slopes are variable over the experiment, and are 
different for the low- and high-PSM negotiators.
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Figure 3: PGG contributions over time, by PSM.
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Experiment 2: Negotiator discretion game
The second hypothesis ‘the solution of the negotiation problem varies with the size of the 
negotiation set’ is supported by the data. There was a significant difference between the means 
of experimental conditions (discretion size) and the claims of the surplus (F(2,957)=6.06, p = 
0.002). As the size of the surpluses differed over the experimental conditions, we calculated 
a relative claim size by dividing the agreed scores for the negotiators by the total possible 
amount to claim per experimental condition. A post-hoc comparison using the Scheffé-test 
indicated that the low discretion condition (M = 0.301, SD = 0.244) was significantly different 
from the medium discretion condition (M = 0.358, SD = 0.225). The large discretion (M = 0.349, 
SD = 0.221) condition did not differ significantly from the medium and small condition (see 
figure 4).
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Figure 4: Agreed % of total surplus, by experimental condition.
Because the negotiators participated in multiple rounds and the negotiations outcomes 
could be an effect of the matched groups we additionally fitted a hierarchical model using 
the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017) in R (R Core Team, 2018). 
The relation between the experimental conditions small, medium and large discretion and 
the size of the claims of the surplus is tested. As the dependent variable is a percentage of the 
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surplus agreed on, the betas are relatively small. The experimental conditions as well as the 
covariates are entered as fixed effects (model 5). 
The matched groups were used as random intercepts (model 4 and 5, table 4)10 and the 
experimental condition ‘medium’ is used as reference category.
 Again, the experimental condition ‘small’ contributes positively to the agreed size of the 
surplus (see table 4). Risk propensity also has a positive relationship with the agreed size of the 
surplus. Being male has a negative impact on the agreed surplus size.
Table 4: Hierarchical estimates on agreed surplus.
MODEL 4: Experimental conditions, varying intercepts for negotiation dyads
   Fixed effects B SE B t p
   Intercept 0.358 0.015 23.020 0.000***
   Small -0.056 0.019 -2.997 0.002**
   Large -0.010 0.020 -0.489 0.624
   Random effects Variance SD
   σ2 Dyads 0.000 0.023
   σ2 Residuals 0.053 0.231
   AIC = -68.8, BIC = -44.5, LogLik = 39.4, df.resid = 955
MODEL 5: Experimental conditions and covariates, varying intercepts for negotiation dyads
   Fixed effects B SE B t p
   Intercept 0.213 0.092 2.317 0.022*
   Small -0.053 0.018 -2.861 0.004**
   Large -0.008 0.019 -0.418 0.676
   PSM 0.018 0.017 1.052 0.293
   Risk 0.047 0.015 2.974 0.003**
   Male -0.039 0.016 -2.381 0.017*
   Age 0.000 0.000 0.629 0.530
   Education -0.002 0.008 -0.325 0.746
   Pro-social -0.017 0.018 -0.983 0.326
   Random effects Variance SD
   σ2 Dyads 0.000 0.016
   σ2 Residuals 0.053 0.230
   AIC = -71.2, BIC = -17.6, LogLik = 46.6, df.resid = 949
10   Note that the variance of the negotiation dyads is (rounded off ) almost zero. However, the model 
quality (LogLik) is significantly improved by adding the matched dyads as level 1.
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The third hypothesis: ‘The effect of variations in the size of the negotiations set is stronger 
for public sector negotiators than for private sector negotiators’ is not confirmed by the 
experimental data. The difference between the experimental conditions is significant 
(F(2,956)=5.88, p = 0.003) but there is no effect of PSM (F(1,956)=0.423, p = .516) (see figure 5). 
This hypothesis is also disconfirmed by adding PSM to the hierarchical model (table 4, model 
5). In the post hoc analyses, a small effect for self-reported risk propensity was found in this 
experiment: individuals who reported engage in more risky activities, agreed on larger total 
claims in the experiment. Similarly, males agreed on smaller claim sizes, compared to women 
in the experiment while age, education and pro-social motivation does not cause different 
negotiation agreements. 
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Figure 5: Agreed % of total surplus, by experimental condition and PSM.
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DISCUSSION
The central aim of this study was to understand if and how the findings of two negotiation 
experiments could be replicated using practitioners instead of a student-based sample. Two 
experiments were used, one that focuses on individual characteristics by using a repeated 
PGG and one that focuses on responses to negotiation discretion by using a variable sum 
game that deals with splitting a surplus. Compared to the original experiments by Bouwman 
et al. (2018; 2018b), similar patterns are found for both experiment 1 and 2 in this replication.
 For the repeated public goods game in experiment 1, the findings in this study mirror 
the original findings with student subjects and show that PSM has a positive effect on the 
contributions in a PGG. Subjects with high PSM levels act more collaboratively than those 
with lower PSM levels. This study additionally found that risk propensity has an almost equally 
strong positive effect on the contributions, while risk and PSM are not correlated in our 
sample. By now, a number of studies have tested the idea that subjects with high PSM are 
more collaborative in prisoners dilemmas (Esteve et al., 2015) and public goods games (Esteve 
et al., 2016). The findings from these studies suggest that PSM is indeed positively associated 
with collaboration, albeit conditional collaboration based on the PSM of the others in some 
instances (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010). Our study uses a repeated PGG in which building trust 
and reciprocity plays an equally important role. In repeated PGG settings, individuals tend to 
cooperate in general (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Our study demonstrates that this higher level 
of collaboration is not only an effect of PSM in students but also in practitioners.
 In the second experiment, we found that the negotiation outcome varies with the size 
of the negotiation discretion. This finding differs slightly from the findings in the original study 
by Bouwman and van Deemen (2018) which is based on a student-sample. In the original 
study, negotiators in the small discretion condition, agreed on larger claims of the ‘pie’, while 
in our replication, negotiators in the small discretion condition agreed on smaller claims of the 
pie. In both cases, negotiation outcomes are especially different when there is little discretion, 
compared to medium and large discretion. The idea that negotiation outcomes vary with 
negotiation discretion size, and thus the number of negotiation solutions, challenges one 
of the fundamental assumptions of game theory, namely that the solutions to a bargaining 
problem is only dependent on the expected utility functions of the negotiators. However, our 
findings are in line with findings from management studies in which discretion is positively 
linked to performance (cf. Leach et al., 2005; Strain, 1999). 
 Furthermore, we found that there is no significant difference for subjects with high-
PSM and subjects with low-PSM for their negotiation behavior. This finding suggests that 
when contextual elements exert a strong influence on the negotiation setting, such as 
discretion, the effect of individual motives and values is reduced. Like in the original study, 
on average, male negotiators agree on smaller claim sizes. Potentially, men in our experiment 
have behaved more competitively. Men are found to behave more competitively on average 
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in most negotiations (eg. Lewicki et al., 2015). A variable sum negotiation setting as in our 
experiment penalizes strong competition because it is costly not to agree or not to cooperate 
as the payoff is zero. Also, risk propensity is positively linked to agreed claim size, in our study 
and in the student-based study. Risk-taking is central to negotiation as it involves exposing 
intentions and dealing with those of others. Risk-taking varies over individuals (Galinsky et al., 
2002) and over cultures (Foster, 1992) while the difference in risk taking and its effects in the 
public-and private sector has thus far been neglected. This study shows that the level of risks 
that individuals are willing to tolerate in various domains of their lives such as sports, socially 
and financially (Nicholson et al., 2005), are positively related to the claims they agree on in a 
negotiation setting. 
 An important contribution of this study is that the pattern of behavior found in the 
two negotiation studies with student samples is similar to the behavior of practitioners. 
Replication is at the core of scientific progress as it creates cumulative knowledge, rather than 
moving from one-shot finding to another (Walker et al., 2017). Moreover, varying in contexts, 
subject samples, experimental designs and realism, enables testing and falsifying theories. 
While calls for replication are made frequently, actual replications are relatively rare in many 
social science fields (Hamermesh, 2007). This is remarkable given that there seems to be a 
strong upswing of using experiments in public administration and public management (Li & 
Van Ryzin, 2017). Experiments are typically touted as being more suitable for replication than 
for instance qualitative interviews and case studies.
 In studies that compare student subjects with practitioners, differences are often found, 
depending on the setting, the game and sample composition (Anderson et al., 2013; Cappelen, 
Nygaard, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Carpenter, Burks, & Verhoogen, 2005; Falk, Meier, & 
Zehnder, 2013). For example, Belot, Duch and Miller (2015) found that students are more likely 
to behave rational and selfish than non-students leading them to conclude that experimental 
studies that use students are likely to overestimate the extent to which individual actors are 
in fact selfish and rational. A test of differences in a public goods game yielded substantive 
differences between students and non-students, who were generic citizens in their sample 
(Ibid.). Our study suggests that practitioners and students do respond in a similar fashion. 
This has two important implications. First, it suggests that the relationship between age, or 
rather experience, and negotiator efficacy is quite limited in our sample. Secondly, from a 
methodological perspective it suggests that student samples can serve as a good benchmark 
for testing theories when these are being replicated in the field with practitioners.
Limitations and further research
This study has three limitations that need to be discussed. The first limitation is that we have 
used a relatively small subject sample of practitioners. Even though the number of observations 
for both experiments are sufficient to run frequentist statistical analyses, more studies with 
replication in practitioners are much needed as sample size may directly influence the results 
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and potentially threatens reliability. Based on our smaller sample size, this study gives a good 
indication of effects.
 Secondly, when comparing practitioners with student subjects, a number of 
observations can be made. Firstly, students are quicker to comprehend instructions, but also 
to ask questions. Moreover, the practitioners in our sample were not easily persuaded to turn 
off their cellphones and were tempted to look at the computer screens of other participants, 
despite being placed in separate cubicles and specifically instructed not to do so. During 
the sessions, this behavior was quickly addressed, and although the participants were 
anonymous in the experiment, we cannot rule out any effects this may have caused. Future 
research could focus on more large-scale comparisons with practitioners as well as on testing 
differences how homogenous student samples and more heterogenous practitioner samples 
compare in terms of comprehension of instructions, tractability and external distractions such 
as telephones during experimental sessions.
 Thirdly, in the original PGG experiment by Bouwman et al. (2018b), the participants were 
matched in negotiation dyads, based on their study enrollment. As we had no background 
information on the participants a priori, and the experimental sessions were run with either 
public sector or private sector participants, this was not feasible. This also means we could 
not test whether collaboration in the repeated public goods game is conditional based on 
group composition in practice as Esteve et al. (2016) have found or unconditional as found 
by Bouwman et al. (2018b). Based on the idea that private sector negotiators have lower 
PSM than public sector negotiators, the point of conditional collaboration based on group 
composition is especially salient in public-private partnerships as parties need to collaborate 
to a high degree and stem from different sectors. This important theoretical point could be 
addressed in future research by having negotiators play with covert or revealed identities.
CONCLUSION
This study is one of very few lab-in-the-field experiments, with the aim of replication with 
practitioners. To the knowledge of the author, no other study systematically assesses the 
validity of the findings of earlier negotiation studies with a sample of practitioners, by focusing 
on public- and private sector characteristics. The main finding is that practitioners with high 
PSM also make higher contributions and thus behaves more collaborative in negotiations. 
Moreover, negotiator discretion is different for the public- and private sector negotiators. This 
study found that the variations in discretion also lead to different claims from a given ‘pie’, 
while this effect is not moderated by the level of PSM of practitioners. While the behavior in 
our practitioner sample are very similar to findings from earlier experiments based on student 
samples, more research is needed to find out when, how, why and under what circumstances 
the behavior of experimental student-subjects deviates from practitioners.
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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this dissertation was to understand if, and how individual and sectoral differences 
cause variations in negotiations and negotiation outcomes. Negotiations are an important 
form of decision-making in the public and private sector. How public and private sector 
contexts and negotiators differ from each other in negotiation behavior and negotiation 
outcomes has received relatively little scholarly attention up to date. In this dissertation I focus 
on contextual and situational differences between the public and private sector context and 
on individual differences between their respective employees. 
 This chapter first briefly discusses the individual differences between public and private 
sector employees and differences in context between the public and private sector, in order 
to arrive at the research question that is central in this dissertation. Next, the findings from the 
empirical chapters and theoretical implications are summarized within the same framework 
of individual and contextual differences. The answers to the sub questions from the empirical 
chapters together inform the main conclusion of this dissertation. Finally, the theoretical, 
methodological and practical contributions are discussed, alongside the limitations of this 
dissertation and opportunities for further research. 
Individual differences
A number of individual-level differences between public and private sector employees have 
been identified by scholars. For example, compared to private sector employees, public 
sector employees have higher levels of public service motivation (PSM). PSM is a set of beliefs, 
values and attitudes that ‘go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the 
interest of a larger political entity and which induces through public interaction motivation 
for targeted action’ (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). High(er) PSM has been associated with an 
increased likelihood of whistle-blowing (Brewer & Selden, 1998), higher attachment to ethical 
leadership (Wright et al., 2016) and higher job performance (Brewer & Brewer, 2011), especially 
when these employees have contact with beneficiaries (Belle, 2013). Additionally, individuals 
with a lower risk propensity tend to self-select into public service jobs (Buurman et al., 2012; 
Pfeifer, 2011). 
 As negotiation settings often demand that negotiators give and take, sometimes to a 
larger public good, the dissimilarities in PSM between public and private sector employees are 
likely to influence their negotiation behavior, which in turn influences negotiation outcomes. 
Similarly, stating an opening offer and opting to reveal or hide strategic information can be 
risky in negotiations, which matter all the more when stakes are high. 
 In addition, negotiation literature has studied how, and under what conditions 
individual traits and contexts impact negotiation process and outcomes. For instance men 
and women negotiate differently, conditional on whether they are in a constant or variable 
sum negotiation setting (Bowles et al., 2005; Leibbrandt & List, 2014). Self-efficacy is known 
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to impact negotiator performance, meaning that negotiators who think that they are good 
negotiators often are more efficient negotiators (Elfenbein et al., 2008). Social value orientation, 
resulting in a priori preferences for pro-self or pro-social outcomes, impact negotiations (Van 
Lange, 1999). Pro-self-oriented individuals seem to prefer a distributive negotiation style 
(Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). Pro-social oriented individuals on the other hand are oriented to 
integrative negotiations and problem solving. Pro-social negotiators are also more satisfied 
with negotiation outcomes because they focus more on what others gain in addition to 
what they get individually (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, 2000). Similarly, conflict styles are a 
predictor of the way in which individuals approach conflict and thus the way they approach 
negotiations (Rahim & Magner, 1995). The BIG-5 personality dimensions (sometimes called the 
five-factor-model) extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness and neuroticism 
have been connected to negotiation behavior (Antonioni, 1998). For example, Dimotakis, 
Conlon and Ilies (2012) study the fit between the negotiation setting (e.g. distributive or 
integrative) and the personality of negotiators based on their BIG-5. A negotiator scoring low 
on agreeableness, is thought to fit better in a competitive and distributive negotiation setting. 
A good negotiator – setting fit leads to more persistence, resulting in better outcomes (Ibid). 
 This dissertation distinguishes between the public- and private sector based on PSM. 
Because some of the personality characteristics that are important for negotiations have also 
been connected to PSM (see for example Van Witteloostuijn et al., 2017), they must be used 
as a measure of control in the analyses.  Consequently, The BIG-5, risk-propensity, social value 
orientation and self-reported efficacy are used as a control measure in some of the empirical 
studies in this dissertation.
The public and private sector context
In this dissertation, the public and private sector context are thought to be different from 
one another. This means that besides the individual differences, public or private context will 
also influence negotiation processes, behavior and outcomes. For this, there are two relevant 
approaches, the core approach and the dimensional approach. 
 The core approach views the public and private sector to be different from one another 
as public organizations are owned by the whole or collective while private sector organizations 
have shareholders or a smaller group of owners (Rainey & Bozeman, 2000b). Moreover, private 
organizations target a limited set of goals like continuity and profitability, while public sector 
organizations target politically set policy goals. They target more diverse goals simultaneously 
and the goals can be conflicting with other policy goals. By targeting their goals, public 
organizations create public goods and services. Exclusion from public goods and services 
is usually not possible or is considered undesirable. Private sector organizations deliver 
their goods and services to those who want to pay for them. Public organizations are often 
monopolists in the sense that citizens and companies do not have the opportunity to switch. 
A functioning private sector market on the other hand gives clients the opportunity to choose. 
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Public organizations are also held to higher standards for accountability and transparency 
(Bovens et al., 2008). Accountability and transparency are considered to be important in the 
private sector as well, (see for example Van der Wal et al., 2008) but they are accountable to 
a limited set of individuals and the focus is more strongly on bottom line results (Mulgan, 
2000b).
 The dimensional approach on the other hand, maintains that public and private sector 
organizations differ from each other on political authority and on economic authority 
(Bozeman, 2004). For instance, state departments have low political authority and low 
economic authority, making them score high in ‘publicness’. Private companies have 
high political authority (low interference) and high economic authority as they answer to 
themselves or stakeholders, making them score low in publicness. The dimensional approach 
offers the advantage of being able to position organizations relative to each other. A downside 
is that it lacks precision and more dimensions have been identified in addition to political and 
economic authority that may equally matter (eg. Moulton, 2009). 
 Clearly, the contextual organizational differences impact the way work is carried out 
in the two sectors. These differences impact the way employees perform their duties. The 
differences between sectors could for example serve as boundaries. The expectation for 
public organizations to be transparent and accountable may lead to a strategic disadvantage 
in cross sectoral negotiations as they have shared information about budgets and policies. 
Similarly, the differences between sectors could serve as an opportunity. The monopolistic 
character of many public organizations could be seen as a source of negotiation power as 
opponents have few or no alternatives. This in turn could put private sector negotiators at a 
strategic disadvantage. Negotiation literature has for example focused on contextual factors 
such as time pressure and the way it impacts how negotiators make decisions and thus what 
negotiation outcomes are achieved (Malhotra et al., 2008). Other contextual factors that 
have been studied are cultural aspects of organizations and the effect of the differences in 
ideologies when negotiators are from various countries (Salacuse, 1988). 
 The impact of sectoral differences for public and private sector negotiators have received 
little scholarly attention but these will impact negotiation behaviors and outcomes. Although 
individual differences in motives, attitudes and values cause different behaviors in both 
sectors, little scholarly attention has been devoted to finding out if and how these differences 
also impact negotiation behaviors and consequently, negotiation outcomes. Therefore, this 
dissertation aims to answer the question: What are the differences between public and private 
sector negotiations in terms of sector context, negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes?
 This dissertation is based on five empirical studies. The chapters can be read 
independently but together answer the main research question of this dissertation. The 
empirical chapters deal with individual and contextual characteristics as an influence on 
negotiation behavior and outcomes. Whether PSM causes negotiators to cooperate more is 
investigated first in Chapter 2. Next, Chapter 3 tests if variations in negotiation discretion affect 
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negotiation outcomes and whether PSM moderates this relationship. In order to see if public 
accountability affects the performance of coalition negotiations, we carry out two tests. First, 
we test if accountability affects coalition formation and negotiation performance at the group 
and individual level in Chapter 4. Next, we test if PSM moderates this relationship in Chapter 
5. In Chapter 6, the experiments of Chapters 2 and 3 are replicated with practitioners.
EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES FOR NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 
AND OUTCOMES
While differences between public and private sector employees have been studied extensively, 
this work has not been extended to negotiations and individual negotiation behavior. Public 
and private sector employees differ from one another in reported risk propensity (Bozeman 
& Kingsley, 1998; Tepe & Prokop, 2018; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990), trust (Tepe, 2016), values (Van 
der Wal et al., 2008) and Public Service Motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990; Vandenabeele, 2008). 
The differences between public and private employees may cause variations in their tendency 
to collaborate or to compete, which in turn impacts negotiation outcomes. PSM consists of 
four latent dimensions such as interest in politics, contributing to a public good, self-sacrifice 
and compassion (Perry & Wise, 1990). 
 As public sector employees have higher levels of PSM on average, we test if this leads 
to higher levels of cooperation in a negotiation setting and if this cooperation is conditional 
on the PSM of their opponents. This was tested in Chapter 2 by carrying out a laboratory 
experiment, in which we placed people in randomly matched dyads in which they played a 
repeated public goods game. In this experiment, we vary the composition of negotiator dyads 
in high – high PSM dyads, high – low PSM dyads and low – low PSM dyads. By doing so, we 
show that the level of cooperation is not moderated by the composition of the negotiation 
dyads. This means that the level of cooperative behavior is not affected by the level of PSM of 
the negotiation opponent.
 The results of the experiment in Chapter 2 indicated that, as expected, PSM is different 
for the student subjects enrolled in a public administration study program versus students 
enrolled in a business administration study program. The experiment also confirmed our 
expectation that negotiators with high(er) levels of PSM cooperate more on average. Therefore, 
research question from Chapter 2: Do people with high public service motivation behave more 
cooperatively than people with low public service motivation in repeated negotiations? can be 
answered with yes. In addition, we found that negotiators with high(er) levels of PSM show 
more cooperative behavior regardless of the PSM of the opponent. According to some, work 
in the public sector requires cooperative behavior as this facilitates problem solving behavior 
(McNamara, 2012; O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). Our study shows that high PSM individuals will 
choose to cooperate regardless of requirements of the context or opponents. 
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 Cooperation in negotiations increases the odds of finding agreement (Halpert, 
Stuhlmacher, Crenshaw, Litcher, & Bortel, 2010). One of the potential consequences is that 
finding agreement is prioritized over finding a desirable agreement by high public service 
motivated individuals.
Post hoc measures of individual differences 
Besides PSM, other individual characteristics were tested. Many experiments have shown 
that men and women negotiate differently (see for example Leibbrandt & List, 2014). In the 
experiments in Chapters 2,3, and 6, the behavior of men and women also deviated, leading 
to variation in negotiation outcome. This finding (re)confirms that gender is a meaningful 
measure of statistical control when the research focus is not on differences in gender. 
 Self-reported conflict style has been identified as an indicator of behavior in negotiation 
settings (Rahim & Magner, 1995). The conflict style measure results in modes of conflict such 
as accommodating, cooperating, competing, avoiding and compromising that individuals 
tend to when confronted with conflict (Rahim & Magner, 1995; Shell, 1974). Negotiators who 
scored high on the competition dimension, cooperated less in the experiment in Chapter 
2. Also, whether the subjects were motivated pro-socially or pro-self was measured using 
a decomposed game in the experiment in Chapter 2 and 6 (Murphy et al., 2011). Pro-social 
motivated negotiators are for example more engaged in problem solving in variable sum 
negotiations and more focused on achieving common outcomes (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 
2000). In the experiment in Chapter 2, there is no effect of pro-self or pro-social motivation. In 
the experiment in Chapter 6, there is a positive (post-hoc) relation found between pro social 
motivation and cooperation in the public goods experiment. Moreover, PSM correlates with a 
cooperative conflict style. Our outcomes seem to suggest that both PSM and conflict style are 
important characteristics for negotiation behavior when comparing public and private sector 
negotiators.
 The BIG-5 measure of personality was also measured in the experiment in Chapter 3 and 
risk propensity (RTI) was measured in the experiments in Chapters 3 and 6. There is a positive 
significant correlation between PSM and agreeableness and openness in the experiment in 
Chapter 3. This finding resonates with earlier work by Witteloostuijn et al. (2017) who found 
that 1) openness is related to the attraction to policy making, 2) agreeableness is connected 
to the compassion and self-sacrifice and 3) commitment is related to the public interest 
dimensions of PSM. In the experiment in Chapter 3 however, PSM nor the BIG-5 dimensions 
had a significant impact on the behavior of negotiators (Antonioni, 1998).
 Risk propensity did have an effect on the outcomes in the experiments presented in 
Chapters 3 and 6. Public sector employees are often claimed to have a low tolerance for risks 
(Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). The risk aversion of public servants has been confirmed using lottery 
games in an online questionnaire (Buurman et al., 2012). Recent findings however suggest 
that public servants report to be more risk averse, but do not display this behavior (Tepe & 
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Prokop, 2018). In the public goods game experiment with practitioners in Chapter 6, we found 
that risk takers contribute more on average in a public goods game both when PSM is low 
and when PSM is high. For high-PSM individuals however, the difference between high and 
low risk takers is larger for their contributions. In sum, we do find observable differences for 
self-reported risks. Risk aversion may lead to lowered information exchange in variable sum 
negotiations, which may complicate finding a mutually desirable agreement.
EFFECTS OF CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES ON NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 
AND OUTCOME
To test the effects of the differences in public and private sector contexts, two contextual 
differences are studied in depth in this dissertation: discretion and accountability. Chapter 
3 looks at negotiator discretion as a situational factor of negotiations. The main question in 
Chapter 3 is: Do variations in negotiator discretion lead to different outcomes for public versus 
private sector employees? 
 From the perspective of game theory (see for example Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
2007), it is expected that more discretion does not lead to different outcomes nor better 
performance (Luce & Raiffa, 2012; Peters, 2010). Discretion in a negotiation set can be modeled 
as variations in the number of options within a negotiation space. A larger negotiation space 
results in more discretion and there is more potential to find a solution. According to game 
theory, the solution itself is not dependent on the amount of discretion for the negotiators. 
The solution to the negotiation problem remains the same (Driesen, Perea, & Peters, 2011; 
Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975; Nash, 1950). 
 Management literature on the other hand, shows that more discretion for employees 
as well as for teams of employees leads to more productivity and that managers with more 
discretion display a greater variety of in and extra-role behaviors (Gellatly & Irving, 2001; 
Graham, 1992; Leach et al., 2005; Strain, 1999). On average, employees in the public sector 
context are thought to have less discretion than employees in the private sector. This is 
especially the case for street-level bureaucrats, whose discretion has been associated for 
example with their willingness to implement policies (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014; Tummers et 
al., 2012). 
 The two opposing theoretical predictions provide us with a critical test. We expect that 
variations in discretion causes variations in negotiation behavior and outcomes. And as public 
sector employees are often assumed to have less individual discretion as they operate in the 
context of the public sector, we expected that the effect of discretion on negotiation behavior 
and outcomes is stronger for public sector employees. 
 By placing negotiators in low-, medium-, and high discretion negotiation dyads, 
we tested if discretion impacts the variability of negotiation outcomes. For this, we used a 
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dynamic and computerized variable-sum negotiation game, in which the negotiators made 
offers and counteroffers to split a surplus. The results show that negotiation solutions vary with 
the size of discretion of negotiators. This finding aligns with the theoretical predictions from 
management literature that indeed variations in discretion impact negotiator outcome. In the 
small discretion condition, negotiators agreed on a larger sum of the surplus. Put differently, 
the total sum of what two negotiators in the dyads agreed on, is the largest - relatively – in 
the small condition. One possible explanation is that when negotiators have little discretion, 
the value of the assets is higher (because the supply is limited). Also, negotiators with more 
discretion agreed on smaller surplus sizes. The findings seem to indicate a non-linear relation 
between negotiator discretion and agreed outcomes. 
 A second finding is that the relationship between discretion and negotiation outcomes 
is not moderated by the PSM of individual negotiators, meaning that the effect of discretion 
on negotiation outcomes is not stronger or weaker for public sector employees. Hence, the 
research question of this chapter is answered both yes and no. Yes, negotiation discretion 
affects negotiation outcomes. No, this effect is not moderated by the level of PSM. In other 
words, there is no difference between public and private sector negotiators based on PSM in 
this experiment.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on accountability as another important contextual difference 
between the public and private sector. Accountability is typically seen as a cornerstone of 
modern democracies that prevents corruption of those who are in power. Accountability has 
been claimed to increase trustworthiness, to enhance integrity and to increase performance 
(Bovens et al., 2008). Critics mention that holding people accountable may lead to window-
dressing and that it generates task overload for public servants (de Wolf & Janssens, 2007). 
Additionally, negotiators in simple negotiation settings who are held accountable show 
lowered performance, while the effects of accountability on more dynamic coalition settings 
have not been tested before. In Chapter 4, the question: does public accountability lead to 
different coalitions and lower negotiator performance in coalition negotiations? is answered. 
Specifically, we proposed that accountability lowers performance at the group level, it leads 
to less inclusive coalitions or to no-deals and accountability invokes sanctioning behavior by 
the accountability forum, especially in the case of poor negotiator performance.
 To address this question, a face-to-face coalition negotiation game was used. The 
negotiation task was to negotiate and form a coalition. The coalition outcomes all have 
different payoffs, resulting into a scorable negotiation game. This game was played in two 
experimental conditions: an accountability and a no-accountability condition. In the no-
accountability condition, the negotiators negotiated in triads and scored their outcomes. In 
the accountability condition, the negotiators negotiated in triads and were held accountable 
for their actions. Next to this, the accountability fora had sanctioning power.
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 The empirical findings in Chapter 4 suggest that indeed accountability lowers group 
performance, accountability leads to fewer coalitions that include all actors present and that 
accountability leads to more no-deals. Additionally, accountable negotiators who performed 
poorly were more likely to be sanctioned by their forum while reaching a no-deal was not 
associated with higher odds of being sanctioned. The answer to the research question in 
Chapter 4 is, yes, imposing accountability mechanisms on negotiators, while negotiating 
a coalition, leads to lowered group performance. It leads to negotiators opting for smaller 
coalitions, that include fewer parties, and it leads to increased odds of not reaching agreement. 
 This finding is particularly interesting as it shows that imposed accountability does 
not only create side-effects that are considered undesirable such as window dressing and 
an increased workload (Wolf. de & Janssens, 2007), it also has the potential to reduce the 
performance of the core process. Also, many projects like infrastructural public-private-
partnerships are a coalition of public and private sector organizations (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000). Accountability regimes differ for public and private sector negotiators in those projects, 
implying that the performance of those networks will not only be reduced as a consequence 
of accountability, it also suggests that the performance will be different for public and private 
setting negotiators because of the contexts of the negotiators.
 The findings from Chapter 4 showed that accountability exerts a strong influence on 
the outcomes of coalition negotiations, but it does not show whether public and private 
sector negotiators respond similarly to imposed accountability. Employees from the public 
and private sector both emphasize the importance of accountability in their work although 
public sector employees find it a more important value (Van der Wal et al., 2008). If indeed 
these values lead to different behavior in negotiations, then exposing public and private 
sector employees to accountability should highlight these differences. 
 We designed a factorial, face-to-face negotiation experiment, in which the subjects were 
asked to negotiate a coalition. The participants were randomized over a condition in which 
negotiators were accountable, and one in which they were not. In addition, subjects who 
were oriented towards the public sector and those who were oriented towards the private 
sector based were placed in two groups. This allowed us to test the effect of accountability on 
negotiation outcomes, as well as testing whether this effect is different for public and private 
sector negotiators.
 Again, the findings show that accountability lowers performance. This is in line with 
earlier studies that focus on the effects of accountability on negotiation outcomes in teams 
or in more static negotiation settings (Klimoski, 1972; O’Connor, 1997). However, the results 
are similar for those oriented towards working in the public sector and those oriented 
towards working in the private sector. In other words, there is no difference for public and 
private sector-oriented employees, when it comes to the type of coalitions that are formed 
or the group performance. Therefore, the research question from Chapter 5: ‘Are responses to 
accountability different for public/private sector negotiators?’ is answered with no. 
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 The findings imply that there is no interaction between PSM, imposed accountability 
and negotiation outcomes. One possible explanation is that the weight that public sector-
oriented negotiators attach to accountability as a value does not translate into a valuation 
of externally enforced accountability. In other words, the accountability is stringent and 
enforced externally, while extrinsic stimuli such as rules are thought to be less effective in 
high-PSM individuals. This is comparable to the findings from Jacobsen et al. (2014), who 
found that strong perceived external obligations for school teachers crowded out their 
internal motivation based on PSM. A different explanation is that PSM refers to a distal and 
unidentified beneficiary like society as a whole while both the accountability setting as well 
as negotiations are more proximal (Vandenabeele et al., 2018).
The studies in Chapters 2 to 5 are empirically based on experimental designs with a mix 
of graduate and undergraduate students as subjects. Public administration and business 
administration students are used as proxies for public and private sector employees. The 
main rationale for this choice is that compared to business administration students, public 
administration students have higher levels of PSM (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2008). This 
situation is mirrored in the practice of the public and private sector where PSM varies for 
professions (van Loon, Leisink, & Vandenabeele, 2013).
 While experiments using students provide a good testing ground for theories in the 
laboratory, critics argue that factors such as age, workplace socialization and experience 
of practitioners would lead to different results (Charness & Kuhn, 2011). For negotiations 
especially training and experience have been shown to positively correlate with the efficacy 
of negotiators (Uta & Sabine, 2011). Also, students often self-select for participation into 
experiments (Belot et al., 2015). Evidence comparing the behavior and motivations of self-
selected to randomly selected samples is mixed thus far (Falk & Heckman, 2009; Falk et al., 
2013).  Studies that compare students to practitioners or to a generic population sometimes 
find differences between the student and practitioner samples, depending on the aim, 
setting, task or game and specifics of the sample composition (Belot et al., 2015). However, 
one could argue that a sample from the generic population is very different from a sample of 
practitioners too. To find out more about this for the negotiation studies in this dissertation, 
Chapter 6 investigates: Can the findings from student-based negotiation experiments be replicated 
with practitioners? 
 To answer this question, the computerized laboratory experiments from Chapter 2 and 
3 have been replicated. The participants in this replication study, negotiated in a repeated 
public goods game (PGG) and over the division of a surplus with varying degrees of discretion. 
Note that this study focuses on both individual level characteristics, such as PSM, as well as on 
context in the form of negotiator discretion. Chapter 6 presents the empirical findings based 
on a small sample of practitioners from a pool of university alumni and employees from two 
Dutch medium-sized municipalities. The experimental test was carried out using a lab-in-the-
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
146                                   
field experiment and for both experiments it was expected that the results would be the same 
compared to the student sample (See appendix Chapter 6). 
 The results from the repeated public goods game (PGG) show that practitioners with 
high PSM levels act more cooperatively than those with lower PSM levels. This effect is 
comparable to the student sample experiment that it replicates. 
 For the experiment that tests whether discretion affects negotiation outcomes, we found 
that negotiators who had little negotiation discretion, tended to agree to smaller claims of the 
total available surplus. Because the differences between the discretion levels are statistically 
significant (a two-tailed hypothesis), the null-hypothesis must be rejected. However, a nuance 
is needed. In the student-based experiment, the individuals with little negotiation discretion 
also differed from those with more or a lot of discretion. However, the students with little 
discretion agreed on larger claims, instead of smaller, as in this replication. The underlying 
assumption of the hypotheses was that there would be no differences between students and 
practitioners in terms of behavior and outcomes. 
 In this experiment, there is no effect of the PSM of the negotiators on the experimental 
outcomes. This means that the effect of discretion on the negotiators is similar, regardless of 
their motivations to serve the public interest. A small effect for self-reported risk propensity 
was found in this experiment: individuals who reported to engage in more risky activities, 
agreed on larger total claims in the experiment. 
 The answer to the research question of this chapter: ‘Can the findings from student-based 
negotiation experiments be replicated with practitioners?’ is yes, implying that the results from 
student-based negotiation experiments provide a good indicator for negotiation results by 
practitioners.
 The most important contribution of this replication study is that, despite its small sample 
size, the behavioral pattern in both negotiation experiments is comparable for students and 
practitioners. In studies that compare practitioners and student samples, both differences and 
similarities are often found (Belot et al., 2015). The discussion whether or not, or how use 
students in experiments is far from resolved (Anderson et al., 2013). For example, economics 
students are found to behave more rational than a generic citizens sample and for public 
administration studies, a sample of generic citizens would equally lead to problems (Belot et 
al., 2015).  More replications with both students and practitioners are much needed in order 
to establish a robust body of evidence when it comes to testing the effects of the differences 
between public and private sector on negotiators and negotiation behavior and outcomes. 
Additionally, it seems that while there are some logistical challenges involved, using lab-in-
the-field experiments provides a good testing ground that balances experimental control 
with variation in setting and subject samples. 
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CONCLUSION TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION OF THE DISSERTATION
Based on the results presented above, the question that is central to this dissertation can 
now be answered. This question reads: What are the differences between public and private 
sector negotiations in terms of sector context, negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes? 
This dissertation found that negotiation processes and outcomes are influenced by individual 
characteristics as well as contextual factors.
 Negotiators with higher PSM show more cooperative behavior, and cooperate 
unconditionally. Discretion levels alter the agreement that is reached by the negotiators, 
especially when negotiators have little discretion. This effect is not different for low and high 
public service motivated negotiators though. Negotiators do form smaller coalitions and 
show lowered performance when they are held accountable. But no differences are found 
for individuals attracted to working in the public- versus individuals attracted to working in 
the private sector. Consequently, the findings of this dissertation can be summarized in three 
main points. 
 Firstly, the differences between the PSM of public and private sector employees cause 
variations in negotiation process and outcomes. This finding aligns with public administration 
literature in which PSM has been found to predict why for example physiotherapists take 
up less profitable tasks that do contribute to a greater good (Andersen et al., 2011) and why 
public servants are more likely to whistle blow (Brewer & Selden, 1998). This finding is also 
consistent with the idea in negotiation literature that individual predispositions, values and 
individual motives matter for negotiation strategies and outcomes (House, Shane, & Herold, 
1996; Lewicki et al., 2015). Additionally, in game theory, players are thought to have a point 
of disagreement and utility functions which capture individual predispositions and values 
(Nash, 1950; Peters, 2010). This dissertation shows that it is not only the utility functions of 
negotiators and some point of disagreement but also the size of the bargaining set that 
impacts negotiation behavior. As the size of the bargaining set is theoretically not thought 
to impact the outcomes, our empirical finding has important implications for game theoretic 
solution concepts such as the Nash bargaining set (Nash, 1950) and Kalai-Smorodinsky 
solution (Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975).
 Secondly, contextual and situational characteristics such as accountability cause a strong 
variation in negotiation behavior and outcomes. This finding may not come as a surprise 
to public administration scholars and provides empirical support for the idea that public-
private sector differences cause differences in behaviors and outcomes. In the experiments 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, negotiators behaved differently under imposed accountability and 
when confronted with variations in negotiation discretion, regardless of whether they 
were motivated to serve the public interest or not. These findings are consistent with social 
psychological literature in the sense that contextual factors matter for how negotiators 
respond and behave (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 1989; Funder, 2001). For the negotiation literature, 
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the public-private sectoral distinction is a useful addition to the set of contextual factors that 
have been studied earlier, such as political ideology and legal pluralism (Salacuse, 1988) and 
culture (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
 Thirdly, differences in negotiation outcomes that are caused by individual differences in 
motivation and predisposition are dampened by contextual and situational characteristics. In 
negotiation experiments with higher levels of contextual realism, the individual differences in 
motives do not cause variations in the outcome while experiments that are more abstracted, 
individual differences matter for the outcome. Public administration literature does not 
make specific predictions about how individual motives and predispositions are moderated 
by variations in the public/private sector contexts. This finding may imply that individuals 
with high levels of public service motivation and thus a higher tendency to cooperate, 
may not be able to wield this in negotiations that require more competition. Similarly, this 
implies that negotiation behavior will differ in situations when demands are strong (such as 
accountability) versus when demands are weaker under otherwise equal circumstances. This 
finding also aligns with the idea of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ situations that are thought to interact 
between personality and contextual cues (Beaty, Cleveland, & Murphy, 2001). For a long 
time, the negotiation literature has seen a dichotomy in which one side claimed personality 
characteristics to be the most important predictors of negotiation behavior (House et al., 1996). 
The other side claimed it is contextual factors that are more relevant (Davis-Blake & Pfeffer, 
1989). This dissertation shows that this debate is a false dichotomy, as not only individual 
characteristics, or only context impact negotiation behavior, but rather that both interact and 
impact behavior (Funder, 2001, p. 200; Lewicki, 2015).
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
This dissertation combines theoretical insights from public administration that focuses on 
public and private sector differences with literature from social psychology and economics 
that focus on negotiations. Consequently, there are contributions to all these fields. Here, the 
three most important theoretical contributions of this dissertation are discussed.
 Firstly, this dissertation has (re)introduced the idea that negotiations are an important 
means of decision making, also in the public sector. Studies that focus on negotiation 
behavior in the public sector are scarce. Previous studies in the field of public administration 
focus for instance on negotiations in the realm of the EU (Tallberg, 2006) or in networks (Klijn 
et al., 1995). These approaches neglect the fact that not institutional actors but individual 
employees engage in actual negotiations. This dissertation has found that both individual 
motives and characteristics of employees matter for negotiation behavior and outcomes, and 
that sectoral differences cause variations in the outcomes. 
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 Secondly, this dissertation contributes to the upcoming stream of behavioral public 
administration (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). Behavioral public administration aims to analyze 
individual and group behavior by taking on a micro-level perspective, based on insights from 
psychology and related fields (Ibid.). This dissertation contributes by not only using micro-level 
insights from social psychology but also from game theory to inform the hypotheses. Thus far, 
the application of game-theoretical insights have not entered into the mainstream public 
administration literature (See Scharpf, 1994 for an exception), even though its application has 
proven valuable in studying (international) political decision-making (Morrow, 1994; Ostrom, 
1998), in businesses (Raiffa, 1982) and even the evolution of species in the field of evolutionary 
biology (de Waal, 2000). This dissertation shows that a good understanding of negotiations in 
the public sector benefits from using insights from various fields, rather than psychology only. 
Insights from game-theory are equally relevant for understanding and predicting negotiation 
behavior. 
 Another contribution is made to the literature that studies similarities and dissimilarities 
between the public and private sector (eg. Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997; Walker, Brewer, 
Bozeman, Moon, & Wu, 2013). This dissertation shows that the individual differences in PSM 
in the public and private sector impact negotiation behavior and outcomes. For instance, 
individuals with high PSM levels show more cooperative behavior, which is unmoderated by 
the PSM level of their opponent. In Chapter 3, discretion has been used from the perspective of 
the dimensional approach, while there is little understanding on how discretion of employees 
impacts for example work performance and goal setting. Discretion is especially relevant for 
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980), like social workers, police officers, doctors and teachers. 
However, understanding what mechanisms drive individual behavior has been somewhat 
limited to understanding shirking behavior and coping with policies.
 Thirdly, in Chapter 3, we manipulate negotiator discretion by varying the set of 
negotiation solutions. This is done by adding options for the negotiator within the negotiation 
setting. In a way, this is similar to adding choice alternatives for negotiators. Solution concepts, 
such as the Nash Bargaining Solution propose the axiom of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives. This means that there is only one solution to a negotiation problem, namely the 
point in a two-dimensional space, where the product of the players utilities are maximized 
(Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975; Nash, 1950). From this perspective, negotiators are thought to 
agree on solutions in the proximity of this theoretical point. Our study contributes to the idea 
that although the alternatives are irrelevant theoretically, and even though the negotiation 
situation remains very similar over the experimental conditions, the outcomes showed 
variation as a result of negotiator discretion, and thus the set of negotiation solution in game 
theoretical terms. The findings show that the theoretical predictions resulting from the Nash 
bargaining solution must be relaxed empirically. The alternative solution, as proposed by Kalai 
and Smorodinsky (1975) may provide a more precise solution concept but requires further 
empirical testing.  
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 In Chapter 4, we contribute to the negotiation literature by using a coalition negotiation 
game as a descriptive framework. The framework describes the values of the negotiator’s 
utilities for the reached agreements and thus focuses on predicting which coalitions are 
formed. Our empirical findings show that imposed accountability lead to 1) different strategies 
by the negotiators and 2) consequently, that accountability leads to reduced performance in 
coalition negotiations. Similarly, more agreements were reached when the negotiators were 
not held accountable in the experiments from Chapters 4 and 5 while in both cases, the 
games were coreless (Parkhe, 1993; Song & Panayides, 2002). This suggests that the higher 
value for every alternative agreement is lowered by externally enforced accountability, while 
all agreements are more attractive than reaching no deal. Why and how this mechanism 
works requires additional theoretical and empirical work. 
METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The research question in this dissertation asks if and to what extent individual characteristics 
and elements of the public context cause variations negotiation behavior and outcomes. 
Because experimental designs are particularly useful in identifying causal mechanisms, this 
dissertation uses a series of experiments to answer the central research question (Morton & 
Williams, 2010). Laboratory experiments, laboratory-in-the-field experiments and face-to-face 
classroom experiments are used in the empirical chapters for testing the hypotheses. By using 
different types of experiments, experimental designs and experimental subjects, a number of 
important methodological contributions can be presented.
 The first methodological contribution is the use of a combination of ‘high control’ 
experimental designs for measuring behavior at the micro level: laboratory experiments, 
laboratory-in-the-field experiments and face-to-face classroom experiments. This dissertation 
responds to the many calls for more experimental designs as a way of producing more robust 
knowledge and disentangling causes from consequences (Bozeman & Scott, 1992; Margetts, 
2011; Morton & Williams, 2010). The benefits that experimental designs offer, such as high 
internal and construct validity, the potential to draw causal inferences and to test theories 
have until recently not gained the interest of scholars in the field of public administration 
(Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Li & Van Ryzin, 2017). One explanation for this is that 
scholars in the field of public administration have disregarded internal validity for the sake of 
external validity and a ‘felt need to provide immediate prescriptions for action’ (Bozeman & 
Scott, 1992, p. 294). More recently, the experimental method has gained popularity. This has 
led to studies that use experimental designs to study governmental performance (Belle, 2014), 
the effects of transparency on citizen trust (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012), co-production 
(Fledderus, 2015; Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013) and decision-making biases (Olsen, 2013), all in 
the realm of the public sector. However, most of those experiments are survey experiments 
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or vignette studies (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Li & Van Ryzin, 2017). Survey 
experiments are a good choice when it is the explicit aim to test motives, intentions and 
values as well as checking for demographics and the socio-economic status of respondents. 
 Survey experiments are much less suited to test behavior of the participants because 
they do not enable them to display actual behavior. While intentions and behavior are 
connected, they cannot be translated directly. For instance, in a meta-analysis based on a 
selection of meta-analyses that focus on a range of behavioral theories such as reasoned 
action and motivation theory, intentions predict only 28% of the variance in prospective 
studies (Sheeran, 2002).
 One of the particular problems is that choices made in survey and vignette experiments 
do not have real consequences for the participants. How intentions, motives and values 
impact behavior is part of a long standing discussion (cf. Ajzen, 2011; Armitage & Conner, 2001; 
Sheeran, 2002). Testing intended behavior where the research objective is to find answers 
about behavior itself results in low construct validity, rendering findings unreliable and making 
generalization pointless. An example would be to test the decision ‘behavior’ of managers or 
citizens by means of a vignette-experiment. The operationalization is captured in hypothetical 
situations, without consequences, repercussions or payoffs and costs for the subjects. Since 
these factors are absent, they are not considered when making decisions, resulting in biased 
decisions. Because of the laboratory, lab-in-the-field and classroom experimental approach, 
this dissertation does not suffer from the lowered construct validity that many ‘behavioral’ 
survey-experiments suffer from.
 A second methodological contribution is that this dissertation varies experimental 
control by using lab, lab-in-the-field and face-to-face classroom experiments. The experiment 
in Chapter 2 is based on a negotiation game that is almost void of context in terms of 
negotiation task, realism and payoffs (Chapter 2). In steps, realism is added to the experiments 
in this dissertation in the form of more realistic negotiation tasks, face-to-face negotiation and 
information density for negotiators (Chapter 4 and 5). This way, the level of (contextual) realism 
and thus ecological validity is systematically increased over the series of papers and thus over 
the dissertation. Consequently, this involves accepting a systematically lowered experimental 
control. By combining different experimental designs and techniques, this approach alleviates 
the drawbacks of individual experimental techniques.
 The third contribution is that two experiments are replicated in this dissertation and 
that this replication is carried out with a practitioner sample. Replication is a core element 
of scientific progress because it enables building on knowledge, instead of moving from 
one shot finding to the next. Replications do exist in the field of public administration but 
are still relatively rare (Walker et al., 2017). In fact, some have argued that the relative void 
of replications in some fields of social sciences is hurting and frustrating scientific progress 
altogether (van Witteloostuijn, 2016). The experimental studies in Chapters 2 and 3 were 
carried out in a university computer laboratory with samples of student participants first. Next, 
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the experiments were replicated, using a mobile laboratory with practitioners, comprising a 
lab-in-the-field setting. 
 Not only does this dissertation contribute to the field methodologically by presenting its 
own replications, it does so by additionally using practitioners as participants in the replication 
study in Chapter 6. Experiments, and especially student-based experiments have been and 
are still continuously being criticized for using students participants (Benz & Meier, 2008; Sears, 
1986). The empirical evidence supporting these claims is scattered and inconclusive (Druckman 
& Kam, 2011; Falk & Heckman, 2009). The point critics make is that because students usually 
self-select into experiments and students are homogenous on characteristics such as age and 
education the results cannot be reliable (Druckman & Kam, 2011). As a consequence of their 
low age, higher education and relative inexperience students will probably behave differently 
compared to a target population such as public managers, politicians or decisionmakers (Falk 
& Heckman, 2009). As such, it is argued, student-based samples negatively impact the external 
validity of experimental findings. 
 However, in statistical terms, a homogenous subject sample like a student-sample, 
is preferable to a heterogeneous sample because it does not assume (ex-ante) that the 
magnitude of the main effect depends on some exogenous influence. See for instance 
Druckman and Kam (2011) who simulate this problem for an OLS-regression model. From 
this, they conclude that when a true data generating process produces a single treatment 
effect, ‘the estimates from any sample will generate an unbiased estimate of the underlying 
treatment effect’ (Druckman & Kam, 2011, p. 11). This means that if the treatment is the same 
in case of a student sample, a sample of practitioners or random sample of citizens, the 
experiment produces an unbiased treatment effect.
 Additionally, critics have focused on the limited representativeness of students for a 
target population and have argued that generalizations cannot be made. However, this is an 
unnuanced view of what generalization means and requires. Generalizability refers to the idea 
that findings must hold over time, contexts and over variations in persons (Shadish et al., 2002, 
p. 83). Moreover, some have pointed out that it is not the generalizability of a single study 
but rather that generalizability should be assessed based on a series of studies on a topic 
(Druckman & Kam, 2011; McDermott, 2002). This dissertation produces a series of studies that 
focus on negotiations, with a variation of experimental subjects. 
 There are many other often mentioned arguments by critics against the use of laboratory 
experiments and students in the laboratory. Firstly, the stakes are usually lower than in real 
life situations, but the findings on varying the stakes experimentally are mixed and seem to 
depend on experimental context (Falk & Heckman, 2009). Also, it is impossible to determine 
what a ‘right’ level of stakes would be. Secondly, the number of observations is small. However, 
this can only effectively be argued in light of the effect sizes of the findings. Conversely, sample 
sizes that are too large are problematic in experiments as many covariates will be statistically 
significant, while they are not significant in meaning (Sullivan & Feinn, 2012). Thirdly, the 
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participants are inexperienced (a variation of the student-sample point). However, studying 
the effect of experience is usually not the aim of experiments, while learning effects have 
been well documented (Cooper, Kagel, Lo, & Gu, 1999). A Hawthorne effects exists because 
subjects feel they are under study. But, based on re-analysis of the data, the Hawthorne effect 
did not exist in the Hawthorne studies (Falk & Heckman, 2009; Jones, 1992) . Fourthly, self-
selection into the laboratory will distort the findings as those who come to the laboratory 
share certain characteristics (Belot et al., 2015). Despite the fact that a selection bias is not 
unique for the laboratory setting as other methods may suffer equally under self-selection, 
experimenters usually collect additional background data that enables comparing and 
studying these effects. In this dissertation, many covariates were considered, such as age, 
gender, self-reported negotiator efficacy, the BIG-5 personality characteristics, risk propensity 
and social value orientation.
 Many of these critiques originate from a limited or flawed understanding of experimental 
designs (Falk & Heckman, 2009). Some of these however present scholars with practical 
issues. For instance, to study if and how experience or socialization of negotiators impacts the 
experimental findings, one needs to find an appropriate subject sample of practitioners. Also, 
practitioners are not easily persuaded to participate in lab-experiments at university locations. 
To overcome these critiques, we used a mobile laboratory to carry out a so called lab-in-the-
field experiment (Morton & Williams, 2010). This was done using samples of practitioners from 
municipalities, private sector companies and consultancy firms. By using a mobile laboratory, 
a more ‘representative’ sample can be used in the same or similar experiments for testing 
theories in a location that is natural to the participants. The particular contribution of this 
approach is that this dissertation is based on a more robust body of evidence because of 
the replications carried out (Walker et al., 2017). And for the negotiation studies that were 
replicated in this dissertation, the differences between the student sample and the sample of 
practitioners proved to be very limited.
LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Before discussing the conclusion of this dissertation, the limitations of this dissertation 
are highlighted. Due to the variations in experimental designs in this dissertation, the 
limitations below may apply in varying degrees to the individual chapters, but rather apply 
to the dissertation as a whole. Below, one methodological, two theoretical points and one 
metatheoretical point are discussed which also provide opportunities for future research. 
The studies in this dissertation are strong on internal validity, at the cost of reduced external 
validity, which limits statistical generalization. The main question that follows, is how the 
results can be generalized over time, contexts and to practitioners. Despite the limited sample 
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size, the replication study (in Chapter 6) suggests that negotiation outcomes of experiments 
with practitioners are quite similar to those with student subjects in this dissertation.
 Also, laboratory experiments limit the level of realism for the participants. Thus, the 
negotiation games require artificial stimuli. This begs the question of how negotiation and 
negotiation outcomes can meaningfully be examined. Face-to-face experiments add more 
realism but this introduces exogenous influences and they are statistically noisier, introducing 
potential confounding variables. Lab-in-the-field experiments may provide a valuable way 
forward as these experiments offer high experimental control combined with a representative 
subject sample. Still, researchers will lose experimental control by opting for a lab-in-the field 
approach compared to a laboratory experiment. Consequently, a laboratory experiment using 
student participants are a good starting point for research (eg. Charness & Kuhn, 2011; Falk 
& Heckman, 2009). Future studies could focus for example on comparing similar or identical 
stimuli in variations of experimental designs like laboratory, lab-in-the-field and face-to-face 
experiments. 
 
Secondly, this dissertation makes an archetypical and bimodal distinction between the public 
and the private sector, primarily based on the core approach (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997). 
Even though this is instrumental, this distinction has been criticized (Allison, 1983; Antonsen 
& Jørgensen, 1997; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). Also, this distinction puts an emphasis on 
differences while it neglects or minimizes similarities between the sectors and its respective 
employees. Moreover, the blurring of sectors complicates this distinction as private sector 
organizations increasingly engage in corporate social responsibility (Holme & Watts, 1999) 
and public organizations sometimes operate on private markets under strict regulations.
 Also, the existence of hybrid organizations or organizations at arm’s length distort a 
meaningful classification between public and private (Denis, Ferlie, & Gestel, 2015; Thiel, 2000). 
On top of that, there are differences between levels of government and parts of the public 
sector. For instance, Dur et al. (2015) found differences in self-reported altruism and laziness 
for caring employees such as nurses and caretakers and employees in non-caring industries 
in the public sector. Parallels can be drawn for the private sector as well: negotiators in a large 
multinational will fit a different profile compared to a negotiator in a small startup company 
(Ouimet & Zarutskie, 2014). 
 The contextual dissimilarities like accountability or discretion of organizations in the 
public and private sector will vary for organizational size, organizational goals and countries. 
For example, accountability expectations are different for European member states and 
agencies (Busuioc, 2010). 
 Another way of thinking about this is that this dissertation has focused on the variance 
between sectoral contexts in studying negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes. This 
choice entails that the variance within sectors has been neglected. As this dissertation is a 
first attempt at opening the black box of how negotiations in the public and private sector 
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are carried out, a more nuanced conceptualization of sectoral and organizational differences 
is needed to gain a better understanding. In addition, this introduces the question if and 
how individual characteristics, motives and predispositions such as risk propensity, the BIG-5 
personality dimensions and negotiator efficacy vary between and within sectors.
 Another valuable way forward would be to study other elements that distinguish public 
and private organizations in relation to negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes. This 
dissertation focused on only two dimensions of the public-private sector divide: the effect of 
accountability and of negotiator discretion on negotiation outcomes. Similarly, the effect of 
ownership, transparency, type of budgeting and the monopolistic character of many public 
organizations is likely to influence negotiation processes and outcomes which require careful 
decomposition in the laboratory environment. 
 Thirdly, this dissertation focused (Chapter 2 and 6) mainly on the effect of PSM on 
negotiation outcomes. More differences have been found to co-vary for public and private 
sector employees, some of which, such as the BIG-5 personality dimensions and risk propensity 
have also been studied in this dissertation. Additionally, other individual characteristics and 
traits like gender, risk propensity, assertiveness and extraversion are well known predictors of 
negotiation behavior (Lewicki et al., 2015). Moreover, a recent addition to the PSM literature 
has been the study of the ‘dark side’, which are the pathological traits and motives of public 
servants, leading to undesired behavior (Jensen, Andersen, & Holten, 2017). Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, power(abuse) and locus of control are promising personality characteristics that 
may moderate the relationship between PSM and negotiation behavior. One promising way 
forward can be based on this limitation. Decisionmakers are known to differ in their responses 
when decisions under risk must be made for the domain of gains versus a domain of losses 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). How negotiators respond to identical gambles embedded in a 
negotiation setting is thus far unclear. This is especially relevant as public and private sector 
negotiators already indicate themselves that they have different risk propensities (Buurman et 
al., 2012). 
Finally, one of the discussions on PSM focuses on the idea that high PSM individuals are 
intrinsically motivated, but also hard to motivate extrinsically. Consequently, high PSM 
individuals, such as public servants are frequently argued to be willing to work for lower 
financial rewards, especially when their person-job fit is high (see for a discussion: Christensen 
& Wright, 2011; Georgellis, Iossa, & Tabvuma, 2011). 
 As the experiment in Chapter 2 was carried out with student participants who were 
financially incentivized, the effect of PSM is potentially biased as the distinction between the 
experimental groups is also based on PSM. All participants, those with high and low PSM were 
reimbursed based on their in-game performance. If the idea holds that high PSM individuals 
attach less meaning to financial rewards, the financial rewards themselves may have caused 
a more systematic variation in the outcomes. In more simple terms, incentives may cause a 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
156                                   
confounding effect, we have not observed. An alternative version of this issue may present 
itself in experimental studies that have a task that appeal intrinsically to some, but less to 
others based on the motivation of individuals to contribute to a public good (PSM in this 
dissertation). This limitation calls for studies that focus on the relationship between the type 
of rewards in experiments and the type of task (complexity) on some measure of outcome – 
especially for comparing public and private sector-oriented individuals.
PRACTICAL RELEVANCE
The aim of this dissertation was to test theoretical predictions and to answer a theoretical 
research question. Despite the fundamental character of this dissertation a number of points 
for practitioners are given here. 
One of the most often studied differences between individuals employed in the public sector 
and individuals employed in the private sector is their motivation to serve the public interest.
A frequently given recommendation is that PSM should be used to market public sector 
organizations in the context of HR (Ritz & Waldner, 2011; Weske, Ritz, Schott, & Neumann, 2019). 
Some public organizations, such as the Dutch state departments have also effectively done so 
in the past (Steijn & Groeneveld, 2009). This dissertation found that higher levels of PSM cause 
higher levels of cooperation in negotiation settings.  However, whether or not to cooperate 
depends on the negotiation aim, setting and opponent (Lewicki et al., 2015). Recruiting 
employees with high(er) PSM levels means recruiting high cooperators in negotiations.
 In variable sum negotiations, it is generally accepted that cooperation helps finding 
agreement and finding it faster (Fisher & Ury, 1981). The public sector has many variable 
sum negotiation settings, such as finding a solution to a common policy problem, together 
with stakeholders for instance implementing health policies.  In constant sum negotiation 
settings, such as buying and selling goods and services, high cooperation may however be 
less favorable for negotiators, depending on the rules of the negotiation.
Recommendation:
If a job description for a public employee requires negotiations within or outside the realm 
of the public sector, high levels of PSM should only be prioritized when cooperation is also 
prioritized in negotiations.
This dissertation shows that differences in negotiator discretion matter for the outcomes. 
This effect has been found in the student subjects in Chapter 3, as well as in a sample of 
practitioners in Chapter 6. Especially having relatively little discretion leads to extremes: 
either claiming a lot of the total available ‘pie’ or the opposite, claiming relatively little. While 
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discretion is in most cases not under the direct control of negotiators themselves, negotiators 
could seek information for a clearly delineated (political) mandate. This idea supports insights 
from management literature that awareness of a clear mandate is required to be successful 
(Lewicki et al., 2015). Moreover, awareness of the discretion of opponents in negotiations will 
increase the odds of achieving mutually desired outcomes (Ibid.)
Recommendations:
1)  Negotiators should be aware of their own discretion in negotiations and check with 
superiors beforehand. 
2)  Negotiators should be aware of the discretion of their opponents as this may provide 
valuable information needed to reach agreement.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we present evidence that accountability severely impacts negotiation 
process and outcomes. When negotiators are held accountable when forming coalitions, 
their individual and group performance deteriorates. Moreover, the formed negotiations are 
less inclusive which may collide with public sector aims and goals. Individual differences in 
motives and personality characteristics such as PSM do not improve or worsen the effect of 
accountability on negotiation outcomes. This suggests that negotiators have little potential 
to alleviate the downward effect of accountability. To complicate things further, formal 
obligations of accountability are often anchored in legislation.
Recommendations:
1)  Accountable negotiators are less likely to form coalitions that include all negotiators—a 
so‐called grand coalition — because negotiators focus on their individual results. 
Keeping out a clear eye for the group result and vulnerable negotiators could lead to 
better results instead.
2)  Accountable negotiators show lower group performance in negotiations. Negotiators 
should make clear arrangements with their superiors at what moments and how they 
will render their accountability for achieved negotiation results.
3)  The negative consequences of accountability—such as sanctions—have little impact 
on the performance of negotiators when negotiations are repeated. Superiors who are 
not at the bargaining table should consider finding alternative means such as finding 
support with additional actors for achieving desired results. Similarly, political fora 
should consider sanctioning unwillingness and not outcomes as this may not lead to 
improvement. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
158                                   
Final conclusion
This dissertation presents a series of ground-breaking papers that focus on 1) the effects of 
individual characteristics of public and private sector negotiators on negotiation behavior 
and outcomes and 2) the effects of contextual factors such as accountability and discretion 
on negotiation behavior and outcomes. It is multi-disciplinary as it uses theoretical insights 
from public administration, negotiation literature and game theory to test what effects of 
the individual and contextual differences on negotiation behavior and outcomes are. It is 
also one of the very few dissertations that is solely based on a series of experimental designs. 
Furthermore, this dissertation is unique because it replicates two of the student-based 
experiments with practitioners. As opposed to many cross-sectional research projects in the 
field of public administration, this type of research provides accurate predictions of causes 
and effects which are much needed to enhance the scientific rigor in the discipline.
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Appendix 2.2: Screens in the experimental game
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Appendix 2.3: Negotiator instructions (translated).
Instructions negotiation experiment      
In this experiment, you are expected to negotiate. You play with one opponent, and one 
opponent only during the entire length of this experiment. Both you and your opponent 
get 10 units per round to use in the negotiation. In dyads, you are asked to contribute to 
a common goal. From the 10 units received, you can contribute. Your opponent can also 
contribute from his or her 10 units. Your contribution is deducted from your 10 units. 
Both you and your opponents’ contributions will be added up and multiplied by 1.5 each 
round. The sum is then divided over you and your opponent. You will contribute by entering 
the amount you want to contribute in the box and press OK. You cannot see what your 
opponent is contributing, nor can he/she see what you are contributing. Only when the 
payoffs have been calculated, you get to see what your opponent has contributed and what 
you both have earned.
Your balance is:   10
 Your much do you contribute? 
OK
-  Note that every choice you make is of importance for your pay-out at the end of the 
experiment. One experimental unit translates to €0.008.
- You play against the same opponent during the entire experiment.
-  This experiment has 11 rounds, with 10 decisions each. The first round is a practice round 
and has 10 decisions also.
- In this experiment, you are paid based on your performance. 
Example:
You contribute 5 from your 10 units by entering this in the text box. You now have 5 units 
left yourself and have contributed 5 by pressing OK. Your opponent contributes 6 units. Your 
common contribution is 11. After multiplication with 1.5 the total sum of contributions is 
16.5. As you both will receive 1/2, you both get 8.25. You now have 13.25 units (5+8.25). Your 
opponent has 12.25 units (4+8.25).
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-Some final notes
-  In each round, you have to make a choice.
-  0 and 10 are also valid choices
-  You participate individually to this experiment.
-  You are not allowed to speak with the other participants in this room during the 
experiment
-  It is important that you follow the instructions as precise as possible. If you have questions, 
raise your hand.
-  You do not talk about the experiment
APPENDICES
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Appendix 3.1: screen shot offer and counteroffer during the game.
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Appendix 3.2: screen shot of the participant instructions
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APPENDICES BELONGING TO CHAPTER 4
Appendix 4.1: Player instructions (Control)
Player instructions
Welcome to this negotiation game. In this game, you will negotiate with two other students. 
The aim is to form a coalition with one or two of your opponents. By forming coalitions, you 
can earn points. The negotiation itself centres around the division of these points. 
On the table in front of you, there are three cards. The card on your table determines what role 
you have: A, B or C.
In each round, you and the other players negotiate over what coalition to form, and how you 
want to divide the value of this coalition. The value of the coalition is as follows:
Players Total value of the coalition
A en B 60
A en C 40
B en C 70
A, B en C 80
Note: players that are not in the coalition, will receive nothing: no points. You are allowed to 
form one coalition only in each round.
How many points you will obtain depends on what coalition is formed and how the total 
value of this coalition is divided over the players (A, B and C). You and the other negotiators in 
your group can make proposals to form coalitions and to divide the points that result from this 
coalition. If the players within a coalition agree with de division of points within the coalition, 
you have an agreement. When the time has passed, you can write down the division of points 
on the group-score card on the table. Negotiations are over only when the time has passed. 
If you agree on a coalition before the time has passed, this agreement is only definitive when 
all time has passed. After time has passed, you make sure you note the score on your group 
scorecard AND on your individual scorecard.
For each round of this game, there is a five-minute time limit. If you do not manage to form a 
coalition at the moment the time passes, all players get zero (0) points. 
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-  After each round, the positions (A, B and C) are reshuffled. When you are finished with 
negotiating, you await new instructions.
-  If you have questions during the experiment, raise your hand. We will answer your 
question as soon as possible. 
-  Do NOT consult with or talk to players from other groups.
-  Do NOT talk about the contents of this experiment with other students (e.g. What you 
have done) 
Individual Scorecard
ID Code:____
Round Player A/B/C Your score
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
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Appendix 4.2: Player instructions (Treatment)
Player instructions
Welcome to this negotiation game. In this game, you will negotiate with two other students. 
The aim is to form a coalition with one or two of your opponents. By forming coalitions, you 
can earn points. The negotiation itself centres around the division of these points. 
On the table in front of you, there are three cards. The card on your table determines what role 
you have: A, B or C. In each round, you and the other players negotiate over what coalition to 
form, and how you want to divide the value of this coalition. The value of the coalition is as 
follows:
Players Total value of the coalition
A and B 60
A and C 40
B and C 70
A, B and C 80
Note: players that are not in the coalition, will receive nothing: no points. You are allowed to 
form one coalition only in each round.
How many points you will obtain depends on what coalition is formed and how the total 
value of this coalition is divided over the players (A, B and C). You and the other negotiators in 
your group can make proposals to form coalitions and to divide the points that result from this 
coalition. If the players within a coalition agree with de division of points within the coalition, 
you have an agreement. When the time has passed, you can write down the division of points 
on the group-score card on the table. Negotiations are over only when the time has passed. 
If you agree on a coalition before the time has passed, this agreement is only definitive when 
all time has passed. After time has passed, you make sure you note the score on your group 
scorecard AND on your individual scorecard.
Behind/next to you is your assigned assessor. How many points this person earns depends on 
your performance. After ending the game, this person may note one third (1/3) of your earned 
points (NOT deducted from your score). Round down to 0.5 points. 
This person is not allowed to speak during the negotiation and is just present as a viewer. 
After two minutes of negotiation, you are allowed to discuss briefly with this assessor (only 
with your assigned assessor). After this, you will have the opportunity to negotiate again with 
your opponents. Again, your assessor is silent then. In each round, the structure is as follows: 
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1.  You negotiate 2 minutes with your opponents;
2.  You discuss 1 minute with your personal assessor;
3.  ou negotiate 3 minutes with your opponents.
If no coalition has been formed after the time has passed (steps 1 to 3), everyone gets zero 
(0) points. 
After each negotiation round passed, your assessor will grade you based on your performance. 
If your assessor is satisfied with your performance, you keep your points (green card). If your 
assessor is not satisfied, you subtract two points from your round total (red card). Note your 
original scores in the column “original score”. Also note your original score and your role on 
the group score sheet.
In case of a green card, this will also be your round score. In case of a red card, your round 
score is the original score minus 2 points. 
-  After each round, the positions (A, B and C) are reshuffled. When you are finished with 
negotiating, you await new instructions.
-  If you have questions during the experiment, raise your hand. We will answer your 
question as soon as possible. 
-  Do NOT consult with or talk to players from other groups.
-  Do NOT talk about the contents of this experiment with other students (e.g. What you 
have done) 
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Individual Scorecard
ID Code:__________
Round Player
A/B/C
Original score Card Score this round Your role this round
1 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
2 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
3 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
4 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
5 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
6 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
Total
Assessor Instructions
Welcome to this negotiation game. You are assigned the role of assessor for this round. Your 
task will be to observe the negotiator that is assigned to you and to provide feedback to this 
negotiator.
The negotiators (A, B and C) will negotiate for 2 minutes. During this phase, you are NOT 
allowed to speak and only allowed to observe. Also, you are not allowed to discuss with the 
other assessors. 
After this, you will have the opportunity to provide feedback to the negotiator that is 
representing you (1 minute). Then, another round of negotiation will follow by the negotiators 
(A, B and C). Again, you are not allowed to speak or interrupt. 
Because you provide feedback, you are allowed to write down one third (1/3) of the points 
that your negotiator has earned. These points are NOT subtracted from the points of the 
negotiator. The more points you earn, the better for you. 
You also will have the opportunity to evaluate your negotiator after an agreement has been 
reached. If you give your negotiator a green card (you are satisfied with the performance), he 
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or she gets to keep all the earned points. In this case, you tick green in the card column on 
your individual score sheet. 
If you give your negotiator a red card (you are not satisfied with the performance), your 
player has to subtract two points from his original score. In this case you tick the red (-2 pt.) 
box on the score sheet.
-  Over the course of this experiment, you will negotiate three times and you will be the 
assessor three times. 
-  If you have questions during the experiment, raise your hand. We will answer your 
question as soon as possible. 
- Do NOT consult with or talk to players from other groups.
-  Do NOT talk about the contents of this experiment with other students (e.g. What you 
have done) 
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Appendix 4.3: Post-test questionnaire
Questionnaire
This questionnaire focuses on a number of personal background characteristics. Your answers 
are never right or wrong. Do not think too long and always provide an answer. Filling out the 
questionnaire will take approximately 5 minutes. 
ID code
1) What is your gender?
[   ] Male
[   ] Female
2) What is your year of birth? 
3) In what year did you start college?
4) What is your highest level of education you have achieved?
[   ] Primary school
[   ] Complete lower secondary school, technical/vocational type (LBO / VMBO / MAVO)
[   ] Complete lower secondary school, technical/vocational type (MBO / MTS / MEAO)
[   ] Complete secondary school, university-preparatory type (HAVO / MMS / HBS)
[   ] Complete secondary school, university-preparatory type (VWO / Atheneum / Gymnasium)
[   ] Applied university college level (HTS / HEAO / Social Academy)
[   ] University level college (University BA/MA / Post-HBO)
5) How many people were there assigned to your group in total in every round 
(yourself included)?
6) With how many people did you play the negotiation game in every round? 
(yourself included but not counting viewers)?
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7) Was there someone in your session as a personal assessor who also received points based 
on your performance?
[   ] Yes
[   ] No
8) Motivation
The following questions focus on motivation. Please tick the answer that applies to you best.
Totally 
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree
Politics is a dirty word [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I unselfishly contribute to my 
community
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
The give and take of public policy-
making does not appeal to me
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I would prefer seeing public officials 
do what is best for the whole 
community even if it harmed my 
interests
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I consider public service my civic duty [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
Contributing to development 
and execution of public policy is 
important to me
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I have little compassion for people in 
need who are unwilling to take the 
first step to help themselves
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
Making a difference in society 
means more to me than personal 
achievements.
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
Meaningful public service is very 
important to me
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I don’t care much for politicians [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
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Appendix 5.2: Player instructions (Control) (translated)
Player instructions
Welcome to this negotiation game. In this game, you will negotiate with two other students. 
The aim is to form a coalition with one or two of your opponents. By forming coalitions, you 
can earn points. The negotiation itself centres around the division of these points. 
On the table in front of you, there are three cards. The card on your table determines what role 
you have: A, B or C.
In each round, you and the other players negotiate over what coalition to form, and how you 
want to divide the value of this coalition. The value of the coalition is as follows:
Players Total value of the coalition
A and B 60
A and C 40
B and C 70
A, B and C 80
Note: players that are not in the coalition, will receive nothing: no points. You are allowed to 
form one coalition only in each round.
How many points you will obtain depends on what coalition is formed and how the total 
value of this coalition is divided over the players (A, B and C). You and the other negotiators in 
your group can make proposals to form coalitions and to divide the points that result from this 
coalition. If the players within a coalition agree with de division of points within the coalition, 
you have an agreement. When the time has passed, you can write down the division of points 
on the group-score card on the table. Negotiations are over only when the time has passed. 
If you agree on a coalition before the time has passed, this agreement is only definitive when 
all time has passed. After time has passed, you make sure you note the score on your group 
scorecard AND on your individual scorecard.
For each round of this game, there is a five-minute time limit. If you do not manage to form a 
coalition at the moment the time passes, all players get zero (0) points. 
 203 
A
-   After each round, the positions (A, B and C) are reshuffled. When you are finished with 
negotiating, you await new instructions.
-   If you have questions during the experiment, raise your hand. We will answer your 
question as soon as possible. 
-   Do NOT consult with or talk to players from other groups.
-   Do NOT talk about the contents of this experiment with other students (e.g. What you 
have done) 
Individual Scorecard
ID Code:____
Round Player A/B/C Your score
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total
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Appendix 5.3: Player instructions (Treatment) (translated)
Player instructions
Welcome to this negotiation game. In this game, you will negotiate with two other students. 
The aim is to form a coalition with one or two of your opponents. By forming coalitions, you 
can earn points. The negotiation itself centres around the division of these points. 
On the table in front of you, there are three cards. The card on your table determines what role 
you have: A, B or C. In each round, you and the other players negotiate over what coalition to 
form, and how you want to divide the value of this coalition. The value of the coalition is as 
follows:
Players Total value of the coalition
A and B 60
A and C 40
B and C 70
A, B and C 80
Note: players that are not in the coalition, will receive nothing: no points. You are allowed to 
form one coalition only in each round.
How many points you will obtain depends on what coalition is formed and how the total 
value of this coalition is divided over the players (A, B and C). You and the other negotiators in 
your group can make proposals to form coalitions and to divide the points that result from this 
coalition. If the players within a coalition agree with de division of points within the coalition, 
you have an agreement. When the time has passed, you can write down the division of points 
on the group-score card on the table. Negotiations are over only when the time has passed. 
If you agree on a coalition before the time has passed, this agreement is only definitive when 
all time has passed. After time has passed, you make sure you note the score on your group 
scorecard AND on your individual scorecard.
Behind/next to you is your assigned assessor. How many points this person earns depends on 
your performance. After ending the game, this person may note one third (1/3) of your earned 
points (NOT deducted from your score). Round down to 0.5 points. 
This person is not allowed to speak during the negotiation and is just present as a viewer. 
After two minutes of negotiation, you are allowed to discuss briefly with this assessor (only 
with your assigned assessor). After this, you will have the opportunity to negotiate again with 
your opponents. Again, your assessor is silent then. In each round, the structure is as follows: 
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You negotiate 2 minutes with your opponents;
You discuss 1 minute with your personal assessor;
You negotiate 3 minutes with your opponents.
If no coalition has been formed after the time has passed (steps 1 to 3), everyone gets zero 
(0) points. 
After each negotiation round passed, your assessor will grade you based on your performance. 
If your assessor is satisfied with your performance, you keep your points (green card). If your 
assessor is not satisfied, you subtract two points from your round total (red card). Note your 
original scores in the column “original score”. Also note your original score and your role on 
the group score sheet.
In case of a green card, this will also be your round score. In case of a red card, your round 
score is the original score minus 2 points. 
After each round, the positions (A, B and C) are reshuffled. When you are finished with 
negotiating, you await new instructions.
If you have questions during the experiment, raise your hand. We will answer your question 
as soon as possible. 
Do NOT consult with or talk to players from other groups.
Do NOT talk about the contents of this experiment with other students (e.g. What you have 
done) 
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Individual Scorecard
ID Code:__________
Round Player
A/B/C
Original score Card Score this round Your role this round
1 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
2 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
3 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
4 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
5 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
6 [   ] Green
[   ] Red (-2 pt)
Assessor / Negotiator
Total
Assessor Instructions
Welcome to this negotiation game. You are assigned the role of assessor for this round. Your 
task will be to observe the negotiator that is assigned to you and to provide feedback to this 
negotiator.
The negotiators (A, B and C) will negotiate for 2 minutes. During this phase, you are NOT 
allowed to speak and only allowed to observe. Also, you are not allowed to discuss with the 
other assessors. 
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After this, you will have the opportunity to provide feedback to the negotiator that is 
representing you (1 minute). Then, another round of negotiation will follow by the negotiators 
(A, B and C). Again, you are not allowed to speak or interrupt. 
Because you provide feedback, you are allowed to write down one third (1/3) of the points 
that your negotiator has earned. These points are NOT subtracted from the points of the 
negotiator. The more points you earn, the better for you. 
You also will have the opportunity to evaluate your negotiator after an agreement has been 
reached. If you give your negotiator a green card (you are satisfied with the performance), he 
or she gets to keep all the earned points. In this case, you tick green in the card column on 
your individual score sheet. 
If you give your negotiator a red card (you are not satisfied with the performance), your player 
has to subtract two points from his original score. In this case you tick the red (-2 pt.) box on 
the score sheet.
-   Over the course of this experiment, you will negotiate three times and you will be the 
assessor three times. 
-   If you have questions during the experiment, raise your hand. We will answer your 
question as soon as possible. 
-   Do NOT consult with or talk to players from other groups.
-   Do NOT talk about the contents of this experiment with other students (e.g. What you 
have done) 
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Appendix 5.4: POST-TEST Questionnaire (translated)
Questionnaire
This questionnaire focuses on a number of personal background characteristics. Your answers 
are never right or wrong. Do not think too long and always provide an answer. Filling out the 
questionnaire will take approximately 5 minutes. 
ID code
1) What is your gender?
[   ] Male
[   ] Female
2) What is your year of birth? 
3) In what year did you start college?
4) What is your highest level of education you have achieved?
[   ] Primary school
[   ] Complete lower secondary school, technical/vocational type (LBO / VMBO / MAVO)
[   ] Complete lower secondary school, technical/vocational type (MBO / MTS / MEAO)
[   ] Complete secondary school, university-preparatory type (HAVO / MMS / HBS)
[   ] Complete secondary school, university-preparatory type (VWO / Atheneum / Gymnasium)
[   ] Applied university college level (HTS / HEAO / Social Academy)
[   ] University level college (University BA/MA / Post-HBO)
5) How many people were there assigned to your group in total in every round 
(yourself included)?
6) With how many people did you play the negotiation game in every round? 
(yourself included but not counting viewers)?
 209 
A
7) Was there someone in your session as a personal assessor who also received points 
based on your performance?
[   ] Yes
[   ] No
8) Motivation
The following questions focus on motivation. Please tick the answer that applies to you best.
Totally 
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree
Politics is a dirty word [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I unselfishly contribute to my 
community
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
The give and take of public policy-
making does not appeal to me
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I would prefer seeing public officials 
do what is best for the whole 
community even if it harmed my 
interests
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I consider public service my civic duty [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
Contributing to development 
and execution of public policy is 
important to me
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I have little compassion for people in 
need who are unwilling to take the 
first step to help themselves
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
Making a difference in society 
means more to me than personal 
achievements.
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
Meaningful public service is very 
important to me
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
I don’t care much for politicians [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
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Appendix 5.5: Analysis of the coalitions at the group level
Coalitions over the length of the experiment % and (counts).
No accountability Accountability Test
AB 1.2% (1) 16.7% (17)
AC 2.4% (2) 11.8% (12)
BC 6.0% (5) 26.5% (27)
ABC 89.3% (75) 38.2% (39)
No coalition 1.2% (1) 6.9% (7)
100% (84) 100% (102)
X2 = 51.09
P=0.000
Coalitions, Business Administration % and (counts).
No accountability Accountability Test
AB 0.0% (0) 19.0% (8)
AC 3.3% (1) 4.8% (2)
BC 3.3% (1) 28.6% (12)
ABC 90.0% (27) 40.5% (17)
No coalition 3.3% (1) 7.1% (3)
100% (30) 100% (42)
X2 = 19.45
P=0.000
Coalitions, Public Administration % and (counts).
No accountability Accountability Test
AB 1.9% (1) 15.0% (9)
AC 1.9% (1) 16.7% (10)
BC 7.4% (4) 25.0% (15)
ABC 88.9% (48) 36.7% (22)
No coalition 0.0% (0) 6.7% (4)
100% (54) 100% (60)
X2 = 33.56
P=0.000
 211 
A
APPENDICES BELONGING TO CHAPTER 6
Appendix 6.1 Lab-in-the-field setup used for replicating laboratory 
experiments
Appendix 6.2 Photo lab-in-the-field session with civil servants at a Dutch 
municipality, Oct 11, 2017.
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ENGLISH SUMMARY
The main research question of this dissertation is: What are the differences between public 
and private sector negotiations in terms of sector context, negotiation behavior and negotiation 
outcomes?
 Negotiations have been primarily studied in the private sector. This research has for 
example focused on cooperation and competition (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011), and on 
the role of information in negotiations (eg. Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, & Bruining, 
2007). Negotiations have also been studied as a tool for joint problem solving (eg. Aarikka-
Stenroos & Jaakkola, 2012; Graham, 1986). Less attention has been devoted to negotiations 
that take place in the realm of the public sector. Moreover, negotiation research does not 
distinguish between the public and the private sector. This is especially surprising as research 
from the field of public administration has established that the public sector and private 
sector are different from each other in for example organizational goals and contexts (Rainey, 
2003; Rainey and Bozeman, 2000; Antonsen & Jorgensen, 1997). Moreover, public sector 
employees adhere to different values and are highly motivated to contribute to society as 
a whole, compared to private sector employees (Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuijzen, 2008, 
Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry, 2000). This set of motivations leads to observable differences in 
behavior in situations that are the same otherwise.
 These insights make the application of negation knowledge problematic while 
negotiation dynamics are ubiquitous in the public and in the private sector. For example, 
European member states negotiate over terms and conditions for further integration. 
Moreover, agencies, universities and railway companies negotiate over their performance 
with ministries. In addition, New Public Management developments have increased the use 
of performance agreements in the public sector (Hood, 1991). Many agreements in the public 
sector are arrived at by means of negotiations. As these negotiations usually involve public 
means, the outcomes of such negotiations can have consequences for citizens. 
 Based on the idea that negotiations are increasingly important in both the private and 
public sector, and given that there are a number of differences between the public and 
private sector in terms of contexts and behavior, this dissertation focuses on differences in 
negotiation behavior and outcomes by comparing the public and private sector. 
 Chapter 2 aims to test if and to what extent individuals with higher levels of public service 
motivation (PSM) display a more cooperative style of negotiations. PSM is a set of beliefs and 
attitudes that go beyond self- or organizational interest and concern the interest of a larger 
societal interest (Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry, 2000; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008). Earlier, public 
service motivation has been connected to a range of preferences but also behavior such 
as a higher likelihood to whistle blow – which is good for society as a whole, but usually 
detrimental for the whistleblower (Brewer & Selden, 1998). Individuals with high levels of 
public service motivation are predominantly found in the public sector, while individuals 
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with lower levels of public service motivation are found in the private sector (Delfgaauw & 
Dur, 2010). Consequently, comparing individuals with either high and low levels of public 
service motivation is comparing the attitudes that are predominantly found in employees in 
the public and private sector. Because of the higher interest in society as a whole of high PSM 
individuals, we expect that they will contribute more in repeated negotiations, regardless of 
their individual gains and regardless of the level of PSM of their opponent. Higher contributions 
can be seen as higher cooperation. By using a laboratory experiment with a repeated public 
goods game, we found that indeed individuals with higher levels of PSM contribute more 
and thus acted more cooperative in a repeated negotiation setting. Moreover, the level of 
cooperation was not dependent on the level of PSM of their opponent. The findings in this 
chapter suggest that overall, individuals with high levels of PSM, such as civil servants, will 
cooperate more in negotiations compared to those with lower levels of PSM. 
 In Chapter 3, we test if negotiator discretion impacts negotiation outcomes. In addition, 
we test if the effect of discretion on negotiation outcomes is different for high and low 
public service motivated individuals. The main research question of this chapter asks: Do 
variations in negotiator discretion lead to different outcomes for public versus private sector 
employees? In this chapter we test two opposing lines of reasoning, based on two different 
theoretical angles. From the game theoretical perspective, negotiator discretion is thought 
not to alter the negotiation outcomes because increasing discretion simply introduces 
more irrelevant alternatives for negotiators (Nash 1950; Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975). From the 
second perspective, discretion is thought to have a positive relation with the productivity of 
employees, job satisfaction and motivation (Gellatly & Irving, 2001; Shin & Konrad, 2014). In the 
public sector specifically, discretion has been connected to the effectiveness and support for 
policies of front-line workers such as teachers and police officers (Lipsky, 1980). These frontline 
workers are thought to use their discretion as they see fit in order to tailor policies to the 
specific characteristics of situations, for instance to help clients (Tummers and Bekkers 2014; 
Tummers, Steijn & Bekkers 2012). As a result it is plausible that discretion will have a stronger 
impact on those with high levels of PSM (Van Wart, 2003).
 In negotiation literature, discretion is thought to impact negotiations as negotiators 
experience power differently and thus use different tactics (Kim & Fragale, 2005; Babcock, 
Loewenstein, & Wang, 1995). Based on a variable sum negotiation game, our expectations are 
tested in the laboratory by exposing negotiators to three levels of discretion, little discretion, 
medium discretion and a lot of discretion. The findings show that discretion impacts 
negotiation outcomes. Especially negotiators with little discretion negotiation setting claimed 
more from the available surplus. This finding suggests that discretion levels of negotiators 
indeed influence the outcomes of negotiations. The difference between high and low PSM 
individuals did not moderate the relationship between negotiator discretion and negotiation 
outcomes. 
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 In Chapter 4, we focus on a specific mechanism that is central in the public sector context: 
public accountability. The aim of this study is to see if public accountability impacts the way 
in which groups of negotiators arrive at a coalition. The central question in this chapter is: 
Does public accountability lead to different coalitions and lower negotiator performance in 
coalition negotiations?
 Public accountability is systematically rated as an important value held by public 
managers (Van der Wal, De Graaf, & Lasthuizen, 2008). It is often claimed to improve 
performance, to enhance integrity and to reduce corruption (Bovens, Schillemans, and ’t Hart 
2008). Moreover, it is seen as a cornerstone of modern democracies (Bovens 2005, Bovens 
2006; Bovens, Goodin & Schillemans, 2014). At the same time, accountability in negotiation 
settings has been known to reduce the extent to which negotiators are willing to make 
concessions (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984). In teams, negotiators behave more competitive if 
they are held accountable (O’Connor 1997). The extent to which accountability also affects 
the performance of negotiators and the type of coalitions they arrive at is thus far unknown. 
 In this study, we use a face-to-face negotiation game, in which the participants are 
asked to form coalitions. In the treatment condition, negotiators had to answer to a personal 
‘forum’ based on their performance.  In the control condition, no accountability demands 
were placed on the negotiators. The findings show that negotiator performance deteriorates 
when forming coalitions under the influence of public accountability. Moreover, negotiators 
seem to opt for coalitions that include fewer opponents. Overall, accountability reduced the 
likelihood that an agreement was reached. These findings are particularly interesting as they 
challenge the idea that accountability will increase performance in the context of negotiating 
over a coalition. 
 In Chapter 5, we test to see if the relation found in Chapter 4 between accountability 
and negotiation outcomes in a coalition setting is different for public versus private sector 
negotiators. Forming coalitions is an important way of arriving at desired outcomes in both 
the public and the private sector, for instance in networks and public-private-partnerships 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). The demand for accountability has steadily grown over the years in 
both the public and in the private sector (Power, 1994). Public and private sector employees 
value accountability, while public sector employees rate it as a more important value (Van 
der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuijzen, 2008). Consequently, the downward effect found in Chapter 
4 could be stronger for public sector negotiators. Therefore, the main research question of 
this study is: Are responses to accountability different for public/private sector negotiators? In 
order to answer this question, we distinguish between individuals oriented to the public 
sector and individuals oriented towards the private sector based in their level of PSM. Like 
in the study in Chapter 4, we exposed our public and private sector-oriented negotiators to 
two experimental conditions. In the treatment condition the negotiators had to report to 
their personal forum while in the control condition, no such demands were present for the 
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negotiators. The experiment was carried out in a classroom setting where the negotiators 
could negotiate over the coalitions face-to-face. 
 The results from this study (re)confirm that accountability causes lower performance 
in coalition negotiations. Like in the study from Chapter 4, negotiators who were held 
accountable showed worse performance, more no-deals and included fewer constituents. 
This finding aligns with earlier work on the effect of accountability on variable sum negotiation 
settings and with teams. Contrary to our expectations, the effect of accountability on the 
coalition formation by negotiations was not different for public and private sector-oriented 
negotiators.
 The specific aim of Chapter 6 is to test to what extent the findings from Chapter 2 and 3 
can be replicated with a sample of practitioners instead of a student sample. It focuses on the 
differences between the public and private sector at two levels: at the individual level and at 
the contextual or situational level. At the individual level, we test if public sector negotiators 
would behave more cooperatively compared to their private sector counterparts. At the 
contextual level, we tested whether the level of discretion would impact the negotiation 
outcomes. The use of student samples has been critiqued because it is claimed by some 
that student samples are not representative for a specific target population such as for 
example public sector managers (Benz & Meier, 2008; Sears, 1986; Falk & Heckman, 2009). As 
a consequence, many studies cannot be replicated in a population of interest. To test if the 
findings from Chapters 2 and 3 hold, we replicate the experiment by using a mobile laboratory 
with a small sample of practitioners from the public and private sector. 
 The findings of this replication study show that, like in the student-based experiment 
from Chapter 2, individuals with higher levels of PSM contribute more during in a repeated 
negotiation setting. This means that those negotiators who have higher levels of public service 
motivation, such as public servants display higher levels of cooperation. Similarly, the findings 
show that discretion impacts negotiation behavior, just like in the experiment in Chapter 3. 
This is especially the case when negotiators experience little discretion. Again, no differences 
were found between public and private sector employees. 
 Another interesting finding is that the behavior of students and practitioners is very 
similar in both experiments.
Conclusions
The main research question of this dissertation is: What are the differences between public 
and private sector negotiations in terms of sector context, negotiation behavior and negotiation 
outcomes? There are three answers to this question.
 Firstly, the differences between public and private sector employees such as public 
service motivation causes variations in negotiation process and outcomes. Those oriented 
towards the public sector tend to display more cooperative behavior in negotiations. Secondly, 
differences between the contexts of the public and private sector such as the need for 
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accountability and levels of discretion cause variations in negotiation behavior and outcomes. 
Thirdly, the individual differences between public and private sector-oriented individuals are 
dampened when the influence of specific situational and contexts is large. This is for instance 
the case when negotiators are held accountable or have little negotiation discretion.
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Dit proefschrift focust op de vraag: Wat zijn de verschillen tussen onderhandelingen in de 
publieke en in de private sector als gekeken wordt naar sectorale context, onderhandelgedrag en 
onderhandeluitkomsten?
 De wetenschappelijke kennis over onderhandelen komt in grote mate voort uit 
onderzoeken die zich richten op (commerciële) organisaties in de private sector. Deze 
onderzoeken focussen bijvoorbeeld op de mate van samenwerking en competitie van 
individuele onderhandelaars (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 2011), op de rol die informatie 
speelt bij besluitvorming (bijvoorbeeld Scholes, Wright, Westhead, Burrows, & Bruining, 2007), 
maar ook hoe onderhandelingen gebruikt kunnen worden als middel voor het oplossen van 
gezamenlijke problemen (Aarikka-Stenroos & Jaakkola, 2012; Graham, 1986). Veel minder 
wetenschappelijke aandacht is er voor onderhandelingen die zich afspelen binnen of vanuit 
het perspectief van de publieke sector.
 Dat de onderhandel literatuur geen onderscheid maakt naar de publieke en private 
sector is merkwaardig. Verschillende bestuurskundige inzichten tonen aan dat de publieke en 
private sector verschillen in organisatiecontext en op individueel niveau (Rainey, 2003; Rainey 
and Bozeman, 2000; Antonsen & Jorgensen, 1997). Publieke en private organisaties hebben
verschillende waarden en streven over het algemeen verschillende doelen na. Waar private
organisaties zich richten op winstgevendheid en continu.teit, streven publieke organisaties
collectieve en maatschappelijke doelstellingen na (Rainey, 2009).
 Op het niveau van de individuele medewerker zijn eveneens verschillen geobserveerd 
tussen de publieke en de private sector. Vergeleken met medewerkers uit de publieke sector 
maken medewerkers uit de private sector, een andere prioritering van waarden die centraal 
moeten staan binnen hun werkzaamheden (Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuijzen, 2008). 
Daarnaast is bekend van medewerkers uit de publieke sector dat zij bijzonder gemotiveerd zijn 
om werkzaamheden uit te voeren die een bijdrage leveren aan het maatschappelijk belang 
(Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry, 2000). Een set van motivaties die bekend staat als Public Service 
Motivation (PSM). Deze motivatie leidt tot verschillend gedrag in situaties die verder gelijk zijn. 
Alhoewel onderhandelingen in de publieke sector dus veelvuldig voorkomen, en tot allerlei 
bindende beslissingen leiden, zorgen de eerdergenoemde inzichten dat de bestaande kennis 
over onderhandelingen niet goed toepasbaar is op de publieke sector.
 In de publieke sector onderhandelen EU-lidstaten om tot overeenkomsten te komen bij 
Europese integratie. Daarnaast onderhandelen bijvoorbeeld ministeries en agentschappen 
met universiteiten en de nationale spoorbedrijven om afspraken te maken over budgetten 
en prestaties. Als gevolg van ontwikkelingen in de publieke sector die beter bekend staan als 
New Public Management, zijn er steeds meer onderhandelingen tussen organisaties die gaan 
over bijvoorbeeld contracten en prestaties (Hood, 1991). Omdat deze onderhandelingen 
veelal publieke middelen betreffen, kan ook gesteld worden dat deze onderhandelingen in 
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toenemende mate belangrijk zijn, temeer omdat de uitkomsten van deze onderhandelingen 
vaak tastbaar zijn voor burgers. Vertrekkend vanuit de gedachte dat onderhandelingen 
van toenemend belang zijn binnen de private en publieke sector, en vanuit het idee dat er 
belangrijke verschillen zijn tussen de publieke en private sector als gekeken wordt naar de 
context en het individu, verwacht ik dat er verschillen zijn tussen onderhandelingen die in de 
publieke – en onderhandelingen die in de private sector worden uitgevoerd. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 toetst of en de mate waarin individuen met veel PSM zich coöperatiever 
gedragen in onderhandelingen. PSM meet de set van waarden en attitudes die voorbij het 
individuele en organisatorische belang gaan, maar die juist gaan over het bijdragen aan 
maatschappelijke doelen (Vandenabeele, 2008; Perry, 2000; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008). 
Onderzoek heeft bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat individuen met veel PSM eerder geneigd zijn 
om te klokkenluiden in het geval van misstanden (Brewer & Selden, 1998). Klokkenluiden kan 
gezien worden als positief op maatschappelijk niveau, maar heeft vaak sterke nadelige gevolgen 
voor de klokkenluider zelf. Individuen met veel (hoog) PSM worden veelal aangetroffen bij 
publieke organisaties terwijl individuen met een relatief later PSM vaker in de private sector 
werkzaam zijn (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010). Gegeven de hogere PSM van individuen die werkzaam 
zijn in de publieke sector, verwachten we ook dat zij zich coöperatiever opstellen in herhaalde 
onderhandelingen. We verwachten eveneens dat zij dit onvoorwaardelijk doen, waarbij dus 
niet het PSM van de tegenstander dan wel de winsten en verliezen van de onderhandeling 
een rol zullen spelen. Om de verwachtingen te toetsen is aan de deelnemers gevraagd 
om tegen elkaar te onderhandelen. Deze herhaalde onderhandeling vond plaats in een 
computerlaboratorium waarbij de deelnemers elkaar niet konden zien en een zogenaamd 
public goods game speelden. De bevindingen laten zien dat individuen met een hoger PSM 
zich inderdaad coöperatiever opstellen door hogere bijdragen te doen aan een gezamenlijk 
project. Een tweede bevinding is dat de mate waarin de onderhandelaars coöperatief 
handelden niet afhankelijk was van het PSM van hun tegenstander in ons experiment. 
Met andere woorden, de mate van coöperatie is niet conditioneel. De bevindingen in dit 
hoofdstuk laten zien dat individuen met meer PSM, zoals medewerkers uit de publieke sector 
zich coöperatievere gedragen dan individuen met minder PSM. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 toetsen we of de onderhandelruimte (de hoeveelheid discretie) van invloed 
is op de onderhandeluitkomsten. Daarnaast toetsen we of de veronderstelde relatie tussen 
onderhandelruimte en onderhandeluitkomsten verschillend is voor individuen met hoog en 
individuen met laag PSM. Dit is gebaseerd op twee verschillende theoretische perspectieven. 
Het eerste perspectief is gebaseerd op speltheorie. De verwachting is dat een verandering 
van (discretie) de onderhandeluitkomst niet zal beïnvloeden omdat meer onderhandelruimte 
slechts meer irrelevante alternatieven toevoegt voor de onderhandelaars (Nash 1950; Kalai 
& Smorodinsky, 1975). Het tweede perspectief is gebaseerd op managementliteratuur. Hier 
leidt het geven van meer discretie aan medewerkers tot betere prestaties, meer tevredenheid 
met hun werk en tot een verhoogde werkmotivatie (Gellatly & Irving, 2001; Shin & Konrad, 
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2014). Daar komt bij dat in de publieke sector, het idee van discretie verbonden wordt met de 
effectiviteit van beleid, zoals dat uitgevoerd wordt door zogenaamde street-level professionals 
zoals leerkrachten en politieagenten (Lipsky, 1980). Het idee is dat deze professionals 
hun discretie gebruiken om beleid uit te voeren naar eigen inzicht, en toegespitst op 
specifieke situaties (Tummers and Bekkers 2014; Tummers, Steijn & Bekkers 2012). Op basis 
hiervan is het mogelijk dat discretie een andere rol heeft voor diegenen werkzaam in de 
publieke sector (Van Wart, 2003). In onderhandelingen is bekend dat discretie vooral de 
manier waarop onderhandelaars macht ervaren beïnvloedt (Kim & Fragale, 2005; Babcock, 
Loewenstein, & Wang, 1995). Gezien deze verschillende en ook tegenstrijdige verwachtingen 
is de onderzoekvraag in dit hoofdstuk: Veroorzaken variaties in onderhandelruimte verschillende 
uitkomsten voor medewerkers uit de publieke versus medewerkers uit de private sector? We geven 
antwoord op deze vraag door gebruik te maken van een laboratoriumexperiment, waarin 
onderhandelaars aan drie verschillende niveaus van discretie worden blootgesteld. De 
onderhandelaars moeten met elkaar een overeenkomst bereiken in een variabele som spel 
waarbij ze weinig, middel en veel discretie hebben. De bevindingen laten zien dat discretie 
inderdaad de onderhandeluitkomsten beïnvloedt. Met name de onderhandelaars die weinig 
discretie hadden, maakten steeds een grotere aanspraak op hetgeen waarover onderhandeld 
werd (surplus). Deze bevinding suggereert, in lijn met managementliteratuur, dat discretie 
inderdaad van invloed is bij het bereiken van een onderhandelovereenkomst. In tegenstelling 
tot wat er op de theorie verwacht zou worden, is er geen verschil tussen hoog- en laag PSM-
individuen bij het bereiken van een overeenkomst als de discretie verschilt. 
 In het vierde hoofdstuk ligt de focus op publieke verantwoording, een belangrijk 
democratisch mechanisme in de publieke sector (Bovens 2005, Bovens 2006; Bovens, Goodin 
& Schillemans, 2014). Het doel van deze studie is om te toetsen of het afleggen van publieke 
verantwoording van invloed is op onderhandelprestaties bij het vormen van coalities.
 Publieke verantwoording wordt vaak gezien als hoeksteen van moderne democratieën 
en wordt met name door medewerkers uit de publieke sector als erg belangrijk getypeerd 
(Van der Wal, De Graaf, & Lasthuizen, 2008). Het afleggen van verantwoording zou leiden 
tot betere prestaties, minder corruptie en meer integriteit (Bovens, Schillemans, and ’t Hart 
2008). Uit onderhandel literatuur is echter bekend dat het afleggen van verantwoording door 
onderhandelaars ertoe kan leiden dat zij minder bereid zijn om concessies te doen (Ben-
Yoav and Pruitt 1984). Ook gedragen onderhandelaars in teams zich veel competitiever als 
ze over deze onderhandelingen verantwoording af moeten dragen (O’Connor 1997). Minder 
bekend is hoe het afleggen van verantwoording van invloed is op de vorming van coalities 
door middel van onderhandelingen. De onderzoeksvraag in dit hoofdstuk is: leidt publieke 
verantwoording tot verschillen in soorten gevormede coalities en tot lagere onderhandelprestaties 
in coalitie-onderhandelingen?
 Om deze vraag te beantwoorden maken we gebruik van een face-to-face 
onderhandelingssituatie. Aan de onderhandelaars wordt gevraagd om een coalitie te vormen 
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waarbij er twee experimentele condities zijn. In de experimentele conditie wordt aan de 
onderhandelaars gevraagd om verantwoording af te leggen aan een persoonlijk ‘forum’ over 
hun prestaties. In de controleconditie legden de onderhandelaars geen verantwoording af 
over hun prestaties. De resultaten uit deze studie laten zien dat de onderhandelprestaties 
sterk afnemen als er verantwoording afgelegd moet worden. Daarnaast leidt het afleggen 
van verantwoording ertoe dat er minder medeonderhandelaars geïncludeerd worden in 
de uiteindelijke coalitie en dat de kans dat er een coalitie wordt gevormd afneemt. Deze 
bevindingen zijn interessant omdat het afleggen van verantwoording over het algemeen 
geassocieerd wordt met een toename van prestaties (Bovens, Schillemans, and ’t Hart 2008). In 
de context van coalitieonderhandelingen lijkt dit mechanisme niet op te gaan. De bevinding 
sluit aan bij bestaande kennis over variabele-som-onderhandelingen in teams maar is tot op 
heden nog niet toegepast op onderhandelsituaties met coalities als uitkomst.
 In hoofdstuk 5 wordt getoetst of de bevindingen over het afleggen van verantwoording 
uit hoofdstuk 4 verschillen voor publieke- en private onderhandelaars. Het vormen van 
coalities is een manier om tot gewenste uitkomsten te komen in zowel de publieke en private 
sector, bijvoorbeeld in netwerken en publiek-private-samenwerking (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000). Daarnaast is de roep om het afleggen van verantwoording toegenomen in beide 
sectoren (Power, 1994). Kijkend naar de verschillen tussen medewerkers in de publieke en 
de private sector valt op dat het afleggen van verantwoording belangrijk gevonden wordt 
in beide sectoren, waarbij medewerkers uit de publieke sector meer belang hechten aan 
het principe van verantwoording afleggen (Van der Wal, de Graaf & Lasthuijzen, 2008). Om 
deze reden zou het verband dat we vaststellen in hoofdstuk 4 sterker kunnen zijn voor 
individuen met hoge PSM, zoals medewerkers uit de publieke sector. Om deze reden is de 
hoofdvraag van deze studie: Zijn reacties op het afleggen van verantwoording verschillend voor 
publieke en private onderhandelaars? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden maken we op basis 
van PSM onderscheid tussen onderhandelaars die georiënteerd zijn op de publieke sector en 
onderhandelaars die georiënteerd zijn op de private sector. Op exact dezelfde wijze als in de 
studie in hoofdstuk 4 worden de publiek- en privaat georiënteerde onderhandelaars aselect 
toegewezen aan een van de experimentele groepen. In de experimentele groep werd aan 
de onderhandelaars gevraagd om verantwoording af te leggen aan een persoonlijk forum, 
terwijl in de controlegroep het afleggen van deze verantwoording niet gevraagd werd. De 
onderhandelsituatie was gelijk aan die in hoofdstuk 4, waarbij de onderhandelaars coalities 
vormden tijdens het experiment en elkaar daarbij ook konden zien. 
 De resultaten van deze studie laten opnieuw zien dat het afleggen van verantwoording 
leidt tot verminderde prestaties bij het onderhandelen over coalities. Daarnaast lukte 
het de onderhandelaars die verantwoording af moesten leggen minder vaak om tot een 
overeenkomst te komen en bevatten de coalities ook minder medeonderhandelaars. 
Tegen de verwachtingen in is het effect van het afleggen van verantwoording over de 
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onderhandelingen niet verschillend voor onderhandelaars die georiënteerde zijn op de 
publieke sector en diegenen met een oriëntatie op de private sector. 
 De doelstelling van hoofdstuk 6 is om te toetsen in welke mate de bevindingen uit 
hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gerepliceerd kunnen worden met een steekproef van medewerkers uit 
de publieke en private sector. Op het niveau van de individuele onderhandelaar wordt 
getoetst of onderhandelaars uit de publieke sector zich coöperatiever gedragen vergeleken 
met onderhandelaars uit de private sector. Op het niveau van de context waarin de 
onderhandelingen plaatsvinden, wordt getoetst of de hoeveelheid onderhandelruimte 
(discretie) van invloed is op de onderhandeluitkomsten. Het gebruik van studenten als 
deelnemers in experimenten wordt regelmatig bekritiseerd (Benz & Meier, 2008; Sears, 1986). 
Een van de punten die veelal aangehaald wordt is dat studenten niet representatief zijn 
voor de populatie waarin onderzoekers geïnteresseerd zijn, bijvoorbeeld publieke managers 
(Falk & Heckman, 2009). Als gevolg hiervan is het soms moeilijk om de resultaten op basis 
van experimenten met studenten als deelnemers te generaliseren naar de doelgroep van 
interesse. Om te toetsen of de bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gerepliceerd kunnen worden 
met medewerkers uit de publieke sector en medewerkers uit de private sector, herhalen we 
de experimenten uit hoofdstuk 2 en 3 met een mobiel laboratorium. 
 De bevindingen van deze replicatie laten zien dat individuen die veel PSM hebben 
zich ook coöperatief gedragen door hogere bijdragen te doen tijdens een herhaalde 
onderhandelingssituatie. Dit houdt in dat diegenen met gemiddeld veel PSM, zoals 
ambtenaren ook meer coöperatie laten zien in onderhandelingen.  Deze bevinding is gelijk aan 
die in hoofdstuk 2, waarin studenten als deelnemers zijn gebruikt. Net als in hoofdstuk 3, laten 
de bevindingen van deze replicatie zien dat onderhandelruimte een sterke invloed heeft op 
de onderhandelresultaten, in het bijzonder als onderhandelaars weinig onderhandelruimte 
hebben. In deze replicatie gedragen publieke en private medewerkers zich op gelijke wijze 
als het gaat om de mate waarin onderhandelruimte de resultaten beïnvloedt. Naast de 
inhoudelijke bevindingen over onderhandelingen, laat deze replicatie zien dat er weinig 
verschil zit in de manier waarop studenten en medewerkers uit de praktijk zich gedragen 
in onderhandelingssituaties. Dit suggereert dat studenten wel degelijk een goed startpunt 
kunnen zijn voor het onderzoeken van onderhandelgedrag van medewerkers. 
Conclusies
De centrale onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift is: Wat zijn de verschillen tussen 
onderhandelingen in de publieke- en in de private sector als gekeken wordt naar sectorale context, 
onderhandelgedrag en onderhandeluitkomsten? Er zijn drie antwoorden te geven op deze 
vraag.
 Ten eerste zijn er individuele verschillen tussen individuen die georiënteerd zijn op de 
publieke sector en individuen die georiënteerd zijn op de private sector, zoals bijvoorbeeld 
PSM, die een variatie veroorzaken in onderhandel processen en onderhandeluitkomsten. 
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Individuen met een oriëntatie op de publieke sector gedragen zich coöperatiever in 
onderhandelingen. 
 Ten tweede veroorzaken verschillen in de context van de publieke en private sector, zoals 
de noodzaak tot het afleggen van verantwoording en de hoeveelheid onderhandelruimte of 
discretie eveneens variaties in onderhandelgedrag en onderhandeluitkomsten. 
 Ten derde worden de individuele verschillen tussen de publieke en private sector 
gedempt als de situationele en contextuele invloed groot is. Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval als 
onderhandelaars verantwoording af moeten leggen over hun onderhandelresultaat of als ze 
weinig onderhandelruimte hebben.
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